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The Indian Residential School system was one of the most visible instances of a broader 
colonial project that sought to destroy Aboriginal difference in Canada and overthrow a 
relationship based on treaties and mutual respect. As part of an out-of-court settlement of 
several class action law suits by school survivors against the federal government and 
churches, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada was tasked with setting a 
historic record of the effects of the residential schools and fostering reconciliation 
between the parties to the settlement (including Aboriginal plaintiffs, the Government of 
Canada, the Roman Catholic Church, Anglican Church, United Church, and Presbyterian 
Church). This research argues that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 
represents a transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations that has the 
potential to initiate a  decolonial and collaborative framework where Crown and 
Aboriginal governments will interact as equals. This conclusion is supported by 
interviews with influential individuals involved in the establishment of the commission 
from the Assembly of First Nations, former government ministers, bureaucrats, and 
church leaders. Far from prescribing an outcome of reconciliation this study argues the 
Crown needs to follow a political ethic that makes room for Aboriginal agency in 
negotiating the continuing relationship between the Crown and various Aboriginal 
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The Indian Residential School (IRS) system in Canada was only one aspect of a broader 
colonial project that sought to rid Canada of Aboriginal peoples.1 It sought to destroy 
important aspects of Aboriginal identity such as language, custom, and religion, to be 
replaced by the settler society’s version of these. It sought to make Aboriginal children 
less Aboriginal by teaching them English and French, Western habits, and the Christian 
religion. To accomplish its assimilationist goals the IRS system required the removal of 
children from their home, and their community, degrading familial and community 
bonds. In short, this system sought to “kill the Indian in the child.” 2 
 While the last Indian Residential School closed in 1996, the architecture of the 
colonial project remains largely in place, with Aboriginal peoples systematically 
marginalized from centres of political, social, and economic power. Underfunding by 
governments for Aboriginal services, indifference from the general public, and the Indian 
Act that regulates and relegates “Indians” to the social, economic, and political margins, 
all combine to support a colonial juridical and social system that tells the lie of 
Aboriginal inferiority and enforces it.  While there are paths out of this colonial system, 
the Government of Canada has significantly failed to act. Take for example the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) which was a wide-reaching critical 
assessment of the state of Aboriginal peoples in Canada that has been little noticed 
amongst the majority of Canadians and virtually ignored by the Canadian governments in 
the nearly two decades since it was published.  
 It is against this backdrop that we once again see the Government of Canada’s 
willingness to stand on the sidelines while an opportunity to address colonialism in 
Canada, in the wake of the TRC, flounders for lack of interest and participation from 
those outside Aboriginal communities. After interviews with elites from the government 
                                                          
1 While I recognize the preferred term for the first inhabitants of North America is Indigenous (See Taiaike 
Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, “Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism,” 
Government and Opposition vol.40, issue 5, 599), I mean to highlight the constitutional relationship 
between the Crown and Indigenous people by using the term Aboriginal peoples. In some very narrow 
cases I use the term “Indian” to refer to a person so defined by the Indian Act. 
2 John S. Milloy, A National Crime: the Canadian government and the residential school system, 1879-
1986, (Winnipeg: University of Winnipeg Press, 1999), xiii 
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and the bureaucracy, churches, and Aboriginal communities, it is clear to me that the 
TRC is in serious danger of going the way of RCAP.  That is to say, it is in danger of 
going unnoticed in the government’s policy and approach to Crown-Aboriginal relations, 
and by the wider Canadian society. A 2015 change in federal government occurred after I 
conducted the interviews herein. This election brought a Liberal government under Justin 
Trudeau to power and with it a seemingly new approach to reconciliation. While the 
rhetoric of this new government is more amenable to reconciliation than the 
Conservatives’, it remains to be seen if words will be followed by action. If it is the case 
that the cost of action is too high, either fiscally or politically or both, as it was with 
RCAP, this will be a significant missed opportunity to create a truly just and 
decolonialised Canada. 
 
Context and History of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 
Many of the recommendations of RCAP went unimplemented, but the commission’s 
identification of the Indian Residential Schools system as a place where “neglect, abuse 
and death of an incalculable number of children… [caused]  immeasurable damage to 
Aboriginal communities” stirred the government of the day to some action.3 In 1998 
then-minister of Indian Affairs Jane Stewart issued the Statement of Reconciliation, 
which expressed regret for the Indian Residential School system’s treatment of students 
and acknowledged the federal government’s role in creating and maintaining that 
system.4 This acknowledgement, while short of an apology, was accompanied by a 
commitment of $350 million for community-based healing, which the Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation was created to manage, and implementation of an alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanism to provide compensation for school survivors.5 The ADR 
process was well-intentioned. As Paulette Regan points out the “impetus for using ADR 
to address residential school claims was threefold: it would move claims out of the 
adversarial litigation process; it would be more timely and cost-effective; and it would 
                                                          
3 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Volume 1: Looking Forward, Looking Back 
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Service Canada, 1996), 353. 
4 Courtney Jung, “Canada and the Legacy of the Indian Residential Schools: Transitional Justice for 
Indigenous Peoples in a Nonstransitional Society,” in Identities in Transition: Challenges for Transitional 
Justice in Divided Societies, Paige Arthur ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 224.  
5 Ibid., 225. 
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better support healing and reconciliation.”6 To be sure, these are laudable goals, but while 
better than an expensive court-driven process for both appellant and defendant, it fell well 
short of meeting the needs of survivors, becoming re-inscribed with colonial attitudes and 
approaches.7  
 By 2002 the failure of the ADR approach was clear as more than 11,000 legal cases 
had been filed against both the federal government and churches responsible for 
operating the schools.8  In 2004, following a conference at the University of Calgary, the 
Assembly of First Nations (AFN) issued a report on the ADR process stating that “there 
[was] a real fear that the present system of compensation is causing additional harms to 
the survivors” and that “reconciliation [was] impossible under the model as it stands.”9 
Testifying before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, 
Chief Robert Joseph put it this way: “By neglecting to address residential school 
survivors and forcing them through an onerous process like ADR, Canada accepts the 
risk of being accused of institutionalized racism yet again.”10 Recognizing the weakness 
in the ADR, the federal government undertook a political agreement with the Assembly 
of First Nations in May of 2005, committing to a negotiation that would resolve the 
issues highlighted by the AFN and others.  
 Feeling the federal government needed a further incentive and to ensure as many as 
possible who were affected by the IRS system were included in the settlement, the AFN 
launched a class action lawsuit against the government, claiming $12 billion in general 
damages, $12 billion in special damages for negligence and breach of duty, and $12 
billion in punitive damages.11 The negotiation process agreed to by the government and 
the AFN, and supervised by the court, concluded with the Indian Residential Schools 
                                                          
6 Paulette Regan, Unsettling the Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and 
Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 111. I will only briefly treat the ADR here, 
however Regan devotes a chapter to it locating its philosophical roots within a colonial mentality. See 
Chapter 4 especially.  
7 Ibid., 112.  
8 Ronald Niezen, Truth and Indignation: Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian 
Residential Schools (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 42. 
9 Assembly of First Nations, Report on Canada’s Dispute Resolution Plan to Compensate for Abuses in 
Indian Residential Schools (Ottawa: Assembly of First Nations), 40. Available at http://epub.sub.uni-
hamburg.de/epub/volltexte/2009/2889/pdf/Indian_Residential_Schools_Report.pdf .  
10 Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder, “Who’s Sorry Now? Government Apologies, Truth Commissions, and 
Indigenous Self-Determination in Australia, Canada, Guatemala, and Peru,” Human Rights Review vol.9 
iss. 4 (2008), 474. 
11 Jung, “Canada and the Legacy of Indian Residential Schools,” 225. 
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Settlement Agreement in May of 2006. The Agreement was endorsed by Parliament on 
May 10th 2006 and the court late that year.12 Throughout the negotiation process the old 
ADR system continued to operate, having received 14,903 claims by the time of the 
Settlement Agreement, but only having resolved 2,805 of those claims, indicating the 
need for another process.13 The Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement 
(IRSSA) set aside $1.9 billion to compensate survivors and additional funds for claims of 
sexual and physical abuse, but required claimants to pursue no further legal action against 
the federal government and churches, except in cases of sexual and serious physical 
abuse. In addition there was a further five years of funding for the Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation totaling $125 million.14  
 The compensation under the terms of the IRSSA was delivered in two ways: the 
Common Experience Payment and the Independent Assessment Process. The Common 
Experience Payment consisted of $10,000 for the first year a student attended an IRS and 
$3,000 for each additional year.15 By September 2012 there were over 100,000 
applications for compensation with the average successful claimant receiving $28,000, 
resulting in $1.6 billion in compensation from the federal government.16 The Independent 
Assessment Process was established to provide compensation for specific abuses 
(physical and sexual) suffered by survivors. The Indian Residential Schools Adjudication 
Secretariat was created to administer the Independent Assessment Process and adjudicate 
claims of abuse. As of December 31st 2015 the secretariat had processed 89% of the 
37,998 applications received.17 This has resulted in $2.95 billion in compensation, a 
simple average of $86,995 per successful applicant.18 Together the Common Experience 
Payment and Independent Assessment Process represent $4.55 billion in compensation to 
individual survivors. For many survivors, however, it was not “about the money” but 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 226. 
13 Kim Stanton, “Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Settling the Past?” The International 
Indigenous Policy Journal vol.2 iss.3 (2001), 3. 
14 Corntassel and Holder, “Who’s Sorry Now?” 474. 
15 Niezen, Truth and Indignation, 44. 
16 Ibid. 
17  Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat Annual Report 2015. Available at: http://www.iap-
pei.ca/information/pub-eng.php?act=ar-2015-eng.php#sec-1.  
18 Ibid. I calculated the mean based on data available in this report. 
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represented a kind of “recognition value” that set the stage for a more reconciliatory 
process.19 
 Importantly for the purpose of this project, the IRSSA also mandated the creation 
of a truth and reconciliation commission. Established with a $60 million budget to 
operate for five years, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada began its 
work in 2009, after an initial start-up in 2008 under a set of commissioners who declared 
they were unable to find a common path forward and resigned. The June 2009 
appointments of Justice Murray Sinclair, Marie Wilson, and Chief Wilton Littlechild as 
commissioners allowed the work of the TRC to get underway to create a historic record 
through survivor testimony, to acknowledge the impact of the Indian Residential Schools 
system, and ultimately to issue a report to the parties to the IRSSA.20 In its five years of 
operation the TRC took 6,750 recorded statements from survivors in both public and 
private settings, hosted national events, and created a historic record and report which it 
issued in 2015.21 It is important to note these events that led to the creation of the TRC 
and compensation payments. The legal maneuvering and negotiations with the backdrop 
of the largest class action lawsuit in Canadian history should cue us to be critical of the 
institution of the TRC and the project of reconciliation itself.22 That is to say, the TRC 
was created against a backdrop of obfuscation, where the government sought to minimise 
responsibility and liability.  
 
Purpose, Themes, and Structure 
This study seeks to understand the significance of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada (TRC) for Crown-Aboriginal relations. It is particularly interested 
in the prospect for the TRC to contribute to a reconciled relationship between the Crown 
and Aboriginal peoples. The study seeks to explain the Indian Residential Schools (IRS) 
system in its historic context. Establishing its connection to a system of colonisation in 
Canada helps to give dimension to the harm that the TRC sought to address, while a 
comparative perspective with other TRCs will help to highlight the obstacles that the 
                                                          
19 Niezen, Truth and Indignation, 44. 
20 Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement Schedule N. 
21 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Survivors Speak (Winnipeg: Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, 2015), 1. 
22 See Appendix I for a condensed timeline of significant events leading up to the TRC.  
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Canadian TRC faced. This is explored in order to qualify the type of relationship between 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples that the TRC might help to create. This study, 
significantly, points out potential problems with the TRC’s project of reconciliation. This 
critical perspective has been informed by the opinions of elite interviewees closely 
involved with the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, as well as in the 
formation and creation of the TRC.  
 The research has been organized around two central questions: Is the TRC a 
transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations? And if so, towards what might 
this be a transformation? By a “transformative opportunity” I mean something quite 
specific. I discuss this concept in some detail in Chapter Seven. In that chapter, I am 
interested in the special qualities that accompany the specific time and place of an event 
like the one the TRC occupies, something that I have called a “transformative 
opportunity.” Following Andrew Schaap and Eric Doxtader in their understanding of the 
time of reconciliation, of a special time outside time in which there is little time, I apply 
this concept to further develop this idea of a transformative opportunity.23 The 
transformative opportunity is a special time in which balances can be tipped, but there is 
not much time in which to do so. 
 Following from this, I ask whether the Canadian TRC represents such a 
transformative opportunity. Concluding that it does, I argue that it follows that there is 
the potential for a transformation away from the status quo toward something else. This is 
where my corollary research question comes to the fore, because it is subsequently 
critical to ask: Towards what might this be a transformation? It is by no means necessary 
for the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples to improve as a result of a 
transformative opportunity. For example, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
established by the Government of Canada in 1991 and whose seminal report was issued 
in 1996, itself represented a transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations. 
But, even years after the report was issued there is little evidence to indicate that RCAP 
has meaningfully improved Crown-Aboriginal relations. Thus, if it were representative of 
a transformative opportunity, it certainly failed in its promise of changing Crown-
                                                          
23 See Andrew Schaap, “Reconciliation as Ideology and Politics,” Constellations vol. 15, no.2 (2008); 
Andrew Schaap Reconciliation and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2005); and Eric Doxtader, 
“Reconciliation a Rhetorical Concept/ion,” Quarterly Journal of Speech vol. 85, no. 4 (2003). 
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Aboriginal relations.24 If the TRC is a transformative opportunity, then assessing how 
Crown-Aboriginal relations may change is an important aspect of this project. 
  The chapters set the stage for the evaluation of the TRC and the project of 
reconciliation, and it is against this set that the main findings based on elite interviews 
play out.  The conceptual groundwork laid out in Chapter Three, builds a link between 
colonisation, decolonisation, and reconciliation, the three concepts most important to this 
project. In a sense the link is sequential: colonisation necessarily comes before 
decolonisation and moreover, a thorough understanding of colonisation is required to 
grasp what is at stake in decolonisation. Conceptually decolonisation must be understood 
before reconciliation, because reconciliation in Canada involves decolonisation, or put 
differently reconciliation is decolonial. Setting out this line of thought that runs from 
colonisation through to reconciliation (reconciliation contains the specter of colonisation 
because reconciliation is decolonial) is necessary to understand the historical processes 
that are detailed in Chapters Four and Five. Having a solid historical understanding, not 
only of the IRS system, but also of colonialism is important as a backdrop for the whole 
study, and indispensable to understanding approaches to decolonisation.  
 Chapter Four deals with colonisation starting with European-Aboriginal contact in 
the 15th century. The detailed account that I offer is important to include in order to set 
the overall backdrop for understanding the TRC. In this chapter it is important to note the 
changing character of the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples. What 
started off as a symbiotic relationship in 16th century by the 19th century ended up 
becoming one where the British Crown dominated and subjugated Aboriginal peoples. 
This complete change in the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples, led to 
decisions taken by the Crown for the welfare of its “Indian wards” that have resulted in 
disastrous outcomes for Aboriginal communities and which, fundamentally, call into 
question the honour of the Crown. The Indian Residential School system, as one of these 
attempts to improve the welfare of Aboriginal peoples, can be seen in its most charitable 
light as a good intention that paved the way to a personal Hell for so many. Seen in a less 
                                                          
24 Idle No More’s 2012 protests against the Conservative government’s budget bill that undercut Aboriginal 
and treaty rights is but one recent example of the continued strained relationship between Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples.  (Gloria Galloway, “Winter Fails to Slow Idle No More’s Momentum,” The Globe and 
Mail 23 Dec. 2012: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/winter-fails-to-slow-idle-no-mores-
momentum/article6699001/ (accessed 15 Jan. 2013).  
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charitable light, the IRS system was something far more sinister, a deliberate attempt to 
destroy family bonds and Aboriginal culture itself.  Here the good intentions prove to be 
far outweighed by the results of privation and abuse that were endemic to the IRS system. 
It is also important to understand the IRS system against the backdrop of the colonisation 
of Canada and the paramount nature of land for colonial settlement. That is to say, the 
IRS system cannot simply be understood as “education policy gone wrong,” but must be 
seen as part of a concerted effort to remove alterity and radical difference from a newly 
formed Canada in order to reproduce the idealized form of European “civilization” out of 
the savagery of the wilderness of North America.25 
 The drive to destroy Aboriginal difference was multifaceted, but involved the 
juridical apparatus of the state. How Aboriginal peoples have been included and excluded 
in Canada is key for understanding how pervasive colonialism was and still is in Canada. 
Understanding Chapter Four in terms of “exception”, outlined Chapter Three, allows 
colonialism to become more visible in contemporary Canada and helps sketch the 
contours of it, ultimately allowing for a meaningful decolonial response. Thus, Chapter 
Five discusses the attempts and approaches to dealing with the legacy of colonialism in 
Canada. In the approaches to decolonisation discussed below, it can be seen again that 
intentions need not accord to results. Well-intentioned liberal reformers who sought to 
give Aboriginal peoples the benefit of European philosophy, religion, and industry were 
among the most supportive of the IRS system. In Chapter Five, I argue, well-intentioned 
liberals wishing to give Aboriginal peoples the benefit of democracy, individual liberty, 
and market economy today are in serious danger of the same sort of colonialism, 
conscious or unconscious, as their reforming forbearers. With colonialism as the 
backdrop, approaches to decolonisation can be seen as set-piece obstacles around which 
the TRC and, more importantly, reconciliation, must manoeuvre.    
 Chapter Six fleshes out truth and reconciliation commissions as a mechanism that 
can promote reconciliation. To give perspective to the form of the Canadian TRC I have 
undertaken a comparative study of South Africa and Australia, because of their direct 
                                                          
25 The suggestion of “education policy gone wrong” was made by then  Minister of Aboriginal Affairs John 
Duncan. See Taryn Della, “Residential School Survivors Outraged Over Duncan’s Residential School 
Statement,” APTN National News, http://aptn.ca/pages/news/2011/10/28/residential-school-survivors-
outraged-over-duncans-statement/ (accessed 25 Oct. 2012). 
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connection to British colonialism. These cases also prove useful in a discussion of the 
differing stages of decolonisation. This chapter not only lays out the mechanism of the 
TRC, but through the comparison with South Africa and Australia, it draws attention to 
the problems faced by the Canadian TRC, which operated in a colonial context. It is 
important to understand the general backdrop of colonisation here as well as the various 
approaches to decolonisation in Canada that have failed to fundamentally overturn the 
colonial order, to understand the specific challenges faced by the Canadian TRC. Without 
the chapters that lay out the context within which the TRC was put into place, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to adequately understand what is at stake in the Canadian 
TRC. 
 Likewise, discussions of reconciliation are unintelligible without the context set out 
in Chapters Four and Five. Reconciliation as a political concept, discussed in Chapter 
Three, is brought back to the specific case of Canada in Chapter Six, where my 
contention is that reconciliation is decolonial and must be understood alongside the 
discussion of decolonisation. I take reconciliation’s decolonial aspect to require 
autonomy rather than representation, eschewing the assimilationist tendency of the latter. 
It is with the history of colonisation and decolonisation as a backdrop that approaches to 
reconciliation in Canada can be understood more clearly. The aim here is to avoid a well-
intentioned, but ultimately colonial approach whereby the settler society seeks to “fix” 
the “Indian problem,” as was the case in the Indian Residential School system. 
 Overall then, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present a rich context that is necessary to 
understand and address the main research questions of this project. The discussion, in 
Chapters Four and Five especially, highlights the unthinking colonialism that can result 
with an insufficient appreciation for history and context, especially combined with the 
theoretical framework of Chapter 3. And Chapter Six shows the obstacles to resolving 
these issues in the context of truth and reconciliation. Thus, it is of vital importance to 
this project to set out a context in which to situate the Canadian TRC and the questions of 
transformation in Crown-Aboriginal relations, as without an understanding of colonialism 
it is far too easy to reproduce colonialism. 
 More specifically, this context allows the reader to gain an understanding of what is 
at stake in this transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations. The findings of 
10 
 
my fieldwork must be taken within this context if they are to be intelligible in any way. 
Chapter Seven, concerning transformative opportunities, not only details the special 
aspects of transformative opportunities, it also examines the opinions of elites from 
government, church, and Aboriginal communities about the possibility of the Canadian 
TRC contributing to change in Crown-Aboriginal relations. In order to avoid an 
unthinking colonialism that continues to treat Aboriginal peoples as objects, lacking 
agency and full humanity, exploring the background of not only colonialism, but also 
decolonisation proves necessary. The context of the first three chapters helps to make this 
danger more apparent and the trepidation of some observers more understandable. 
 The history and comparison of colonisation and decolonisation that run throughout 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five are also necessary to understand Chapter Eight, which 
deals with the possible relationship that may result from this transformative opportunity. 
The Canadian TRC could have no impact; or, worse, it could be used as a screen to 
continue a neo-assimilationist policy, whether it is a conscious policy or not. The 
government of Stephen Harper took important decisions that affected Aboriginal peoples 
with little or no consultation with Aboriginal peoples. The frustration on the part of 
Aboriginal peoples was evident in the brief and sensational protests in late 2012 and early 
2013, including the “Idle No More” movement and the hunger strike of Chief Theresa 
Spence. While there is at time of writing a Liberal government, it is new and its resolve 
has yet to be tested on Aboriginal issues. 
 Ultimately, I conclude that the TRC does represent a transformative opportunity for 
Crown-Aboriginal relations, where a certain political ethic of reconciliation will be able 
to play out. Yet, while there is hope that the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples will be decolonised as a result of the transformative opportunity offered by the 
TRC, there were signs from Stephen Harper’s Conservative government that indicate that 
the re-inscription of the same colonial dynamics will be present in the relationship in 
future. This is mainly due to the disjuncture in the understanding of the depth and breadth 
of reconciliation, between, on the one side, those who did not hold formal power in 
Ottawa at the time of the interviews (Liberals, Indigenous, and church leaders) and on the 
other side, the federal government. With a new Liberal government elected in October 
2015 there has been a rhetorical shift in the government’s approach to reconciliation, but 
11 
 
it remains to be seen how actions will match with words. Those in power at the time of 
my interviews took the view that the role of reconciliation is a more limited one, and only 
the specific harms of the Indian Residential School system need to be addressed in this 
reconciliatory process. Moreover, the lack of public engagement with the Canadian TRC 
is a significant hurdle to reconciliation, as drawing Canadians into this process is the key 
to the political action that reconciliation so desperately needs. 
 More than just the analysis of the Canadian TRC within its context, the chapters as 
laid out are meant to convey a central contention of the TRC itself. That is, far from being 
relegated to the annals of history, colonialism is very much present in the lives of 
Aboriginal peoples, and, moreover, that these colonial attitudes are embedded 
institutionally. It is far too easy to dismiss past and ancient wrong. But, the IRS system is 
not ancient; the last school closed in 1996.26 Further, the effects of the IRS system are all 
too present in many Aboriginal communities. It is the very presence of the colonialism 
that makes Harper’s contention so right, that Canada has “no history of colonialism,”27 
for it is present, alive and well. The presence of colonialism is key to understanding the 
TRC and the possibility of reconciliation here. 
 Living up to the words of Prime Minister Harper’s apology in 2008 requires 
reconciliation. To do this the TRC’s impact must be felt by both the Canadian people and 
their government. If the Government of Canada cannot be moved by its citizens or by the 
TRC to deal honourably with Aboriginal peoples, then the TRC will serve as little more 
than a cover for a renewed effort at assimilation. If Canadians are concerned about living 
in a just society, then these impediments need to be overcome to create a pathway to 
reconciliation. The real value of this study is in pointing to these potential problems faced 
by the TRC and the reconciliation process in the context of the opinions of those elites 
who were intricately involved in the Settlement Agreement and in the creation of the 
TRC. 
                                                          
26 The last school in operation was St. Michael’s Indian Residential School, originally the Duck Lake Indian 
Residential School, in Duck Lake, SK. 
27 David Ljunggren, “Every G20 nation wants to be Canada, insists PM,” Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/09/26/columns-us-g20-canada-advantages-idUSTRE58P05Z20090926 








Before moving on to the discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of colonisation, 
decolonisation, and reconciliation, some discussion of the structure of the project and its 
methodological approach will be helpful, especially the methodology used for the 
interviews. This project is organized around two related research questions: First, is the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada a transformative opportunity in Crown-
Aboriginal relations in Canada? Second, toward what might this be a transformation?  
While there are valuable questions about healing, and community/family relations to be 
asked about the Indian Residential School system, I am interested, primarily, in the 
relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. To help address these two 
research questions I have carried out elite interviews, with what Lewis Dexter terms 
“elite personnel.”1 For Dexter, these elite personnel are “people in important or exposed 
positions.”2 These interviews, in conjunction with analysis from the literature, form the 
basis for assessing where the TRC has come from, what was initially expected of it, and 
how far it went towards those expectations. Below, I discuss each aspect of the research 
design and method I have used in conducting the interviews. 
 
The Sample 
In order to establish who might be helpful to interview for this project, I started by 
identifying individuals who held public and influential positions during and after the 
Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement process. It seemed that talking to 
members of government at the time of negotiations would be helpful in understanding the 
Agreement and the genesis of the TRC. Similarly, talking to those in leadership roles 
within the churches that had been involved in the running of the IRS system and, 
especially, the leaders of the Assembly of First Nations, would round out a view of not 
only the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, but also the TRC, and Crown-
                                                          
1 Lewis Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 
2 Ibid., 5. 
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Aboriginal relations more broadly. As the interviews began, I employed a response 
directed method of selecting further potential interviewees. This non-probabilistic 
method, often referred to as “snowball sampling,” allowed me to get at the “hard to reach 
populations” of government, church, and Aboriginal communities.3 While I asked each 
interviewee for suggestions of others who were important to the Agreement and TRC, 
this method ultimately produced very few people whom I had not initially identified.4   
 There are, in essence, three main communities that are party to the Indian 
Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, the document that led to the creation of the 
TRC. These three broad groups are: the Government of Canada; Aboriginal peoples; and 
the churches that operated the Indian Residential Schools. Thus, I sought to interview 
representatives from each of these communities. 
 I conducted interviews with sixteen people from these three main groups. Eight 
were related to the Government of Canada. Four of these were former Liberal privy 
councillors: Irwin Cotler, who served as Minister of Justice from 2003-2006; Paul 
Martin, who served as Prime Minister of Canada from 2003-2006; Anne McLellan, who 
served as Deputy Prime Minister from 2003-2006; and Andy Scott who served as 
Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development from 2004-2006. Two were high 
level bureaucrats: Mario Dion who served as Executive Director and Deputy Head of the 
Office of Indian Residential Schools Resolution of Canada from 2003-2006 and then 
Public Sector Integrity Commissioner; and Michael Wernick, who at the time of 
interview was Deputy Minister Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada 
(appointed 2006) and later Clerk of the Privy Council (appointed 2016). Both of these 
civil servants worked on the Aboriginal Affairs portfolio at the time of the Agreement’s 
negotiation and at least part of its implementation. One, Ian Brodie, was a former Chief 
of Staff to Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper (2006-2008). And one, former 
                                                          
3 Mark Handcock and Krista Gile, “Comment: On the Concept of Snowball Sampling,” Sociological 
Methodology vol. 41 no. 1 (2011), 369. Discusses the use of snowball sampling in such hard to reach 
populations. 
4 The interview with Andy Scott (telephone interview with author, 25 Oct. 2011) produced information 
related to cabinet leadership on the negotiation process. I had assumed that Scott, as Minister of Indian 
Affairs, would have taken the lead, but, rather, it was the Deputy Prime Minister. This instance was not as 
much an example of snowball sampling as adjusting my interviewee list based on emergent information. 
The other referral which identified an interviewee not initially identified was the suggestion by Michael 
Wernick (telephone interview with author, 1 Nov. 2011.) to speak with his former colleague at Indian 
Affairs, Mario Dion. 
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Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iaccobucci (1991-2004), was a former 
government negotiator/representative in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement process.  
 From within the Aboriginal community, the four people whom I interviewed were 
leaders and former leaders of the Assembly of First Nations and the Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation: Mike DeGagné who served as Executive Director, Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation from 1998-2012 and President of Nipissing University at the time of 
interview; Phil Fontaine who served as National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations 
from1997-2000, and 2003-2009; Ghislain Picard who served as Regional Chief of 
Québec and Labrador, Assembly of First Nations from 1992; and Bob Watts who served 
as Interim Executive Director of the TRC from 2007-2008 and former Chief Executive 
Officer and Chief of Staff, Assembly of First Nations from 2003-2007. The fifth elite 
interviewee who falls into this division, but who, herself, is not an Aboriginal person, is 
Kathleen Mahoney. Professor Mahoney serves as legal counsel to the Assembly of First 
Nations (AFN) and worked closely with the National Chief, Phil Fontaine, at the time of 
the negotiations. She also helped to represent the AFN at the negotiations. 
 From within the church community, I interviewed David McDonald, Special 
Advisor on Residential Schools of the United Church of Canada (appointed 1998), and 
Gerry Kelly, former director of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops’ secretariat 
on Aboriginal affairs and current advisor to Roman Catholic entities regarding the Indian 
Residential Schools legacy. 
 I also interviewed Jane Morley, a former Commissioner of the TRC, who was 
appointed in the commission’s first iteration. Unlike the other two commissioners 
appointed to the first commission, Morley is not an Aboriginal person. While I attempted 
to establish communication with all three of the former commissions, I received no 
response from Claudette Dumont-Smith and Harry LaForme. 
 The interviews I conducted were based on the availability and willingness of 
those contacted to speak with me. While I contacted many potential interviewees from 
both the Conservative and Liberal parties, it is important to note that the positive 
responses are skewed toward to the political left, with many more Liberals than 
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Conservatives responding to my request. That is to say, there is a selection bias5 at work 
here, as I interviewed so many more Liberals than Conservatives—based on their 
respective wiliness to participate. This bias gives me a slanted perspective, as I have a 
clear view of the vision of Paul Martin’s Liberal government, but only one interviewee 
from Stephen Harper’s Conservative government, Ian Brodie, and as of 2008 Dr. Brodie 
no longer worked for the Prime Minister’s Office. Understanding government action and 
thinking is important in addressing my research questions, but without more interviews 
with the Conservatives who were in government for much of time the TRC has operated, 
this understanding is necessarily limited and based on my interpretation of that 
government’s actions. It is important to include Conservatives and Liberals, not just for 
representative reasons, but also because of the changeover in government that occurred in 
the 2006 general election. Thus, the exclusion of Conservative elite interviewees was not 
by design. I contacted two former Ministers of Indian Affairs, John Duncan when he was 
the minister, and the Prime Minister’s Office, in an attempt to get Conservative views. 
None of these people were willing to talk with me, either not responding to repeated 
attempts at contact or citing a busy schedule.  In an attempt to ameliorate this deficit of 
Conservative voices I have used public statements made by members of Harper’s 
Conservative government, and referred to actions taken by that government. While these 
public statements do not give the same candid assessment that an elite interview might, 
these public statements do point to sentiments expressed by these individuals, for which 
they are accountable.  
 This sample has its deficiencies. However, there is still merit in the study and it 
does provide insights. The main virtue of the sample is that I have interviewed many of 
the people who were most involved in negotiating the Settlement Agreement, from the 
Aboriginal community, the political party in power at the time, the bureaucracy, and the 
federal representative in the negotiation. These people have given me a picture of what 
the intent of the TRC was and have been actively involved in following its work, thus 
being able to give a unique analysis of how far the TRC has gone toward those original 
                                                          
5 For a discussion of selection bias see Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social 
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 130-1. 
While I am not drawing causal inferences in this research the issue of biased interviews is important to bear 
in mind. Even at the level of intuition, having five times the number of Liberal interviewees compared to 
Conservatives impacts on my understanding of the situation. 
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goals. These interviews have given me first-hand accounts, at the highest political levels, 
of the process that led to the TRC and its inception. 
 
The Interviews 
With each person who responded positively to my request for an interview, I carried out 
either an in-person or by-telephone interview. The length of each interview varied, based 
on the time each elite interviewee had available, how long their answers lasted, and how 
much additional information each wanted to provide. All interviews were conducted “on 
the record” and each interviewee agreed to be quoted and cited directly.  
 Each interview was recorded on a digital recorder, except the interviews with Phil 
Fontaine and Irwin Cotler because of environmental constraints.6 In all of the interviews, 
in addition to the recordings, I made notes throughout the interview. For my interviews 
with Fontaine and Cotler, these notes were more careful and detailed, as they were the 
only record of the interview. Understanding the constraints, Fontaine paused often to let 
me finish copying down his answers. In Cotler’s interview, it was not as easy to make 
thorough notes as the background noise was distracting and Cotler was interrupted 
several times by colleagues and, at one point, a phone call. I transcribed each of the 
digital audio recordings I did make with the aid of a transcription software package.7  
 In conducting the interviews, a hybrid method was used to keep the conversation 
directed to matters related to the TRC, yet allow the interviewee to convey what they 
thought was important. I followed the model of what Sue Arthur and James Nazroo call a 
“topical interview,” which has “a stronger emphasis on factual and descriptive data than 
in the more exploratory forms of data collection.”8 That is to say, I kept these elite 
interviewees directed toward a set of topics through my selection of questions, and kept 
the interview from wandering as much as possible. This allowed room for what Dexter 
calls “special, nonstandardized treatment,” which allows each interviewee to reveal what 
                                                          
6 The interview with Fontaine was conducted at an Ottawa bistro where background noise prevented the use 
of recording equipment. The interview with Irwin Cotler was conducted in the Opposition Lobby of the 
House of Commons, where background noise prevented effective audio recording. 
7 Dragon Naturally Speaking was used. 
8 Sue Arthur and James Nazroo, “Designing Fieldwork Strategies and Materials,” in Jane Ritchie and Jane 
Lewis (eds) Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (London: 
SAGE Publications, 2003), 110. 
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he or she considers important and to share his or her perspective on the situation.9  Thus, 
my questions did not follow a script; rather, a skeleton outline was used so each 
interviewee could discuss his or her opinion and expertise related to the Indian 
Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, the TRC, and Crown-Aboriginal relations. 
While some of the same questions were asked of each interviewee such as “Do you think 
the Government of Canada has a sincere commitment to reconciliation?” the interviewees 
were not each asked the very same questions in each interview nor in the same order. The 
skeleton outline of questions used to keep the conversation on topic and directed toward 
the information I was most interested in, similar to the “grand tour or main questions” 
that William Miller and Benjamin Crabtree describe as “open, easily understood, 
descriptive question that seek to elicit understandings.”10  
 There was a fluidity to each conversation, where I asked follow-up questions on 
issues identified by the interviewee and allowed each one to highlight what he or she felt 
was significant. At some points I found it necessary to “teach the interviewee what [I 
was] looking for,” by clarifying the meaning of the question, “so that the interviewee 
[could] later teach [me],” as Dexter puts it.11 The questions I asked, and especially the 
“grand tour or main questions” were used to “open a space for discovering what others 
think and feel about”12 issues related to the TRC. It was my intention to conduct an 
interview that was more like a conversation, as recommended by Dexter. Many of the 
interviews, however, ended up as a “quasi-monologue [on the part of the interviewee] 
stimulated by understanding comments [on my part].”13 
 In order to get the best answers possible from the interviewees, I tried to engage 
each one by being enthusiastic, nonjudgmental, relaxed, and by showing interest in the 
information, as suggested by Miller and Crabtree.14 I also maintained a professional 
distance, keeping the interview warm and at the same time serious. I advised each 
interviewee at the beginning of the interview that they would have an opportunity to 
                                                          
9 Dexter, Elite, 5. 
10 William Miller and Benjamin Crabtree, “Depth Interviewing,” in Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and 
Patricia Leavy eds. Approaches to Qualitative Research: A Reader on Theory and Practice (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 192. 
11 Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing, 63. 
12 Miller and Crabtree, “Depth Interviewing,” 192. 
13 Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing, 56. 
14 Miller and Crabtree, “Depth Interviewing,” 196. 
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review the statements they made, a practice known as member checking.15 Interviewees 
were given the opportunity to review their statements as included in this work for 
accuracy, to ascertain “whether the data analysis is congruent with the participants’ 
experience.”16 As is often the case, interviewees were given a single opportunity to verify 
and correct their statements. 17 While this gives interviewees a high level of control over 
the final version of the interview material, it is hoped that this has set each one at ease 
and allowed for fuller participation. Moreover, member checking helps to ensure the 
accuracy and credibility of the statements taken from interviewees.  
 
Supplementary Material 
To overcome some of the difficulty of not having many Conservatives interviewees, I 
further undertook a study of public statements made by prominent members of that party 
on issues related to Aboriginal peoples.  By searching Hansard, ministerial websites, and 
national media sources, it has been possible to include the opinions of additional 
Conservatives.  During the tenure of the Conservative governemnt there have been a 
number of high-profile decisions taken on the Aboriginal affairs portfolio, providing a 
rich source of media coverage, notably in the area of education and language policy. 
While some of these publicly available statements have been used, they have not been 
relied on as much as the interviews because of my inability to engage the individuals 
directly and establish a context for their views and ensure a proper understanding.  
   
The Analysis  
The 16 interviews I conducted gave me over twelve hours of recorded material, from 
which I produced transcripts.18 It is these transcripts that form the textual data that I have 
analyzed, compared, and from which, ultimately, I have drawn conclusions. 
                                                          
15 Julie Carlson, “Avoiding Traps in Member Checking,” The Qualitative Report, vol. 15, no. 5 (2010), 
1105. 
16 Michael Curtin and Ellie Fossey, “Appraising the Trustworthiness of Qualitative Inquiry: Guidelines for 
Occupational Therapists,” Australian Occupational Therapy Journal, vol. 54, no. 2 (2007), 92. 
17 Carlson, “Avoiding Traps in Member Checking,” 1105. 
18 In each case I recorded the conversation, with the exception of Phil Fontaine as the meeting was in a 
public place and it was not possible to make an effective audio recording in this instance. In this case many 




 In addressing the research questions, a folk Bayesian approach was used. In a folk 
Bayesian approach, the researcher moves “back and forth between theory and data, rather 
than taking a single pass through the data.”19 The folk Bayesian approach helped me to 
revise many of my prior beliefs as a process of the research and allowed me to better 
address the research questions.  This approach allows for a dynamic element in the 
research, which can lead to a better description of the possibility of transformation and an 
indication as to where the relationship between the Canadian government and Aboriginal 
peoples might be going. 
 By analysing and seeking connections and conclusions from these interviews, that 
is, in writing my findings, I engaged in a process of representation of others and their 
views on key questions. As Norman Denzin points out, “representation... is always self-
presentation. That is, the Other’s presence is directly connected to the writer’s self-
presence in the text.”20 This is even more the case here, as in the text of the transcript I 
am actually asking questions and encouraging statements from interviewees, to say 
nothing of my presence in the moment of the interview itself. As a male member of the 
dominant society and denominationally Anglican, there are a variety of ways in which I 
may be biased. I have tried to be reflexive in approach and analysis, but I am still open to 
bias in two important regards. First, as a Christian member of the one of the church that 
operated residential schools I am hopeful that this period can be addressed in a truly just 
way, perhaps overly hopeful. Moreover, hope is an important worldview forming concept 
for me and may bias my analysis. Second, the term reconciliation is one that has special 
meaning for me in a religious context and I may be overly attached to and invest in its use 
and conceptual appropriateness. While I take pains to show reconciliation as political 
ethic that can be useful and broadly intelligible for the various stakeholders involved, my 
fondness for it may be informed by my subjectivity. There may be other areas that are 
affected by my subjectivity to be sure, but these strike me as two prominent areas where I 
can identify my own biases. Knowing that I am a white male Anglican may put the reader 
                                                          
19 Timothy McKeown, "Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and 
Verba’s Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research," International 
Organization vol. 53 no. 1 (1999), 180. 
20 Norman Denzin, “The Art and Politics of Interpretation,” in Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia 
Leavy eds. Approaches to Qualitative Research: A Reader on Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 452. 
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on the search for other unconscious biases herein, but it is my hope that this search will 
not be distracting. 
The problem of self-presentation here is even more important as several 
interviewees were Aboriginal peoples. In the many areas of the academy, there has been a 
history of colonisation through social science research,21 and it has especially been the 
case that “research involving Aboriginal peoples in Canada has been defined and carried 
out primarily by non-Aboriginal researchers.”22 Notwithstanding the inherent process of 
representation present in writing, in a real effort not to appropriate the voice of anyone 
whom I interviewed, but especially Aboriginal peoples interviewed, I have tried to let the 
interviewees speak for themselves as much as possible in presenting my findings. 
 Moreover, in conducting the interviews and in my subsequent analysis, I have 
tended towards a “thick description” rather than a “thin description.”23 Denzin puts the 
difference between the two this way: “a thin description simply reports facts, independent 
of intentions or circumstances. A thick description, in contrast, gives the context of an 
experience, states the intentions and meanings that organized the experience, and reveals 
the experience as a process.”24 The intent of this approach was to “create the conditions 
that will allow the reader, through the writer, to converse with (and observe),” that which 
has been studied.25 This thick approach has been taken with regards to the context of the 
interviews and the TRC, located as they are within a specific political-historical frame of 
Canada. While wanting to let interviewees speak for themselves as much as possible, a 
full and rich context is essential for the reader to understand what is at stake with the 
TRC and reconciliation.  
  
                                                          
21 See, Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (New York: 
Palgrave, 1999). 
22 Panel on Research Ethics,  Chapter 9 “Research Involving the First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples of 
Canada”http://www.ger.ethique.gc.ca/eng/policy-politique/initiatives/tcps2-eptc2/chapter9-
chapitre9/#toc09-1 (accessed 17 Oct. 2012). 
23 It is important to note that this understanding of “thick” and “thin” description is not based on Clifford 
Geertz’s theory.  It is based on Denzin’s discussion of thick and thin (Denzin, “The Art and Politics of 
Interpretation,” 455). 
24 Denzin, “The Art and Politics of Interpretation,” 455. 




Broadly speaking, the methodology used here could be said to be critical. The most 
relevant sense in which my approach is critical is the spirit in which I open the field of 
what constitutes evidence to include broader and more prevalent social texts. For 
example, I not only understand political oppression as an indication of colonialism, but 
also understand social repression in its many forms as a means of colonialism. That is to 
say, I recognize both social constructions of “Aboriginality” as well as overt government 
policy as aspects of a complex system that seeks to exclude Aboriginal peoples and ways 
from the social, political and economic order of Canada, in what is broadly understood as 
colonialism or colonisation. I take seriously the “gut feelings” that Canadians have of 
Aboriginal peoples that are not based in reality, such as moral corruptness, indecency, 
and sloth, identified in my interview with Mike DeGagné, as part of colonisation.26  
 More generally, as Laurel Richardson argues, “the core of postmodernism is 
doubt that any method or theory, discourse or genre, tradition or novelty, has a universal 
and general claim as the ‘right’ or privileged form of authoritative knowledge.”27 It is this 
doubt that I have tried to carry around with me throughout the process. Concretely, this 
has meant a rejection of the idea of objective description and a self-reflective process of 
writing and researching that recognises my own presence in the work. As Denzin argues, 
“writers create their own situated, inscribed versions of the realties they describe.”28 That 
is to say, I do not take my findings to be anything but my interpretation of what these 
elite interviewees told me during the interviews, combined with a certain analysis on my 
part. These findings cannot be generalised. At most, they tell us that particular people 
hold certain attitudes or opinions. I do not make claims about the extent of an opinion or 
attitude in a community or population, but the few interviewees from a given population 
give us an idea that an attitude or opinion might exist there, if only because these 
communities are represented in formal ways by those whom I interviewed. 
                                                          
26 Mike DeGagné, former director of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation (1998-2012), telephone interview 
with author, 21 Feb. 2012. 
27 Laurel Richardson, “Writing: A Method of Inquiry,” in Sharlene Nagy Hesse-Biber and Patricia Leavy 
eds. Approaches to Qualitative Research: A Reader on Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 475. 
28 Denzin, “The Art and Politics of Interpretation,” 455. 
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 The thesis makes clear a way of understanding the process of colonisation, 
decolonisation, and reconciliation in Canada by offering theoretical lens for each, 
applying them to the historical process of colonisation, approaches to decolonisation, and 
the prospect for reconciliation offered by the TRC. But the major contribution this work 
makes is in making public the opinions of influential figures that helped created the TRC, 







There are three complex concepts involved in this work: colonisation, decolonisation, and 
reconciliation. While each of these concepts could constitute dissertations in and of 
themselves, space here only allows for a limited discussion of each. But these are 
necessary concepts to understand in order to proceed to the main questions of this 
dissertation, namely: is the TRC a transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal 
relations? And if so, toward what might this be a transformation?  
Dealing with colonisation, decolonisation, and reconciliation is necessary to 
adequately address the possibility offered by the TRC, as the TRC is expressly directed 
toward one of the most visible sites of colonisation, the Indian Residential School system, 
and is specifically tasked with fostering reconciliation among the parties to the Indian 
Residential School Settlement Agreement (although here I am most interested in Crown-
Aboriginal reconciliation). For a thoroughgoing reconciliation, a reconciliation that is 
more than resignation to one’s circumstance, decolonisation must be strongly at work in 
the Canadian case, as I argue below. This understanding better helps to situate the 
analysis presented in Chapters Five and Six, as well as giving a theoretical backing to the 
historical process of colonisation outlined in Chapter Four, and past approached to 
decolonisation discussed in Chapter Five.  
 The goal of this chapter is to draw these three concepts together in more than a 
simple chronological way, in order to provide insights into the work and possibility of the 
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TRC. While these processes are discussed in detail in later chapters, here I want to detail 
the theory that informs my thinking on colonisation, what I take decolonisation to mean, 
and how I understand reconciliation.  
First I start with the work of Giorgio Agamben, which gives a useful structure to 
understand colonisation at its very core. The theory of the “state of exception” that runs 
through some of Agamben’s works is a helpful tool for seeing a process of normative 
exclusion of Aboriginal peoples from the political, economic, and cultural constructions 
of Canada. Here I only discuss Agamben’s theory, leaving a detailed discussion of the 
historical unfolding of colonisation in Canada for Chapter Four. This history of 
colonisation importantly informs the context for the Indian Residential School system and 
a discussion thereof. Having a theory of colonisation in mind is important when reading 
Chapter Four, and will add clarity to the balance of the work. 
Second, I discuss what I take decolonisation to mean, particularly in light of my 
discussion of the state of exception. As decolonisation is a fraught term and can become 
violent or revolutionary, it is important to lay out how I understand decolonisation before 
moving on to discuss reconciliation. At its heart, I take decolonisation to mean the 
removal of alien structures of power from a people as well as the overturning of a 
hierarchical taxonomy of humanity that relegates the colonised to a qualitatively different 
form of humanity than the coloniser. However, I want to eschew the economy of violence 
upon which colonisation is built in redressing it with decolonisation, so that violence is 
not the means to remove violence, perpetuating a cycle of that which it seeks to 
overcome. That is to say, I am keen to avoid rectifying colonial violence perpetrated 
against the colonised with violence perpetrated against the coloniser. Whereas a 
revolutionary decolonisation, such as that advocated by Frantz Fanon, seeks to overcome 
colonialism through its violent negation, I understand decolonisation to be more closely 
linked to a peaceful reconciliation that transcends the economy of violence that separates 
and enforces a hierarchical taxonomy of humanity.1 The concept of decolonisation is 
recurrent in discussing reconciliation and thus must be carefully delimited here. It is 
discussed in the Canadian context in Chapter Five.  
                                                          
1 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), 1. 
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Last, and most directly relevant to the research questions, I discuss reconciliation. 
As I understand reconciliation, it is inseparable from decolonisation: understanding both 
colonisation and decolonisation builds towards reconciliation. Here reconciliation is seen 
as a political-ethical approach that relies on an agonistic politics, which I detail below. 
This understanding of reconciliation needs to be kept in mind when assessing the 
possibility that the TRC offers in reconciling Crown and Aboriginal peoples.  
These concepts hang together loosely, to be sure, but are important to understand, 
in order to clarify the balance of this work. In a sense, their link is transitive. We need a 
theoretical structure to begin to understand colonisation in a thoroughgoing way, which 
makes the aim of decolonisation intelligible. As decolonisation itself is a fraught concept, 
delimiting it, and outlining a structure that is non-violent is important. It is in part through 
this link to non-violence that decolonisation is connected to reconciliation. At its heart, as 
I understand it, reconciliation is decolonial, as both reconciliation and decolonisation aim 
to restore basic human dignity. This trail, from colonisation, to decolonisation, to 
reconciliation, is not direct or comprehensive, but tracing this line provides insights for 
Chapters Four through Six. These chapters give the necessary context with which to 
approach the Canadian TRC and inform the interview finding discussed in Chapters 
Seven and Eight. 
 
Towards a Historico-Political Understanding of Aboriginal peoples in Canada 
Chapter Four contains a detailed discussion of the colonisation of Canada by Europeans. 
What is at stake in this process, I argue, is made more visible by the application of the 
theoretical lens detailed here, the “state of exception” outlined by Giorgio Agamben. It is 
through this rubric of exception that the tensions and contractions of colonisation can be 
better understood. With the groundwork laid, the historical context laid out in Chapter 
Four, can be understood in much fuller way. I am not interest here in tracing a legal 
history per se, but rather using the legal notion of exception to help understand 
colonisation within a political-philosophical context. I am not looking for declared states 
of emergency or suspensions of constitutions. Rather, this part of the project concerns 
conceiving of the legal-political fact of colonisation within a philosophical framework 
that, as we will see, takes Aboriginality as outside the norm.  If we see colonisation as the 
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extension of the Western legal tradition, as Robert Williams argues, I argue that it is in 
the exception, inherent in the law, that we see this extension.2 Thus, Agamben’s theory of 
exception gives a productive lens to use in understanding colonisation in more than a 
historical way and to see what is at stake in addressing it.   
Understanding what Agamben means by the “state of exception” is not as 
straightforward as it first appears, as it is more than a simple suspension of the law. By 
beginning with the semantic origins of the term, we can move on to understand how the 
law always already contains its own rupture in the form of exception, opening up a space 
where unlicensed force is used, or at least force licenced only by force. In Chapter Four I 
will return to this to help make sense of the historical process of colonisation there 
detailed. 
The state of exception, as Agamben outlines it, is an intricate concept. However, 
the roots of it can be easily seen in the colloquial understanding of states of emergency. A 
cursory examination of our history indicates that in war the suspensions of certain 
activities are justified as “exceptions,” for the maintenance or defence of the state.  The 
Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) during the First World War and the Emergency 
Powers Act 1939 during the Second World War in the United Kingdom are corollaries to 
the Canadian War Measures Act, which was invoked in Canada during both world wars.  
Indeed, even in times of extreme threat, absent war, like the October Crisis of 1970 in 
Canada, invocations of extraordinary power by the state (or sovereign) are often 
welcomed, if not expected. These instances share the suspension of the law as such, and 
are moments or sites where the only law is force.  That is to say, in each there is a state 
excepted from the normal operation of law. It is here that we glimpse visible localized 
invocations of states of exception from the past century. However, in order to understand 
this term, it is helpful to utilize the type of historical and philosophical treatment that 
Giorgio Agamben offers.  
 This concept of exception is common in the West. In German it is referred to as a 
“state of necessity.”3  In the more familiar Anglo tradition, the terms “martial law” and 
“emergency powers” are generally used. Agamben’s term “state of exception” refers to 
                                                          
2 Robert Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990). See especially Chapter 5 and 6. 
3 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press, 2005), 4. 
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instances where the state suspends the operation of law as it is commonly practiced, thus 
creating a state of exception for law, as such, under its pre-exception form. In the modern 
Western constitutional tradition there are provisions for the exception or derogation of 
rights and even the constitution itself, which presents an interesting way of containing 
within law its own suspension. 
 This is the central paradox of the exception. The law always tries to annex or 
relate to the exception, despite the impossibility of it. Following Carl Schmitt, whose 
famous declaration “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception”4 for Agamben “the 
paradox of sovereignty consists in the fact the sovereign is at the same time both outside 
and inside the juridical order… the paradox can also be formulated this way: ‘the law is 
outside itself,’ or ‘I, the sovereign who am outside the law, declare that there is nothing 
outside the law.’”5 For the state of exception, “what is excluded in the exception 
maintains itself in relation to the rule in the form of the rule’s suspension.”6 It is not that 
“the exception subtracts itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise 
to the exception.”7 In this way, Agamben links exception to law in a Heideggerian 
syntagma: the law “always already contains its own virtual rupture in the form of a 
‘suspension of every law.’”8 That is, the law is inconceivable without conceiving of a 
potential need to suspend it. The exception is indispensable to the rule, “the exception 
does not only confirm the rule, the rule as such lives off the exception alone.”9 This only 
seems counterintuitive, as it is clear in the case of mortal danger to the state itself (the law 
itself) such as Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, the invocation of the Defense of 
the Real Act in the UK, the Patriot Act in the US, even the peacetime invocation of the 
War Measures Act in Canada.10 These exceptions ensure the rule; they support and allow 
the existence of the rule through its suspension, to preserve the conditions of the rule 
                                                          
4 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters in the Concept of Sovereignty , George Schwab trans. 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 4. 
5 Agamben, Homo Sacer; Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford; University of Stanford Press, 1995), 
15. 
6 Ibid., 17-18. 
7 Ibid., 18. 
8 Ibid., 37. 
9 Ibid., 16. 
10 Lincoln justified his suspension of this ancient right in a speech before Congress “are all the laws, but 
one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Abraham Lincoln, 




itself. The outside must be kept outside, if possible destroyed by all means, but destroyed 
outside to preserve the purity of that which is inside. The exception fully reveals the rule, 
that which is other is dehumanised, subjected to a force-of-law-without law.11 Thus it is 
for Agamben, following Kierkegaard, that “the exception explains the general as well as 
itself.”12 
 Moreover, this exception can become lodged as the rule, which can only subvert 
the rule utterly. It is here where the state of exception “becomes the rule, then the 
juridical-political system transforms into a killing machine.”13 While Agamben has in 
mind here the Nazi regime, with its unambiguous recourse to exception as rule—what 
Oren Gross calls “exceptionless exception”14—and its clear realization as “killing 
machine,” most visibly in places like concentration camps, it is nonetheless applicable for 
my purpose here. It is especially fit in the context of the “camp,” which for Agamben is 
“a piece of territory that is placed outside the normal juridical order... The camp is the 
structure in which the state of exception is permanently realized,”15 localised and 
contained, as well as physically manifested in certain terrain or location. The system of 
reserves and legislation separating Indian from settler are at least designed to destroy a 
way of life, if not a whole people, a body politic. The residential school was explicitly 
charged with “killing the Indian in the child,” if sometimes it erred and merely killed the 
child. In either case the exception-cum rule in these sites created a “machine” whose 
foremost interest was to kill a people.  
 To the extent that we see the construction of a legislative framework around 
Indians in Canada (The Gradual Civilisation Act, Indian Act, etc.), detailed in Chapter 
Four, we see the playing out of law’s desire to annex the exception, a problematic and 
impossible task. Referring to the ‘War on Terror’ and the accompanying anti-terror 
legislation, Cox, Levine, and Newman point out that in this state of exception “the law is 
                                                          
11 Agamben, State of Exception, 39. 
12 Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archives (New York: Zone Books, 
1999), 48. 
13 Agamben, State of Exception, 86.   
14 Oren Gross, “The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Emergency Powers 
and the ‘Norm-Exception’ Dichotomy,” Cadozo Law Review, vol. 21 (2000), 1825. 
15 Giorgio Agamben, “What is a Camp?” in Giorgio Agamben Means Without End: Notes on Politics 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 39. 
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used to suspend and weaken itself.”16 Put somewhat differently “rather than law imposing 
constraints on sovereignty, the law increasingly operates as its instrument or weapon… 
the law embodies its own lack, its own suspension—and thus there is a paradoxical 
relationship between law and lawlessness, between the rule of law and its abrogation.”17 
This is precisely what Agamben means by a force of law without law; “the state of 
exception is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law… in 
which potentiality and act are radically separated… [it is] a fictio by means of which law 
seeks to annex anomie itself.”18 Thus, the exception is not extra-legal per se. That is to 
say, it is not simply outside the law. Rather it is “a kind of grey zone between sovereignty 
and law, in which the limits of each become indistinct and blur into one another.”19  
 For Cox, Levine, and Newman, in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ this means 
“the sovereign decision on the exceptional situation refers not just to the ability to act 
unilaterally outside the law in response to a real or perceived terrorist threat, but also to 
work through and use the law to suspend and limit the legal constraints that would 
normally be imposed on sovereign power.”20 While I am not concerned with a terrorist 
threat to the state, this logic obtains nonetheless. As I detail in Chapter Four, the radical 
alterity of Aboriginal peoples posed a perceived threat to the Anglo-European 
construction of Canada, culturally, economically, and politically. Thus, the derogation of 
the treaties and the extension of a legislative framework devoid of the normal operation 
of law (indeed respect for ancient rights as a subject of the Crown) amounts to a 
declaration of exception, the goal of which is the maintenance of the settler state, no 
matter the cost. The most visible localization of the exception being the Indian 
Residential School system.  
 The paradox of exception can be useful not only in understanding Aboriginal 
peoples and their relation to the state of Canada, but also to the people of Canada. Having 
always been “other” to the colonial project, the history detailed in Chapter Four shows 
how Aboriginal peoples have been outside and unnecessary to the governmental and 
                                                          
16 Damian Cox, Michael Levine, and Saul Newman, Politics Most Unusual: Violence, Sovereignty and 
Democracy in the ‘War on Terror’ (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 72. 
17 Ibid., 72-3. 
18 Agamben, State of Exception, 39. 




cultural construction of Canada. In the case of the Upper Canadian treaties, it was exactly 
the removal of Aboriginal peoples from the land that allowed the creation of Upper 
Canada, in its agrarian and European form. Yet, paradoxically, through law and 
assimilation in particular, the colonial project has continuously tried to annex the 
rebellious outside that is the otherness of Aboriginality. Here we can see that in not only 
the civilizing policy of the 1830s, but also the hard bargains the Western treaties sought 
in an effort to settle the more nomadic plains tribes that hold Aboriginal peoples outside 
the construction of Canada. When Williams argues that “the West’s archaic, medievally 
derived legal discourse respecting American Indians is ultimately genocidal in both its 
practice and its intent,”21 he is exactly right. But it is not the rule of law per se that is at 
the core of this “genocidal practice and intent,” but rather the exception from the law that 
licences this genocide, that licences a force-of-law-without-law. By holding Aboriginal 
peoples in such a state of exception, anything becomes “legal” to inflict upon them, for 
theirs becomes a state without law. The Canadian state has sought a relation of 
domination with the otherness, the exteriority, of Aboriginal peoples, to control and 
regulate with a force-of-law-without-law. However, it has continually failed to master 
this exteriority. It is this exteriority, this absence that puts Aboriginal peoples at the 
centre of a meaningful understanding of Canadian history.  That is to say, the absence is 
the presence.  
 The cruelty of the residential school is the clearest instance of the state of 
exception, where the inmates were reduced to the whim of the guards, whether white or 
gangs of Aboriginal students, in such a way as not to seem like a crime to the 
perpetrators.  That is to say, the treatment of Aboriginal children in the schools was not 
isolated nor was it individual.  Instead, we must see the schools against a backdrop that 
systemically dehumanises all Aboriginal peoples, subjecting them to means of 
transformation outside the order applicable to settler Canadians.   
Thus, rather than reading a history of Canada absent of Aboriginal peoples, or, 
worse, the suggestion by John Ralston Saul of reading a history of Canada as 
                                                          
21 Robert Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), 326. 
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Indigenous,22 we must see the complex topology of Canada, which includes an exteriority 
that is irreducibly outside of Canada in the way we usually understand it. That is, 
Aboriginal peoples are present in the historical construction of Canada, economic, 
cultural, and political, because of their exclusion, their exception. While it is not incorrect 
to include Aboriginal peoples as something like a “third solitude”23 this misses, per se, 
their inclusion through exception to the politics and culture of Canada.  By understanding 
colonisation in this way, the events outlined in Chapter Four can be seen as appropriately 
insidious, and building on this understanding, what is at stake in decolonisation. For 
understanding decolonisation relies expressly on understanding colonisation, and here 
understanding what I take to be decolonisation relies on the above historical-political 
view of colonisation as what it seeks to address. 
 
 The project of unravelling 
Taking seriously the state of exception invoked around Aboriginal peoples in Canada 
brings into focus the true enormity of colonisation and thus the scope of decolonisation. 
As “decolonisation” is a recurrent theme in later chapters, and a fraught and amorphous 
term, here I sketch the contours of what I understand decolonisation to mean. In Chapter 
Five, below, I examine particular attempts at decolonisation in Canada. Starting with the 
cultural underpinnings of colonialism gives us a sense of the extent of unravelling that 
needs to occur with decolonisation, as cultural (mis)representations are bound so closely 
with political domination. It is colonisation and decolonisation as political relations with 
which I am most concerned here, but it would be irresponsible to take them as separate 
from their cultural aspects and give an unnecessarily reductive view of colonialism. 
The colonisation described in Chapter Four is a historical one, concerned mainly 
with the settlement of European newcomers over the land of North America, and with the 
increasingly uneven relationship between the British Crown and Aboriginal nations. That 
is to say, it concentrates on one aspect of the colonial paradigm: governmental relations. 
This is my main concern here. However, it is not the entirety of the colonial project. As 
                                                          
22 The central contention of Saul’s book is that Canada exhibits more Aboriginal characteristics than 
European, but this can obscure a history that involves clearing Aboriginal peoples from the land in order to 
create Canada. John Raulston-Saul, A Fair Country (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 3.  
23 The term of “two solitudes” to refer to French and English Canada comes from the novel written by 
Hugh McLennan ( Hugh McLennan, Two Solitudes (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1945)). 
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Edward Said notes, colonialism and imperialism—allied concepts wherein colonialism is 
the process, and imperialism is the ideology—are “supported and perhaps even impelled 
by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and 
people require and beseech domination.”24 Moreover, this domination continues “in a 
kind of general cultural sphere as well as in a specific political, ideological, economic, 
and civil practices.”25 It is important to say something of the cultural aspects of 
colonisation that are latent and so insidious.  I should not like to give a false impression 
of what decolonisation must counter, nor delay too long from the main point; however, 
acknowledging the cultural aspects of colonisation are important here.  
 Land and peoples are not only targeted through governmental relations, but also 
through cultural representations that reinforce the hierarchy of coloniser and colonised. 
Said argues that specific cultural forms such as the novel, for example, contain in their 
early, and especially in early British, formulations many references and allusions to 
“empire.” Taken together, these references and allusions constitute a “structure of attitude 
and reference.”26  At the very genesis of modern European empires was a new literary 
form that contains a legitimating expression of the imperial project. For Said, it was not 
the novel that “‘caused’ imperialism, but the novel, as a cultural artefact of bourgeois 
society, and imperialism are unthinkable without each other.”27 This is but one example 
of culture and imperial power working together to ingrain a European attitude of 
superiority toward indigenous people the world over. 
 While Said is discussing the expansion of European powers over the globe more 
generally, the cultural representations of alterity in North America—in the image of the 
“Indian”—are nonetheless important for European colonisation here as elsewhere. As 
Wayne Warry notes, the stereotypical view of Aboriginal peoples in Canada is helpfully 
adaptive to colonial objectives, and likewise indispensable, as “the enemy has to be 
created before they are defeated—or converted.”28 Culture, as well as policy, has been 
used to construct a view of the “Indian” that European settlers have come to possess, as a 
                                                          
24 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knoff, 1993), 9. Emphasis original. 
25 Ibid., 9. 
26 Ibid., 62. 
27 Ibid., 70-1. 
28 Wayne Warry, Unfinished Dreams: Community Healing and the Reality of Aboriginal Self-Government 
(Toronto: University  of Toronto Press, 2000), 21. 
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necessary condition to overcome the other, the “Indian,” by way of the colonial project. 
In policy, as discussed below, and especially under the Indian Act, the homogenized and 
reified form of the “Indian” has been constructed from a diverse range of First Nations, 
which are as different from one another as European nations are. Thus, in a very real 
sense: “The Indian is an invention of the European.”29   
 As Thomas King states, expectations can be fostered by the imagined visage of 
the other.30 King tells the story of Edward Sherriff Curtis, the famed American 
photographer of the West and its Aboriginal people.31 “Curtis was fascinated by the idea 
of the North American Indian, obsessed by it. And he was determined to capture that 
idea, that image, before it vanished.”32 Curtis sought to construct the image of the other in 
the form of a reified Aboriginality. This period sought to construct a pre-historic 
narrative, a provenance for the American nation, one it found in the noble savage being 
left behind by progress and modernity: “The Romantics [of which Curtis was one] 
imagined their Indian as dying. But in that dying, in that passing away, in that 
disappearing from the stage of human progress, [they interpreted] a sense of nobility.”33 
There was the heroic male character of Americana literature that framed the “Indian” as 
the last of his race; the “noble savage” was noble in his graceful dying away.34 And to 
ensure that it was this very “Indian,” this vanishing savage, whom Curtis captured on 
film, he used crate-loads of traditional costumes, head-dresses, blankets, painted 
backgrounds, and wigs to costume his “Indian” models.35 The images in Curtis’ highly 
                                                          
29 Daniel Francis, The Imaginary Indian: The Image of the Indian in Canadian Culture (Vancouver: 
Arsenal Pulp Press, 2008), 5. 
30 Thomas King, The Truth About Stories: A Native Narrative (Anansi: Toronto, 2003), see especially 31-
60. 
31 Edward Sheriff Curtis was an American photographer from about 1885 until about 1935. His most 
famous and controversial work was The North American Indian, which was a sweeping and lavishly 
illustrated twenty volume set of photographs and text relating to American Indian tribes. The first volume 
was published in 1907 and the last in 1930. See “The North American Indian in the Northwestern 
University McCormick Library of Special Collections—a description,” 
http://curtis.library.northwestern.edu/curtis/description.html (accessed 30 August 2011).  This site also 
contains an electronic version of the twenty volumes, “Content” 
http://curtis.library.northwestern.edu/curtis/toc.cgi?sec=nai.01.book,nai.13.book,&psec=#nai.01.book 
(accessed 30 August 2011).  For a thorough study of the project of The North American Indian itself, see 
Mick Gidley, Edward S. Curtis and the North American Indian, Incorporated (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
32 King, The Truth About Stories, 32. 
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34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 34. 
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popular book, The North American Indian—published in twenty volumes with a forward 
written by Theodore Roosevelt—reinforced an image of Aboriginal peoples of North 
America as objects of history, unable to adapt to a changing world, from which they were 
consigned to vanish.   
 Pauline Wakeham argues that Curtis was essentially seeking a taxidermic object 
in his photography. “Curtis pursued mastery over nature not by the literal practice of 
taxidermy by employing photography and film as technologies of taxidermic 
preservation, technologies that sought to reconstruct the bodies of ostensibly extinct 
species in the guise of liveness.”36 Curtis began his career as a nature photographer, but 
shifted into the preservation of a nature that contained this image of the vanishing 
“Indian,” turning from a documentary naturalist preserving landscapes and animal species 
to a sort of ethnographic documentarian capturing the disappearing “Indian.” As 
Wakeham puts it, this was “a shift that, according to the colonial stereotypes of 
Indianness, was hardly a shift at all.”37 It is the desire to preserve an evaporating image, 
to preserve a species that never really existed, against the reality of cultural change and 
dynamism, which marks the project of Curtis as a problematic colonial exercise. Curtis 
retouched his images to remove any hint of modernity from them, to preserve the 
“Indian” the colonisers could only imagine had existed before their arrival, regardless of 
Aboriginal people’s reality or self-representation. White society could change, but the 
Aboriginal society needed to be fixed to an anachronistic image, an imagined visage.38  
 This cultural form of colonisation is not merely a historical feature of the 
paradigm of Aboriginal exclusion and marginalisation.  As Daniel Francis notes, the 
image of a constructed “Indian” continues to be used in advertising and as a sort of short-
hand for out-doors and Canadiana.39 Advertising is an increasingly important source of 
cultural expression in our advanced appetitive and capitalist society. From the smoke 
shop Indian—the tall austere wooden carving of a feather head-dressed First Nations 
purveyor of tobacco, often placed outside tobacconist shops across North America—to 
the use of a stylised Inuit sculpture as the logo for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics, 
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“Indians” in advertising have been and continue to be very much in evidence.40  Like the 
novel at the outset of the age of empires, these cultural expressions fetishize and 
caricature Aboriginality reinforcing the subordination of Aboriginal peoples to the 
dominant Euro-centric order.  
 Cultural representation of Aboriginality comes also to inform our political-
philosophical ideas of state and community. I am thinking here in particular of the 
influential figures of Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes in searching for an analogy for the state 
of nature, which he uses as a device in understanding sovereignty, likens this condition, 
wherein life is “nasty, brutish, and short,”41 to that of “the savage people in many places 
of America.”42 To be sure this view would have been informed by travel literature of the 
period which consists of, as Stephanie Martens puts it, “very subjective, biased, ill-
informed descriptions, mixing in nascent ethnography with mythology, dreamt antipodes 
and marvelous being.”43 The veracity of these accounts is immaterial here, as the 
perception by Hobbes of the anarchic natural state of these “savage people” importantly 
puts them in a condition in need of controlling through the imposition of sovereign 
power. After all it is the sovereign that is constructed to end the state of the constant war 
of all against all, that is, the state of nature.44 This certainly places in our political-
philosophical imagination the image of Aboriginal-as-savage in need of the colonizing 
benefit of the law and the sovereign power which constructs and maintains it. This clearly 
creates a ‘straw Indian’ that theorists and practitioners are licensed to bring up to the full 
level of civility through the extension of the sovereign power to create the security 
conditions of civilisation. This also admits the specter of the exception discussed above, 
where we see this supposed state of nature re-emerge and controlled by the sovereign 
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Aboriginal culture being appropriated to the nationalistic purposes of Canada, and in so doing the is 
denuded of Aboriginal content. This argument was made during his remarks in the “Welcome and Opening 
Plenary Session” of the Rethinking Multiculturalism: Brazil, Canada, and the United States conference held 
at York University 29 and 30 January 2010. 
41 The famous arrangement of nasty brutish and short is found in the final sentence to a long list of those 
things which are impossible in the state of nature (the “Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man”) 
where the life of any individual is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.” (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 
C.B. MacPherson ed. (London: Penguin, 1968), 186). 
42 Ibid., 187. 
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44 Hobbes, 223. 
35 
 
power in exception, a perceived lawlessness whose answer becomes a real lawlessness 
and destruction of those it is ostensibly charged to protect. For Agamben this is explicitly 
the case when the state of exception becomes the rule, the state of nature and the state of 
exception become indistinguishable from each other.45 Thus, our modern political 
philosophy always already contains this imagined view of the ‘savage Indian’ used by 
Hobbes. 
 Similarly in the work of John Locke we see a representation of the “Indian” 
importantly off the mark to ensure a consistent European right to their land.46  It is clear 
from Locke’s work in the Second Treaties on Government that, like Hobbes, he 
considered the inhabitants of the Americas to be in a state of nature.47 It is important to 
note that Locke’s state of nature differs from that of Hobbes. The former consisting of the 
absolute liberty to person and property subject only to the law of nature that “teaches all 
mankind who will but consider it, that, being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possession.”48 The latter in a war of all against 
all, the natural law of “Justice, Equity, Modesty, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee 
would be done to” only obtains under the sovereign. 49 
 For James Tully, Locke’s natural state has two important implications. First, the 
settlers of the Americas have an absolute right to wage war against the Aboriginal 
peoples there found.50 Second, settlers have a right to appropriate land without consent of 
the Aboriginal peoples found upon it.51 The first follows from a view of retaliatory right 
by the settlers to protect themselves against any violation of the natural rights by the 
Aboriginal peoples. Transgression of the natural right to health, liberty, and possession 
indicates that the transgressor “declares himself to live by another rule than that of 
common reason and equity” and gives the transgressed “a right to punish the offender and 
be executioner of the law of nature.”52 The second owes to Locke’s views of the 
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ownership of labour and the productive use of land. Since humans have an absolute 
ownership in their labour, it is by mixing labour (“improving”, enclosing, cultivating) 
with the land that an individual comes to own it. For example, “the labour that was mine 
removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.”53 
Tully points out the importance of the state of nature, where the law of nature rules, for 
the removal from the common land without consent. It is here that “the appropriation of 
common fruits and nuts, fish and game, and vacant land by means of individual labour is 
legitimate and creates a property right in the products as long as they do not spoil and 
there is enough and as good left in common for others.”54 Hunters and gatherers have a 
right to the produce of the land, but not the land itself, and farmers only have a right to as 
much land as is under their cultivation. For Locke, then, it is possible, due to the immense 
size and scarce use of land in America, to remove without consent as much as a person 
could mix their labour with, as “the Possession he could make himself upon the measures 
we have given [i.e. that there be no spoilage and that there is enough and as good left in 
common for others], would not be very large, nor, even to this day, prejudice the rest of 
Mankind, or give them reason to complain, or think themselves injured by this Man’s 
Incrochment.”55 
 The essence of the Lockean approach is to explicitly devalue Aboriginal ways of 
being to license the colonial activity Locke was involved in. As Tully puts it “First, 
Locke defines political society in such a way that Amerindian government does not 
qualify as a legitimate form of political society… Second, Locke defines property in such 
a way that Amerindian customary land use is not a legitimate type of property.”56 Locke’s 
problematic and racist views of Aboriginal people place them in a state of nature, one 
where even their natural law rights to health, liberty, and property are in fact in doubt, 
even though he is at pains to detail how they obtain for Europeans. Even if Kathy 
Squadrito is correct in concluding that “arguments in the Second Treatise were often 
taken out of context and occasionally used by policy makers to support their goal of 
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taking native resources; Locke is not responsible for such use,”57 what Locke can be held 
responsible for is furthering the imagined view of the “Indian” in Western thought. Like 
that of Hobbes, this degraded view of Aboriginality is always already in the tradition of 
Western political and philosophical thought. A view that may or may not have been 
historically invoked (or invoked consistently), but none the less, philosophically, licences 
the exceptional treatment of Aboriginal peoples. After detailing what right humans 
naturally have in the state of nature, indeed carry with them into society, Locke is at pains 
to exclude Aboriginal peoples from natural law. 
 More broadly, that Williams argues the “Doctrine of Discovery and its discourse 
of conquest asserts the West’s lawful power to impose its vision of truth on non-Western 
people through racist, colonizing rule of law,”58 highlights exactly the subversion this 
exception wreaks on the rule. For the Doctrine of Discovery to be lawful notions of the 
Law of Nations, natural law and common law need to be suspended, as Hobbes and 
Locke do above. Important common law precepts of equality before the law, consent, and 
property are denied Aboriginal peoples as exception to them. 
In analogy, then, to the state of exception, both legally and in formal political 
structures, into which, I have argued, Aboriginal peoples historically have been placed, 
there is a sort of cultural exception as well.59 Here again, we have a complex zone of 
indistinction, where the image of the “Indian” serves as shorthand for both idyllic 
Canadian concepts, such as wilderness and undisturbed nature, and also as a signifier for 
that which is “other” and irreconcilable, forever outside the norm, yet necessarily in 
relationship with that norm. In either case, as symbolic of the rugged Canadiana, or that 
which is exotically outside and “other” than ourselves, the image of the “Indian” is 
constructed and appropriated by the dominant society; and in that reification and co-
option, even when it stands in for what it means to be Canadian, the image of the 
“Indian” contains the germ, at its very centre, of the colonial project which dehumanises 
and misidentifies the other of the “Indian.” As the exception of “Indian” is used in this 
way to culturally articulate the rule of Anglo-European Canada, it subverts this very rule 
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and lays bare the very problematic relationship at the heart of Canada between the other 
of Aboriginal people and the familiar of Anglo-European settlers. 
  In addition to the formal attempts at decolonisation set out in Chapter Five, it is 
important to note that an ongoing cultural decolonisation is occurring in Canada. From 
mainstream CBC Radio programs such as The Dead Dog Cafe Comedy Hour and 
Revision Quest, to the publication of works by accomplished contemporary Aboriginal 
literary figures such as Thomas King, Drew Haydon Taylor, and Sherman Alexie, to the 
Indigenous-produced content on the Aboriginal Peoples Television Network, the cultural 
imperialism discussed above is being eroded, albeit piecemeal and slowly. While this 
cultural imperialism is an important source of Aboriginal disadvantage in Canada, 
rectifying this is more properly done in the social sphere and with a healthy dose of 
Aboriginal voice—a voice I in no way want to appropriate or abuse. Thus, while 
decolonisation encompasses both cultural and formal political arrangements, I am 
concerned here with the latter. 
 
Decolonisation, Revolution and Reform 
 Decolonisation is set against these cultural aspects of colonisation, the overt 
governmental colonisation outlined in Chapter Four, and theoretical structure of the state 
of exception above. It is important to understand colonisation through the lens of 
exception in order to get at the heart of decolonisation, while realizing how widely a 
thorough going decolonisation will have to reach to redress the cultural aspects of 
colonialism.  
 At its core I understand decolonisation as an attempt to free peoples from the 
subjugation of alien structures of power that dominate them through formal political 
mechanisms, as well as through the cultural and symbolic representations, which provides 
reassurance to the oppressor of the oppressed’s participation in a qualitatively different 
form of humanity.60 In using the terms cultural and symbolic representations, I mean 
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exactly the general background of cultural articulations of Aboriginality discussed above 
that forms a shorthand of alterity in refereeing to Aboriginal peoples. Decolonisation 
frees the colonised from the paternal imposition of alien structures of power and the 
image of the noble savage represented in cultural artefacts and articulations. As Frantz 
Fanon puts it, “decolonisation is quite simply the substitution of one “species” of 
mankind by another.”61 By this, he means the inclusion of formerly excluded “species” of 
mankind—that is, the colonised—into places of economy, state, and society from which 
they had been excluded. This inclusion is important as Sium, Desai, Ritskes point out 
“decolonization is not interested in simply turning the colonial world upside down, but 
requires the courage and imagination to envision and construct a new future.”62   
The very metaphysical, epistemological, and ontological basis of Aboriginal 
peoples is threatened and subverted by colonialism’s totalizing assimilation. Take for 
instance the issue of land, of place, which we return to in a formal political sense below. 
Deloria Vine argues that land is central to Aboriginal metaphysics and informs 
Aboriginal ethics and ways of being. Deloria argues that “American Indians hold their 
lands—places—as having the highest possible meaning, and all their statements are made 
with this reference in mind,” which is in contrast with the Western mode of thinking that 
places historical development, time, at the centre of the narrative.63 As Glen Coulthard 
points out, this is “a profound misunderstanding to think of land or place as simply some 
material object of profound importance to Indigenous cultures (although it is that too); 
instead, it ought to be understood as a field of relationships to other things.”64 Paying 
insufficient attention to this metaphysical perspective, Coulthard argues, means the very 
instrument of land-claims settlement attempts to “coercively integrate our land and 
communities into the fold of capitalist modernity.”65  
Key then in decolonisation is the reprioritizing of Aboriginal knowledge, of ways 
of knowing.66 For as surely as the territory of Aboriginal peoples have been colonized so 
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too have their minds.67  As Alfred and Corntassel argue “it is remembering ceremony, 
returning to homelands and liberation from the myths of colonialism that are the 
decolonizing imperatives.”68 It is not merely the retrograde image of the “Indian” that 
license colonialisms’ exception of Aboriginality that must be dealt with by 
decolonisation, but the interpretation and internalisation of that image. As it is “a self-
conscious kind of traditionalism that is the central process in the ‘reconstruction of 
traditional communities’ based on the original teachings and orienting values of 
Indigenous peoples,” which is decolonisation’s ally in the form of regeneration.69 These 
two concepts are allied as “both decolonization and resurgence facilitate a renewal of our 
roles and responsibilities as Indigenous peoples to the sustainable praxis of Indigenous 
livelihoods, food security, community governance, and relationships to the natural world 
and ceremonial life that enables the transmission of these cultural practices to future 
generations.”70  That is to say, at least part of decolonisation is decolonisation within the 
self and within Aboriginal communities. It would be a mistake, however, to take 
decolonisation as a complete rejection of everything furnished by the coloniser, and 
return to pre-colonial times for Aboriginal peoples. Speaking as an Indigenous woman 
Linda Smith argues it “is about centring our concerns and world views and then coming 
to know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own 
purposes.”71 
 Decolonisation has another formal political sense in which territory and the 
people upon it are freed from an alien structure of formal political power. In the case of 
European decolonisation of its former colonies in the 1960s and 1970s, the Union Jack 
was lowered across much of southern Africa, and the French Tricolour across the 
northwest of Africa. But this process is only one manifestation of decolonisation; at its 
heart decolonisation is the removal of alien formal political structures imposed upon a 
people and the ending of the hierarchical taxonomy of human beings, the latter being as 
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much concerned with culture as with formal politics. Decolonisation is a process that 
ultimately points to a goal of emancipation and equality and “it starts from the very first 
day with the basic claims of colonized.”72  In Canada this means, centrally, addressing the 
issue of sovereignty. As discussed below in Chapter 5, approaches to treaty federalism 
importantly point to an understanding of Aboriginal sovereignty conceived independently 
and equally with Crown sovereignty. I want to leave a thorough discussion of this issue 
for Chapter 5, but suffice it to say here that this approach aims at a truly nation-to-nation 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal nations. Dealing with the imposition of 
the Canadian state on Aboriginal peoples, however, is only one aspect of the complex 
phenomena of colonialism in its formal political guise. As Ladner points out, 
decolonisation is called for within Aboriginal communities as “decolonising Indigenous 
political structures means marking a departure from the Indian Act and its imposed 
system of band council government (designed to provide for indirect colonial rule) and 
allowing Indigenous peoples to decide how to govern themselves.”73 Here the facet of 
formal political decolonisation can be linked to epistemological decolonisation, as 
Aboriginal people decide for themselves how to be governed, how to organize their 
society. As Linda Smith puts it “decolonization, once viewed as the formal process of 
handing over the instruments of government, is now recognized as a long-term process 
involving the bureaucratic, cultural, linguistic and psychological divesting of colonial 
power.”74 
In the more specific context of Canada and the Indian Residential School system, 
it is clear that the colonial project, especially the IRS system, was a violent one. As 
Milloy carefully details, the philosophy of the IRS system was to “kill the Indian in the 
child.”75 Fanon expressly argues that decolonisation “is clearly an agenda for total 
disorder”76 and in Fanon’s conception violence is an indispensable part of the de-colonial 
project. It forms a sort of praxis where “each individual represents a violent link in the 
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great chain, in the almighty body of violence rearing up in reaction to the primary 
violence of the colonizer.”77 For Taiaiake Alfred, colonization is beastly assimilation, and 
it that beast that must be “beat[en] into submission and taught to behave.”78 It is easy to 
see how calls for decolonisation in Canada, as elsewhere, can run toward the violent in 
resisting such a violent force as colonisation. However, as the history of Algeria’s 
independence shows, Fanon may have “overstated the cleansing value” of violence.79 In a 
complex colonial environment like Canada where colonialism is not neatly localized, but 
rather diffuse, what Alfred describes as a “fluid confluence of politics, economics, 
psychology and culture,”80 violent resistance or violent decolonial revolution seems ill 
suited to the project of decolonisation.  
 Thus, rather than a revolutionary decolonisation, which calls upon violent 
resistance and liberation through force, this project is concerned with a more 
reformational decolonisation in Canada. At the end of the decolonial process in Canada, 
both the settler society and Aboriginal peoples will be left in the same territory. In the 
specific context of Canada then, decolonisation need involve not only the removal of an 
alien structure of power from Aboriginal peoples and the overturning of hierarchical 
taxonomies of humanity, both explicit and implicit, but must also contain some means of 
settler and Aboriginal peoples living together as neighbours in those shared spaces and 
territories. Unlike in Africa in mid-20th century, decolonisation in Canada cannot consist 
of any great power simply lowering its flag and the settlers leaving the territory; the 
situation is far too complicated for this as we have seen above. Aboriginal peoples live 
outside traditional territories in areas lawfully ceded to the Crown and inhabited by non-
Aboriginal peoples; land has been lawfully ceded and settled by newcomers, Aboriginal 
peoples have chosen to share this land with non-Aboriginal peoples. Canadian 
colonialism is not a matter of a few white administrators, but rather is a complex 
interconnection between settlers and Aboriginal peoples, which cannot be addressed by a 
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simple transfer of formal power.  Decolonisation, therefore, I argue must provide a way 
of living in peace and friendship once more.81  
 Thus, without prescribing a particular form of decolonisation, I wish to highlight 
what I take to be its most central qualities. In recognising the “inside” and “outside” that 
colonisation so problematically seeks to draw and dominate, decolonisation premised on 
striking down taxonomies of humanity and centred on dialogue rather than violence, can 
provide a fruitful path to living in true peace and concord. It is not that decolonisation can 
provide a final “bringing in” of the outside, but starting from the understanding of this 
complex relationship can drive an agency centred approach.  
 
What is Reconciliation? 
While colonisation and decolonisation have an explicit relationship, the latter seeking to 
undo the former, the connection of these concepts with reconciliation is not, on its face, 
clear. I argue here, however, that reconciliation is a decolonial process in the Canadian 
case, making this connect much more explicit. This section outlines what I take 
reconciliation to mean, which is bound up in a decolonisation that must work to unravel a 
state of Aboriginal exception in Canada. Thus, reconciliation builds on the above chain of 
concepts, for if exception is at work in colonisation and decolonisation seeks to remove 
alien power and a hierarchy of humanity inherent in colonialism, then reconciliation is 
unintelligible without these concepts. Here I provide the theoretical basis for the later 
discussion of reconciliation in Canada, and its prospect in relation to the Canadian TRC 
discussed in Chapter Six. Before we can move on to what I take reconciliation to be it 
will be helpful to ground that discussion in what others have said about reconciliation. It 
is important to note here that there is considerable debate about reconciliation in the 
literature and by highlighting these differences the groundwork will be laid for 
understanding reconciliation as politics. Looking to reconciliation as a process, goal, or 
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relationship, where it can occur alone, between people, between communities, and 
between states, helps us understand what might be meant by reconciliation. All of this 
points to reconciliation’s fundamentally political nature.  
There are a variety of ways in which the term reconciliation is used and 
understood. This has led to discussion and disagreement in the literature. Reconciliation 
as a concept and as an object of observation is difficult to define.82 As will be discussed 
below, much hangs on the way reconciliation is used and what it is taken to mean. As 
David Bloomfield notes, the absence of a clear definition of reconciliation is “observable 
not only among scholars and their writings; it is also reflected in policy circles, within 
governments, donor agencies, INGOs, IGOs, and so on.”83 There is deep uncertainty over 
what reconciliation is, no doubt due to its various “psychological, sociological, 
theological, philosophical, and profoundly human roots.”84 
 Moreover, while many consider reconciliation to be a process,85 reconciliation can 
also be viewed as an end state to be reached, and as both an end and a process. Audrey 
Chapman, for example, sees that reconciliation can  “best be understood as a multi-
dimensional and long-term process,”86 while John Paul Lederach sees reconciliation as a 
process “aimed at peace building and healing.”87 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Benniuk, 
however, argue that reconciliation is an end state, albeit one that is brought about by 
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psychological processes,88 while Bloomfield notes that reconciliation is both a process 
and end-state or goal.89 Daniel Philpott argues that in whatever form, as process or end 
state, reconciliation contains a “core proposition” that it is “itself a concept of justice.”90 
Further, the “animating virtue” of reconciliation is “mercy, and its goal peace.”91 How 
reconciliation is understood, as process, end state, or both, has important implication for 
what is meant by reconciliation, as we will see below. 
   Justice may not and, in fact, need not be the core concept or aim of reconciliation. 
Some rituals of reconciliation aim more at reintegration of the perpetrator back into the 
community and may not even have justice as a referent at all.92 That is to say, there need 
not be punishment or any offsetting action (restitution, apology, etc.) of some sort. 
Rather, simply the aim and desire to have an offender reintegrated into the community 
after the violation that caused them to break with it.  
 Perhaps more usefully, and without excluding justice per se, reconciliation can be 
thought of as relational.  This relational view of reconciliation is well supported in the 
literature. Hizkias Assefa argues that reconciliation seeks to “allow future positive 
relationships between opposing parties,”93 and Brandon Hamber and Gráinne Kelly see 
reconciliation as “the process of addressing conflictual and fractured relationships.”94 For 
Erin McCandless, reconciliation is a process that has as its goal a “more cooperative 
relationship.”95 Seen as a relationship the above distinction between process and goal 
becomes less helpful in understanding reconciliation, as a relationship is both at the same 
time. 
Moreover, this relationship need not be ideal. Louis Kriesberg argues that 
reconciliation is “the processes by which parties that have experienced an oppressive 
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relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or restore a 
relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable.”96 Here reconciliation has, as 
its primary referent, the restoration of the relationship between parties, rather than 
punishment and mitigation of wrongs. Thought of in this way, reconciliation is both 
process and end point, of sorts. As with a friendship between two people, reconciliation 
continues to be acted out in the interaction of the parties, but can be thought of an end 
point reached, as one thinks of acquiring a new friend. This friend will not remain such 
for long if the friendship is not acted out in the interaction, creating a paradoxical 
relationship between being and becoming. I take reconciliation to be a relationship in this 
way, and thus it requires continued action to sustain.  
 Beyond the realm of relationships, there are many dimensions of reconciliation. 
There is both internal reconciliation and external reconciliation.97 The former 
encompasses the psychological aspects of reconciliation, while the latter, the physical 
conditions of socio-political interactions and the space in which they occur.98 In the 
Canadian context, reconciliation is meant in this internal sense when it refers to “the 
diversity of individual or collective practices that Indigenous people undertake to 
reestablish a positive ‘relation-to-self’ in situations where this relation has been damaged 
or distorted by some form of symbolic or structural violence.”99 External reconciliation, 
meanwhile, is concerned with “restoring estranged or damaged social and political 
relationships.”100 But, these two dimensions of reconciliation can be seen as linked in the 
psychological context, as Bar-Tal and Benniuk argue that the internal process of 
psychological transformation leads to the end-goal of reconciliation, which is “the 
construction of lasting peaceful relations.”101 Thus, reconciliation is a complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon that works both in the public square, but also in the human 
psyche.   
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 There are also different levels at which reconciliation can function. Mark Amstutz 
broadly conceives of two levels at which reconciliation can operate, the micro-level and 
the macro-level.102 In contrast, Erin Daly and Jeremy Sarkin argue for a more nuanced 
understanding, one in which reconciliation can happen either “alone or with others.”103 
Moreover, it “can be oral (‘I’m sorry’; ‘I forgive you’) or written (a charter or a peace 
accord) or symbolic (a handshake, or wearing of the other side’s colors, the payment of 
money, the sharing of a drink, a hug).”104  
These instances of reconciliation can operate on the individual level alone, but it 
is once reconciliation happens between individuals that we can see it much more clearly. 
This is the level of interpersonal reconciliation.105 At this level, acts that are both private 
and public begin to overcome the state of enmity that exists between people and can be as 
simple as neighbour talking to neighbour. This type of regular contact can take the form 
of an incremental process by which people “begin to trust each other in smaller and then 
in progressively more significant ways.”106 Intra-community reconciliation can consist in 
these spontaneous acts, many of which involve compelling visuals such as handshakes or 
hugs, but it can also consist of more ritualized reintegrative measures.  
 Inter-community reconciliation is another level at which reconciliation can 
operate. Here reconciliation is between communities, within a state. This level of 
reconciliation is quite different than the ones outlined above and need not “depend on the 
kind of intimacy that religious and some forms of individual reconciliation may 
demand.”107 Operating nationally, reconciliation can be about the constitution or 
reconstitution of shared ties of belonging; for example the aim of the South African TRC 
was to promote national unity by linking white and black South Africans to a new multi-
racial view of South Africa.  This was also the goal in the reunification of East and West 
Germany, where the challenge was to foster identity and a sense of loyalty to the newly 
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recreated Germany.108 At this level, reconciliation “can be thought of as the development 
of a sense of national citizenship, or loyalty to the nation.”109 This loyalty could be the 
aim of a new constitution, national anthem, or new holidays. As cultural symbols such as 
the anthem, flag, and other civic rituals have become tarnished by the abuse that is to be 
overcome, it is at these sites that there are important opportunities to say something new 
and different about a people. That is to say, the construction of a new national narrative 
can be an important part of national reconciliation.110 But here we must be careful as 
these new narratives and symbols can as easily exclude and marginalise as those they 
replaced did. Perhaps more insidious, these new claims to inclusive nationalism can be a 
distraction or misdirection from meaningful social, political, and economic changes that 
would substantially include those pervious excluded.  
 In South Africa, the post-Apartheid government adopted a new flag that no longer 
featured the colonial imagery of the British flag and the two Dutch colonies amalgamated 
into British South Africa.111 In Australia’s quest for reconciliation, a national “Sorry 
Day” was enacted as a day on which to commemorate the past, and hundreds of 
thousands of Australians signed “Sorry Books” in the wake of the report on the stolen 
generations.112 These types of symbolic actions can significantly help to recreate a new 
national narrative, where the previously excluded can be included. They can form a 
backdrop for more substantive action that would bring these people into the new national 
fold. 
 Inter-community reconciliation can also occur at the international level. This sort 
of reconciliation may be the easiest to observe and understand, as it is often public and 
newsworthy. It can be made manifest as normalized diplomatic and economic 
relationships between states, or a process leading toward these. Inter-state reconciliation 
is usually less emotional than that of individual, intra-community, or national 
reconciliation. This is the case “in part because it is more abstract and in part because 
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those who would resist reconciliation need not participate or even accept it; most citizens 
will not be substantially affected by international reconciliation one way or the other.”113 
Inter-state reconciliation that would lead to the reestablishment of an embassy or normal 
diplomatic relations demands little effort from most citizens and may not even impact 
them at all.  
 In addition to these various levels at which reconciliation can operate, what 
reconciliation actually is can be understood in a variety of ways. Definitions of 
reconciliation abound, ranging from the colloquial contained in a dictionary definition to 
the philosophical and theological. There are seemingly simple definitions such as that 
brought forth by Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts, who argue that reconciliation is “making 
good again.”114 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma Benniuk argue that all scholars of 
reconciliation agree that the concept “concerns the formation or restoration of genuine 
peaceful relationship between societies that have been involved in an intractable conflict, 
after its formal resolution is achieved.”115 There are definitions that seek to reclaim 
conceptual precision such as Jens Meierhenrich’s contention that “reconciliation refers to 
the accommodation of former adversaries through mutually conciliatory means, requiring 
both forgiveness and mercy.”116  And the above definition of reconciliation by Philpott as 
a kind of mercy that purposefully draws a link to theological considerations of the 
Abrahamic faiths, to create a broader reach for reconciliation.117 There is also the 
explicitly theological, such as St. Paul’s description of the figure of Jesus Christ as 
reconciliation.118 Thus, as with other terms and concepts that exist in a complex network 
of practices, reconciliation can be seen as what W. B. Gallie famously called an 
“essentially contested concept.”119 That is to say, reconciliation is a concept “the proper 
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use of which involves endless disputes about [its] proper use on the part of [its] users.”120 
We should be sanguine about the challenges of giving content to reconciliation, and 
aware that reconciliation may mean different things to different people. This is a 
significant aspect of the political nature of reconciliation. 
Adding to this problem of definition in the case of Canada is the complex 
interaction between overarching colonial and assimilationist policies and the specific 
abuses and colonial policies of the Indian Residential School system. At least part of 
reconciliation in Canada is meant to deal with the abuse that took place within the 
residential school system—sexual, physical, and emotional—neglect, and racism, while 
recognising these harms stemmed from government policies. But I argue that beyond 
these individual incidents reconciliation must deal with the system of colonisation that 
led to the creation of the Indian Residential School system itself, exactly because 
colonialism is so intricately connected to the IRS system. While directing reconciliation 
to such a large system phenomena as colonisation might be overly ambitious, at 
minimum reconciliation in Canada needs to go beyond the individual acts committed 
against the school survivors and address the colonial aspect of the IRS system. 
 The diversity of meanings of the term “reconciliation” makes talk of 
reconciliation particularly complicated in transitional or divided societies. There can be a 
great deal of suspicion on the part of both parties over the invocation of reconciliation. 
For something like reconciliation to emerge, there needs to be some agreement on the 
content of the term. However, as Richard Wilson points out, the requirement for a 
“shared moral fabric” which is implied by reconciliation “has the potential to coerce 
individuals into compliant positions they would not adopt of their own volition.”121 This 
may lead to a peace that is bought by an inequality of power, one that begs quiet 
resignation to the hopelessness of overturning it. In this way, a “shared moral fabric” can 
have the effect of re-inscribing the violence that reconciliation is meant to transcend. That 
is to say, reconciliation contains a danger of being reconciled to one’s fate, or de facto 
acceptance because there is no alternative. The definition that Bar-Tal and Benniuk offer 
above, for example, need not involve overturning currently unjust relations at all, as the 
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“formation or restoration of genuine peaceful relationship” could mean nothing more than 
a cessation of hostilities. Such a cessation could be brought about by overwhelming force, 
or the realization that overcoming the force of the other is impossible. 
 In fact, Susan Dwyer argues that reconciliation is nothing more than “bringing 
apparently incompatible descriptions of events into narrative equilibrium.”122 For Dwyer, 
reconciliation is a much less ambitious project than a peaceful or just relationship. It is 
meant simply to “lessen the sting of tension: to make sense of injuries, new beliefs, and 
attitudes in the overall narrative context.”123  It is understandable that one party having a 
fuller interpretation of reconciliation might be dubious of the process if the other party 
holds this thin view. Narrative coherence and consistence needs neither point to a new 
cooperative environment nor be linked to conciliatory mechanisms such as forgiveness or 
apology. It should not, for Dwyer, be “touted as aiming at the happy and harmonious 
coexistence of former enemies.”124  
 Moreover, for Dwyer reconciliation should not be confused with justice. “Political 
leaders should not pretend that reconciliation is the same as justice.”125 A perspective on 
reconciliation that sees it as coexistence or toleration need not even imply a cessation of 
hostility, or a background of hostility; as seen in the Cold War where the great powers of 
the West and the Soviet bloc coexisted, but were still quite hostile.126  
 The difficulty in defining reconciliation, taken with its quality of essential 
contestation,127 tells us, not trivially, that reconciliation is, at its heart, political.128 It is not 
necessarily political in the sense of formal or electoral politics. Rather, reconciliation is 
political in a fuller sense of being dialogical, contestable, and contingent. 129  
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Reconciliation does have clear formal political applications. In South Africa, for 
example, the enabling legislation of the TRC made explicit reference to reconciliation’s 
role in the creation of a new South Africa. Thus, reconciliation was explicitly bound up 
with nation building. In South Africa it was stated “the object of the Commission shall be 
to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends 
the conflicts and divisions of the past.”130 In the case of Australia, a formal reconciliation 
process was undertaken against the backdrop of Australian nationalism, where it was the 
desire of at least part of the government to clear up “the unfinished business that the 
Aboriginal affairs policy represented” by the time of the centenary of the Australian 
federation in 2001.131 While these two examples, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Six, had formal political aspects, these are just aspects of the broader work to overturn the 
view of the colonised as inferior to the coloniser.  
 For reconciliation to be more than reconciliation to one’s fate it must be a 
disruptive disjuncture with the past. Theodor Adorno argues that the “spell of the past” 
must be broken and that “we will not have come to terms with the past until the causes of 
what happened then are no longer active.”132 It is not a denial of the past or a 
“whitewashing” of it, but, rather, crucially depends on a transformation of the present 
relationship to it. “It is a matter of the way in which the past is called up and made 
present.”133 Even Dwyer’s thin definition of narrative coherence identifies two important 
facets of reconciliation: that it is linked to language, and that it unsettles something that 
had previously been unfairly settled. For Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts, reconciliation in 
South Africa was going to bring about “a rupture with the skewed ethics of apartheid, and 
so upset any possibility of smooth sailing on a previously immoral course.”134 In a sense, 
then, reconciliation holds out the offer of being not just a politics, but also a generative 
politics; a politics that is capable of transformational change. Taking reconciliation 
seriously as politics, I argue, can leave us in a fertile place for understanding what to do 
in the wake of conflict. Moreover, taking a close look at what reconciliation as politics 
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means can help us better understand its specific applicability in the case of Canada and 
the Indian Residential Schools truth commission. 
 
Reconciliation as Politics 
At one level, political reconciliation involves matters of state, and the state’s relation to 
its citizens. Here it is a matter of formal politics: Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse claim 
that reconciliation is “a necessary requirement for the long-term survival of 
democracy.”135 They further note that a polity left unreconciled will be unable to support 
a “political system based on respect for human rights and democratic structures.”136  
Similarly, the type of political reconciliation Philpott argues for is primarily concerned 
with “those relationships that are proper to the political order, that is, rights and duties 
that are shared reciprocally among citizens, between citizens and states, and between 
states in the international system.”137  
Reconciliation certainly has a formal political aspect, but at another level political 
reconciliation involves so much more. Here it is closely bound to justice, as it “seeks not 
only to restore rights and the laws and institutions that guarantee them but also to redress 
[a] wide range of injuries.”138 Injustices that are social or economic, beyond the ambit of 
formal politics per se, yet clearly related to it, are also the subject of reconciliation.  For 
Philpott, the “primary wounds” that political injustice inflicts can be redressed with six 
practices to which an ethic of political reconciliation is directed: building socially just 
government institutions; acknowledgment of the suffering of victims by the community; 
reparations; punishment; apology; and forgiveness.139 Again, some of these are clearly 
about formal political arrangements and a state’s relationship with its citizens. Making 
these institutions workable requires more than state action.  
 Reconciliation is broadly applicable to the public square, not just formal political 
arrangements between state and citizen. As Philpott’s definition recognizes, 
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reconciliation involves speech, but for Doxtader, reconciliation can be understood best as 
a rhetorical concept. That is to say, reconciliation is an idea that is made in speech. This 
is necessary because of its ambiguity. “What is reconciliation? If not paradox, our 
answers court performative contradiction: the act of defining reconciliation depends on a 
logic that the concept and practice of reconciliation appears to upset.”140 Moreover, “in 
(re)making what is, somehow converting one state of affairs or mind to another, 
reconciliation opposes the way in which we establish the essence (the exclusivity) of 
things, challenges the ways that we justify the value of such distinctions, and endeavours 
to dismantle those modes of definition that legitimize identitarian violence.”141  
 In addition to generating new (political) arrangements, I argue that reconciliation 
has the ability to transform what already exists. This is not unimportant, as the generation 
of an entirely new state, or new institutions, may not always be possible or desirable. In 
ancient Athens, the “reconciliation” of the 5th century B.C.E. involved “a close relation 
between poiēsis and logos.”142 Poiēsis is Greek for production, and logos means, broadly, 
philosophy, or, put differently, reasoning and discussion. Thus, reconciliation here brings 
together practice and theory (or thought).143 It was conceived as a “question that calls for 
speech, [it] is a potential (dunamis) to make with words.”144 It is within language and 
speech that the potential and reason of reconciliation is present. Reconciliation’s 
fundamental promise of transformation is in its “power to turn one kind of relationship 
into another,” notably through words. 145 Here this turn of one kind of relationship into 
another may be less structural and more ideational, as formal aspects of it remain 
unchanged whereas how these aspects are understood have the ability to transform the 
relationship. Indeed, it is easy to imagine how this might work in the case of institutions, 
where formal aspects of them remain scarcely altered overtime, but how the institution is 
theorized may transform it, effectively transforming the institution itself. How agents of 
the institution may act can change, but the institution itself can remain unaltered.  
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To be clear, Doxtader also contends that reconciliation has a generative aspect; 
just when the law fails in its promise of justice, reconciliation offers an opportunity of 
generation, of (re)constitution. “It affords standing to citizens, creating a time in which it 
is possible to invent topoi that recover and support deliberation in the wake of its 
collapse.”146 What is significant and exciting about this concept is that it puts dialogue 
and discussion at the centre of reconciliation, which holds out the possibility of 
establishing the rules and structure of these discussions to transform peoples’ 
philosophical understanding of what is established. 
 Doxtader’s approach can help us understand the time of reconciliation, and the 
space for its performative speech actions. Doxtader understands this “time in which it is 
possible to invent topoi,” as a moment in which to make history and break from the past. 
It is a time of generation that stands apart from normal time; it is a time of opportunity.147   
 The rhetorical aspects of reconciliation are important in adding another layer to 
the complexity of politicking about reconciliation. Dialogue and interaction between 
parties are intimately connected to language. The transformative power of reconciliation, 
and its generative power, for that matter, involves the rhetoric that brings reconciliation 
into being. As Doxtader argues, the reality of reconciliation is “wed to words, the power 
of logos to turn us from one condition to another and the actions of speech that provoke 
us to reflect on how we talk and to what ends.”148 What this moment in a time set aside 
from time can open up is “an occasion for talk, [which] performs the movement of 
relationships, and inaugurates deliberative controversy about the form and substance of 
collective life.”149 Transforming and transcending the identities of oppressor and victim is 
a dialogical, speech-centred, endeavour that is part of the aim of reconciliation. 
Moreover, the centrality of dialogue to reconciliation gives us a clue to its cooperative 
basis, for a conversation is not made alone, without something like equal engagement it is 
a monologue. 
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 Reconciliation as a project of politics is not straightforward, especially in colonial 
societies.  Motha argues that the emphasis that reconciliation places on commonality can 
have the perverse effect of reinforcing the unjust relations of power it seeks to overturn. 
For Motha, “reconciliation is marked and delineated by the possibility of producing a 
renewed polity or ‘political community.’”150 The danger here is that the “process of re-
inscribing the ‘political’ under ‘one-law’ subordinates indigenous laws and customs, once 
again, in the name of ‘civilization,’ and its new effigies, democracy and human rights.”151 
Corntassel, similarly views reconciliation with suspicion, seeing it, along with rights and 
resources, as one of “three main themes that are commonly invoked by colonial entities to 
divert attention away from deep decolonizing movements and push us towards a state 
agenda of co-optation and assimilation.”152 So reconciliation conceived as politics does 
not entirely resolve the ongoing concern to avoid having a process directed against 
colonialism contain colonialism.  For example the unilateral subjection of Aboriginal 
peoples to a Western human rights framework (such as a bill of rights) does not overturn 
the paternalism of colonisation, but merely re-inscribes it into a new rights discourse, as 
the coloniser still in part seeks to save the colonised from their barbarity. This may be 
motivated by the best of intentions, but in the unilateral construction of “one-law” to rule 
the land, the inequalities of power between settlers and natives are played out again and 
what is left is not a new law, but rather the same colonial law re-invented.  
Motha argues that Australia has suffered just this sort of impediment to 
reconciliation. With an insistence on a “unitary political community,” the Australian 
approach has only reproduced an assimilationist tendency.153 This highlights a central 
tension so often felt in the application of reconciliation, between creating a just order and 
just creating order. Motha calls this unfortunate result a “double move: both 
emancipatory demand and device by which an enforced commonality can be re-inscribed. 
In the latter move reconciliation is nothing less than domination.”154 
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Picking up on this double movement, Schaap argues that the tensions of reconciliation 
can be viewed as politics and ideology, respectively.155 Schaap deals with six prominent 
objections to reconciliation.  Rather than countering these critiques of reconciliation as an 
ideology with moral idealism, Schaap demonstrates how reconciliation can be recast as 
“politics that is reducible neither to violence nor consensus, although it is conditioned by 
the possibility of both.”156 By discussing each of these objections and how Schaap 
responds to them, we can see how reconciliation fits into the realm of politics, refining 
reconciliation as political concept. As I want to follow Schaap closely in understanding 
reconciliation, it is helpful to detail his response to these six objects, and in so doing 
elucidate the political character of reconciliation. 
 First, Schaap argues against the objection that reconciliation is problematic 
because it has, at best, an ambiguous definition. Schaap calls this the “ambiguity 
objection.”157 This ambiguity refers to the difficulty of defining reconciliation, 
highlighted above. In addition to the problems of conceptualizing and then 
operationalizing reconciliation that have been highlighted by Meierhenrich, there are the 
practical problems that arise in the application of reconciliation when there is not a clear 
definition, or when stakeholders have differing definitions of reconciliation. In the case of 
the formal Australian reconciliation process, Andrew Gunstone argues that the education 
goal of the process failed, in part, because of “the confusion over the meaning of the term 
reconciliation.”158  However, it is this vague and contestable quality that most commends 
reconciliation as a political approach. As Schaap points out: “[i]f we had to agree on a 
definition of reconciliation before we could begin to reconcile, reconciliation would 
never be initiated.”159 Moreover, it is this tension of contestability that can prove most 
fruitful as it gives hope to those involved by providing “the basis for an overlapping 
dissensus in relation to which people can debate and contest the terms of their political 
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association.”160 This dissensus goes to the very foundation of political association, in 
contrast to consensus, which presupposes having sorted out fundamental principles of 
interaction and legitimacy. An overlapping dissensus mobilizes reconciliation around the 
very issues of injustice that necessitate reconciliation and provides fertile ground for a 
political (re)association.161 In this way, the contestability of reconciliation “enables an 
agonistic politics that is potentially constitutive of political community.”162  
A predetermined approach to reconciliation opens the process—especially in post-
colonial or de-colonizing societies—to the domination with which Motha is concerned. 
Thus, as Schaap rightly asserts: “If reconciliation depends on a population within a state 
coming to think of itself as a people, then a particular conception of reconciliation cannot 
be determined in advance but must be worked out politically by those who would get 
together to reconcile in the first place.”163 This aspect is important to keep in mind in the 
case of Canada, as the inequality of power between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples 
raises the possibility of domination in the reconciliation process. The full and active 
participation of the parties to the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement is 
important for reconciliation to avoid the negative aspects of a predetermined approach. 
 Second, Schaap deals with the criticism that reconciliation is illiberal. Critics posit 
that to the extent that reconciliation is pursued in liberal societies, or as Philpott suggests, 
builds on the “liberal peace,”164 reconciliation’s illiberality is problematic.165 It is 
specifically problematic that to the extent that reconciliation seeks to enact an ideal 
society that is united and harmonious, it demands too much.166 This leads some, such as 
Dwyer, to pursue a more limited and “realistic” reconciliation; perhaps, something closer 
to peace and coexistence.167 Schaap, however, argues that this misses the “constitutive, 
foundational dimension of human rights that is implicit in the promise ‘Never Again.’”168 
More importantly, it fails to deal with why people who live in close proximity should 
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look to the same institutions and laws to safeguard their rights.169 That is to say, it 
presumes too much, failing to return to the beginning to re-establish an order that avoids 
the pitfalls of the past. An approach to reconciliation that eschews anything more than 
peaceful coexistence expressly denies the “constitutive” function of articulating a “thick” 
description of reconciliation based on a respect for others and expressed in commitments 
to human rights. When human rights are themselves cast in the light of the political, the 
declaration “Never Again” can be seen “insofar as it expresses a collective intention, [as] 
an act of self-determination.”170 This is to say that reconciliation, from a political 
standpoint, cannot presuppose a party’s interest in securing human rights, but, rather, 
must make the discussion of the good a foundational part of the politics of reconciliation. 
In Canada the monological idea of the supposed good forced on Aboriginal people, 
perhaps most clearly through the Indian Residential Schools System is part of what needs 
to be overturned through reconciliation. More specifically the dialogue over a new and 
shared concept of the good cannot take the Crown at its word alone, nor presuppose that 
it respects human rights, as it is exactly its obfuscation of these that must be reckoned 
with in reconciliation.  
 Third, Schaap deals with the “question-begging objection.” The question that is 
begged by reconciliation is what relationship is there to return to, as implied by the “re” 
in reconciliation. There can be considerable debate whether anything like a justice 
relation ever existed between parties before the rupture; thus, the appropriateness of 
“reconciliation” is brought into question. This is an important consideration for Canada 
and is discussed in more detail below. Here Schaap points out that reconciliation often 
involves or refers to a restoration of friendly relations. However, as in some post-colonial 
or de-colonising societies, there is no such a priori state to be restored.171 To the extent 
that reconciliation is conceived in an ethical-philosophical sense of the reunion with a 
community that one has been disunited with by violation of common norm—which as 
Bennett describes is a “story of alienation and return”172—it is problematic in 
communities that have definitive norms to which to return. Schaap again, points to the 
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example of Australia, describing it as a context “in which violence and oppression against 
the colonized was legitimated in the terms of the shared moral norms of the 
colonizers.”173 Here reconciliation as a story of alienation and return would run headlong 
into the dominating norms of colonisation itself, which is expressly what reconciliation 
seeks to overturn. It can be of little surprise then, that colonized peoples are “suspicious 
of the ‘re’ in reconciliation.”174  
 Again, this is the domination with which Motha is concerned. To subsume 
reconciliation into a false “we,” or some sort of imagined unity, is to deny the 
“emancipatory demand” that reconciliation makes. What Schaap offers here is a politics 
of reconciliation that is a way of “distinguishing between the proto-political community 
of equals to which the “re” in reconciliation refers, and the determinate political 
association that it potentially calls into question.”175 In this way reconciliation cannot be 
an end of politics, and cannot aim at an ideal community, which a given community 
would approximate. Rather, it stands in complex relationship with that community, in its 
impossibility of realization; it is not “a blue print for a new society as utopias are 
sometimes interpreted.”176 As Kerruish argues, this means that reconciliation’s 
“conceptual link is to freedom, [and] in the Australian context, decolonisation.”177 This is 
also the case for Canada, I argue below, where reconciliation must be linked to 
decolonisation and must aim at some finishing place where a way of living together and 
sharing—land, or institutions, or whatever may be negotiated—is not the final realization 
of its own goal, at least not in a way that limits freedom and other constitutive aspects of 
agonistic politics.  In this way, the “re” does not involve return to a prior community, but 
the return to the beginning of constructing community itself in a political, and therefore 
discursive, way.  
 Fourth, objections can be raised against reconciliation in its capacity for nation 
building. In the case of South Africa, it was the nation building project of Apartheid 
which led to wide spread injustice, as it excluded black South Africans from the white 
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dominated polity, society, and economy. In the cases of Australia and Canada, again, a 
nation-building project is at the heart of injustice, this time directed not at exclusion, per 
se, but toward assimilation. This is what Schaap calls the “assimilation objection.” 
Reconciliation can overdetermine the incorporation of disparate factions into the new 
political community. In cases where wronged parties may not want to remain in the same 
community as their perpetrators, there is a danger that reconciliation as nation building 
will presuppose and then guarantee the incorporation of the wronged party into the new 
community, regardless of the understandable and legitimate reservations of the wronged.  
In post-colonial or de-colonising contexts especially, there is a danger that reconciliation 
will be assimilative, “since it seeks to overcome the state’s crisis of legitimacy by 
incorporating the colonized into the political community as free and equal citizens rather 
than recognizing their right not to reconcile.”178  
 If the wrong to which reconciliation is directed is one that emanates from the 
foundation of a nation, or to its incorporation of other peoples into its polity, then 
reconciliation as nation building runs the serious danger of failing to transcend or 
overturn the very wrong it has sought to redress. The national unity to which the South 
African TRC was expressly directed forestalled any questions about whether white and 
black South Africans even wanted to live under shared institutions. Reconciliation that 
seeks to correct historical inconsistencies with current national projections, especially in 
post-colonial societies, overdetermines the composition of the political community, the 
questioning of which may be the demand of an emancipatory reconciliation. That is to 
say, it may be the case that victims of past abuses no longer want to live under the same 
institutions as their perpetrators, and it is this questioning of the composition of the new 
political community that might well be demanded by an emancipatory reconciliation.  
Schaap points out that reconciliation in Australia “was supposed to be achieved to 
coincide with the centenary of the Australian Federation in 2001, pointing to the close 
connection between the concept of reconciliation and nation-building in Australia in the 
1990s.”179 Following Christodoulidis’ discussion of reconciliation as risk,180 Schaap 
                                                          
178 Schaap, “Reconciliation as Ideology and Politics,” 255. 
179 Ibid., 255. 
180 Emilios Christodoulidis, “Truth and Reconciliation as Risks,” Social and Legal Studies vol. 9 (2000), 
179-204. Christodoulidis concludes that we can richly theorize a reconciliation that “involves a certain leap 
62 
 
argues that a politics of reconciliation can help to (re)found a political community, if 
attention can be drawn to the political risk involved in attempting such an ambitious 
project.181 Risk of a generative politics must be assumed, which can create a community 
that overcomes the injustices of the past. That is to say, this sees “the present as a point of 
origin.”182 That an endeavour to create such a community might fail is not necessarily a 
weakness, but bespeaks the sincerity of the effort. As Christodoulidis argues, and Schaap 
would appear to agree: 
 Reconciliation is ‘not yet’; and this ‘not-yet’ is a risk brought into the present to 
 become constitutive of the experience of the present. As such, it is to be 
 celebrated. Because this ‘not-yet’, this tending into the future imports an 
 awareness that keeps community both attuned to the aspiration of being-in- 
 common and aware of its vulnerability; it thus taps the source of its being,  to the 
 extent that community must be conceived as dynamic, as always in the process of 
 becoming.183 
 
In Canada determining the exact shape of the community that will ultimately result from 
decolonisation is part of the process, but a community of some sort will inevitably have 
to exist as Aboriginal peoples and Canadians overlap geographically. At the very least it 
will involve a relationship between communities.  
 Fifth, Schaap deals with the “quietest objection,” which involves the invocation of 
reconciliation as a form of resignation, with the maligned party being reconciled to its 
fate.  In the name of enforced commonality victims may be required to forgive and forget, 
making reconciliation little more than being “reconciled to domination.”184 
Reconciliation becomes quietist to the extent that it is not concerned with justice. Rather, 
Schaap argues, “a willingness to reconcile should be understood as providing a political 
context in terms of which justice can be staged.”185 Justice and politics exist in a complex 
relationship to one another, and in reconciliation both justice and politics are at the heart 
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of the thing itself. As Schaap rightly points out, it is justice “that depends on political 
institutions for its (imperfect) realization,”186 and it is these very institutions that 
reconciliation scrutinizes. A politics of reconciliation is intimately linked to justice and 
should refuse a demand for resignation on the part of the oppressed. Instead, it “requires 
finding reasons to reconcile in order to redeem the offer of forgiveness that made possible 
the foundation of a new political association.”187 It recognizes the gift of the oppressed in 
their willingness to reconcile in the face of their right not to and introduces reflexivity to 
the oppressor and demands they furnish reasons for reconciliation.188 This theme is 
discussed again below, but what it means for the Canadian case is that reconciliation 
concerns the dominant society and more importantly the Crown. This implies the active 
participation by the coloniser in an ethical-political process that requires the case to be 
made for living together in peace and friendship, as I put it earlier. But the participation 
of the dominant society must take a form that allows Aboriginal expression, lest it force a 
dominating reconciliation on Aboriginal peoples.  
 Sixth, Schaap deals with the “exculpatory objection,” which says reconciliation 
“enables those ordinary citizens collectively implicated in past injustices as beneficiaries 
of a regime to evade assuming any real responsibility by lapsing into a sentimental 
politics of guilt or shame.”189  While guilt and shame on the part of the oppressor may be 
helpful emotions that lead to constructive action that might redress the injustice over 
which these people feel guilty or shameful, these can also lead to an empty 
sentimentality. A feeling of shame or guilt can become sentimental, argues Schaap, 
“when it centers attention on feeling good about ourselves and our nation rather than on 
what can be done to redress the situation.”190 These feelings of shame or guilt need to 
lead oppressors to shared responsibility that “needs to be thought of in terms of a 
responsibility that is responsive to the political claims of those who suffered previous 
injustices.”191 These feelings can neither be ephemerally sentimental nor paralyzingly 
real, but, rather, must be part of a continual unsettling that will lead to a politics of 









reconciliation that “would seek to realize political community while acknowledging the 
impossibility of any final settling of accounts.”192 In Canada, the dominant society cannot 
rest at feeling guilt for past actions by the Crown, centring reconciliation unduly on the 
oppressors. Rather, the disquiet we ought to feel as part of the reconciliation process 
needs to be mobilised to political action and dialogue to ensure a return to living together 
in peace and friendship and the maintenance thereafter.  
 Schaap’s politics of reconciliation is shifting, contingent, and contestable. Rather 
than the ideological approach that seeks to prefigure and overdetermine reconciliation as 
an end—and by doing so, to specify in advance its content—a politics of reconciliation 
sets the forum in which the contestability of reconciliation can play out. Thus, we can 
understand the politics of reconciliation in these terms: it is a generative and 
transformative ethic, one that provides a forum for a dialogue of possibility with urgency, 
but without pre-scribing the ultimate end of reconciliation. It must take seriously the 
conversational quality, and parties to reconciliation must approach it with the 
understanding of the contestability and contingency of reconciliation, and willingly be 
open to the self-transformation and opposition that can be wrought through 
reconciliation. This helps form the basis for how I understand reconciliation, which will 
have implications for understanding reconciliation in the Canadian case. This discussion, 
however, leaves open the question of return that the “re” in reconciliation implies, which 
is especially important as I continue to refer to living together in peace and friendship. 
 
 
(Re)Conciliation or Reconciliation? 
The problem of reconciliation in post-colonial or de-colonising societies, as discussed by 
Schaap above, is a problem of return (regeneration) or constitution (generation). This is 
the problem of the “re” in reconciliation. For the Canadian case it is an important to deal 
with the disjuncture between conciliation and reconciliation. John Amagoalik argues that, 
properly speaking, in Canada we need conciliation, rather than reconciliation.193 There is 
nothing positive to return to, as “the history of this relationship [between Europeans and 
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the original inhabitants of North America] is marked by crushing colonialism, attempted 
genocide, wars, massacres, theft of land and resources, broken treaties, broken promises, 
abuse of human rights, relocations, residential schools, and so on.”194 Thus, as there “has 
been no harmonious relationship, we have to start with conciliation.”195  This requires the 
coming together for the first time in peaceful and harmonious way. The difference here is 
more than semantics, as the Canadian TRC contains within its terms of reference, as a 
principle, the fostering of reconciliation on many levels and between many groups, not a 
commitment to conciliation.  
 Moreover, conciliation’s effective link is to notions of mere coexistence. As 
Amagoalik notes in his definition of conciliation, it is directed towards overcoming 
distrust, gaining good will, or being agreeable.196 That is understandable, as the degree to 
which conciliation is connected to coexistence is less epistemologically demanding than 
reconciliation and can circumvent many of the above pitfalls. Reconciliation is 
demanding, much more so than conciliation, and may be an “unrealistic goal for 
postconﬂict peacebuilding, especially in the aftermath of genocide.”197  However, the 
suspicion of reconciliation is also justified in a worry over its nation-building qualities. If, 
as Motha has described reconciliation in Australia, it is “a neo-imperial gesture... [that] 
subordinates indigenous laws and customs, once again, in the name of ‘civilisation,”198 
then Canadian Aboriginal peoples have good cause to treat reconciliation with 
scepticism, if not hostility. To do so would be a mistake, one that would make the project 
of dealing with the legacy of the Indian Residential School System much more difficult. 
 In Chapter Four I outline a history of Indigenous-European relations that does 
have a harmoniousness to which it can return. This, in fact, is part of the decolonial 
contention of “treaty federalism” discussed in Chapter Five. But I want to bracket this 
fact and follow Schaap here, and suggest that in Canada, what is called for is exactly the 
politics of reconciliation that can avoid the ideological tendencies that lead to the 
weaponization of reconciliation. As Motha puts it, the “emancipatory demands” of 
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reconciliation are what matter. Part of a politics of reconciliation, which overcomes the 
suspicions of the “re” in reconciliation, is the need for “an admission of the facticity of 
the political community with its origin in violence and the fiction of any reference to an 
original harmony that might be restored.”199 In many important ways, as will be seen, any 
harmony between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples predates the establishment of the 
Canadian state as we know it now. 
It is also important to note the role of treaties in the early context of Canada, as a 
device that might prove fruitful for the articulation of a new relationship between the 
Canadian Crown and Aboriginal peoples. In January 2012 a Crown-First Nations meeting 
was held in Ottawa, called to address issues facing First Nations, especially in the wake 
of widely publicized reports of substandard housing on remote reserves.200 The state of 
housing was brought under public scrutiny late in 2011 when Attawapiskat, a remote 
First Nations community in Northern Ontario, declared a state of emergency due to many 
of its inhabitants living in poorly heated tents and garages with winter about to set in. The 
outcome of the Crown-First Nations summit highlighted the need to begin to take the 
words and spirit of the Royal Proclamation 1763 seriously in addressing issues facing 
First Nations in Canada.201 That is, taking seriously a relationship of equals between 
Crown and Aboriginal nations could be a productive starting position for addressing 
issues created under the unequal colonial relationship.  
 More specifically, what is called for by a politics of reconciliation in Canada is a 
politics of agonism that follows Schaap and that is mindful of the transformational and 
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speech aspects of reconciliation highlighted by Doxtader.202 This is a politics that 
eschews the “friends and enemies” economy of Polemarchus or Schmitt.203 Rather it is a 
politics that gives standing to the other as interlocutor and understands the contestability 
of political decisions. It is Schmitt’s understanding of politics that Mouffe extends and 
contradicts in building up a theory of agonistic politics.204 While I do not want to 
belabour the point, it is worth pausing for a moment to understand Mouffe’s argument for 
agonism, especially given the off-hand reference by Schaap to the politics of 
reconciliation being agonistic.205 
 For Mouffe, politics is conflictual.  Agonistic politics, however, seeks to see the 
other “not as an enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence is legitimate 
and must be tolerated.”206 Politics cannot, in a sense, be seen as settlement, as finally and 
completely deciding something. Decisions have to be open to be re-decided. As Schaap 
says, it is not the closing of accounts, but the taking seriously of the political claims of 
those who have suffered injustice.207 Reconciliation as agonistic politics cannot seek to 
destroy the other with a settlement or suppose that once an argument is settled that the act 
of politicking is over. Agonistic politics is juxtaposed to liberal politics, as at its heart 
there is significant contingency and undecidability.208 The proper task, therefore, of 
politics, “instead of shying away from the component of violence and hostility inherent in 
social relations, is to think how to create the conditions under which those aggressive 
forces can be defused and diverted and a pluralist order made possible.”209 It is the 
essential contestability of all decisions that needs to be recognized. These decisions 
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necessarily occur in an arena of undecidability and represent only a contingent ordering 
of values to reach a decision. It must be recognized that in choosing there has been an un-
choice; that is, some other avenue has been closed as a result of the specific decision 
taken.  It is because of the dual nature of choice that contestability must be retained after 
political decisions have been taken.  For Mouffe, the political decision must be subjected 
to the conflict of interests that constitutes politics. 
 In this way, it is fair to say that Canada needs reconciliation, both between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, and between Aboriginal peoples and Canadians 
generally. What reconciliation will look like is a matter of dialogical and political 
interaction that can fruitfully use the existing tension if it refuses to condemn it to a failed 
consensus or settlement. An agonistic politics of reconciliation that takes seriously the 
fact of the past, the contingency of agreement, and the contestability of even 
reconciliation itself, is necessary in order to move forward into a shared future. If a 
process of reconciliation cannot be mindful of these things, it runs the serious risk of re-
inscribing the colonial relationship in the “reconciled” relationship it seeks.  
 
 
Four Aspects of Reconciliation in Canada 
Having a political understanding of reconciliation and being attuned to the pitfalls of 
recolonisation points us toward four aspect of reconciliation to keep in mind for Canada: 
reconciliation is not painless, it is continually (re)enacted, it hinges on the agency of the 
transgressed, and the transgressed owe nothing.  These four aspects can give guidance for 
interlocutors to engage in this relationship of reconciliation, respecting each other and 
what they build together.   
 First, reconciliation is not painless. The transformative and generative aspects of a 
politics of reconciliation should point to a meaningful departure from the status quo. That 
is, a politics of reconciliation will be at the least uncomfortable and quite possibly may be 
disorienting for participants. Reconciliation is possible only through a difficult process of 
change, not a sentimental expression of guilt, shame, contrition, not as a simulacrum, or a 
commitment to the rule of law—especially when it is the law itself that is in question—
but through a costly risk and payment of that cost. As Taiaiake Alfred argues:  
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without massive restitution made to Indigenous peoples, collectively and as 
individuals, including land, transfers of federal and provincial funds, and other 
forms of compensation for past harms and continuing injustices committed 
against the land and Indigenous peoples, reconciliation will not permanently 
absolve colonial injustices and is itself a further injustice.210  
 
Canadians need to expect that reconciliation will be costly. According to some estimates 
the compensation as stipulated in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement 
will likely exceed five billion dollars.211 However, Canadians need to be prepared for 
great costs that risk more than the public purse. 
 A commitment to reconciliation in Canada means addressing more than the 
specific injustices of the Indian Residential Schools system. The IRS system was not 
created in a vacuum, and the schools created wider harm than that suffered by the school 
survivors alone. The system of colonisation created significantly more widespread harms 
within the Aboriginal community, which continue today, including familial strife, 
domestic violence, and substance abuse. The Kelowna Accord would have been an 
example of paying the cost to support the health of Aboriginal communities. But the 
Kelowna approach pays another cost of changing minds and overturning epistemologies 
that reserve knowledge and solutions to the Crown alone. 212 The difficult process of land 
claims can be seen as part of reconciliation. Some people from the dominant society own 
land that was fraudulently obtained and exchanged in a series of good faith transactions; 
it still remains, however, that land was taken outside of even the colonial laws. Land 
claims and treaty making will be costly. This high cost, however, does not have to 
involve settlers taking down the Canadian flag and returning to the land from which we 
have come, or from which our ancestors travelled. Neither can this be seen as what is 
being demanded by Aboriginal peoples as restitution. As Alfred puts it “irredentism has 
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never been in the vision of our peoples.”213 Rather, it is a costliness that will involve 
risking more than property in coming into dialogue with the very people who have shared 
their land with us.  
 A second consideration is that reconciliation must be perpetually (re)enacted. The 
constitutional change that has been brought by the challenge in and enforcement of the 
Supreme Court, especially accelerated after the 1982 patriation of the Canadian 
constitution, is not a settlement once and for all, but rather is commitment to an ethic that 
will inform how disagreements are resolved. Even the legacy of the failed accord, the 
Kelowna approach, is only reconciliatory to the extent that it informs future dealings. 
And this type of consultation is continued. What this helps illuminate for Canadians is 
that reconciliation is not a ledger book to be closed or a debt to be paid off. 
Reconciliation in Canada strikes so close to the core of the political community and 
vision of sharing the territory that the end of reconciliation must be its constant living. 
While the cost of reconciliation is decolonisation, even in a post-colonial Canada the 
continual (re)enactment of reconciliation will be necessary to live in peace and 
friendship. 
 Third, reconciliation hinges on the agency of the transgressed. It is key to take 
measures that focus on restoring or conceiving of an Aboriginal agency that is no longer 
diminished because of colonial stereotypes. To be sure, Aboriginal agency is not 
completed in such measures. Rather, it can be seen as constitutive. Canadians need to 
understand that the central actor in reconciliation is that of the transgressed, that of 
Aboriginal peoples. This does not mean that Canadians should sit idly by as 
reconciliation plays out before them, indeed some aspects cannot play out without them. 
There is enough work in reconciliation to go around, but what this helps us understand is 
that reconciliation concerns us, without being all about us. If Canadians see themselves as 
the prime mover in the economy of reconciliation, the danger of co-opting the process for 
neo-colonial ends is very present. The Canadian community cannot be self-congratulatory 
in seeing itself as being good enough to address the concerns of Aboriginal peoples, nor 
mired in self-indulgent guilt over the Indian Residential School system. Rather knowing 
the place of Canadians within this economy of reconciliation means being poised to 
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respond to the needs and just demands of Aboriginal communities. That is to say, the 
story of reconciliation in Canada must make enough room for Aboriginal peoples, more 
so than the histories we usually tell, and be willing to hear the story in Aboriginal voices.  
 Canadians need to pay attention to the truth that the truth commission established. 
Canadians need to listen to the stories being told by Aboriginal peoples, and the claims 
that are advanced: cultural, legal, experiential, and epistemological. Canadians need to be 
willing to do the heavy work of overturning stasis. Canadians need to take their cues 
from Aboriginal peoples for reconciliation to blossom. As Walter Wink points out, the 
victim initiates reconciliation.214 Canadians cannot impose reconciliation, but must take 
seriously its rhetorical quality and our own ability to be transformed through 
conversation. If we can see the reconciliation process in Canada as dialogical, then we 
must come to see that it is our chance to listen and be transformed, as well as to speak 
and participate. 
 Last, it is important to recognize that Aboriginal peoples owe nothing. That is to 
say, there is a danger of reading the components of reconciliation as steps in a 
predetermined transaction, the ultimate outcome of which is reconciliation. This is a 
mistake.  We cannot know the outcome of our actions and we can only hope that the 
result will be a desirable one.  To think that our contrition will lead to forgiveness and 
ultimately, perhaps after restitution, lead to reconciliation, is to grossly misunderstand 
what is at stake. This understanding could create a sentiment that vilifies Aboriginal 
peoples for not responding as this transactional account has us expect. Canadians can 
make apologies, as has been done on our behalf on the floor of the House of Commons, 
but that fact alone neither guarantees their acceptance nor does it ensure that Canadians, 
whether collectively or individually, will be forgiven.215 We do not exchange one for the 
other. Even if, as I contend, reconciliation is costly, perhaps far costlier than it has been 
already, it cannot be worked out in any other way than through dialogue, and we cannot 
mistake what penance we pay to be sufficient or for us to determine that sufficiency.  We 
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can only hope that in earnestness and in time we can be forgiven and move toward the 
living out of reconciliation.216  
 Importantly, this gives Canadians a place to begin. Taken with an agonistic 
politics of reconciliation as outlined above, these considerations focus on the importance 
of being an attentive and responsive interlocutor in the dialogue. We need to look for the 
generative, transformative, and continual qualities of reconciliation in our own lives and 
in the space we share with Aboriginal peoples, hoping that we can offer enough, risk 
enough, and that it will be accepted. 
 
Conclusion 
These three central concepts, colonisation, decolonisation, and reconciliation, run 
throughout the balance of this work and are foundational to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada and the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples. In 
all three I want to put Aboriginal agency at the fore and seek to provide a fully humanised 
discussion. In the case of colonisation, this is, at least in part, at risk. 
 In recasting colonisation as state of exception I do not want to remove Aboriginal  
agency in the least. There are important stories to tell of resistance and cultural continuity 
in the face of determined efforts to erase Indigeneity from Canada. I know that in saying 
the system of reservation lands is a construction of exception–its manifestation in 
Agamben’s conception of the “camp”–I seriously risk overextending myself. While it is 
clear that reserves are problematic, both removing Aboriginal peoples from the normal 
operation of Canada as I argue above and providing a homeland, a geography from which 
to resist, I maintain that they can be read through the lens of exception. Missing here is a 
discussion of resistance; however, this is a story I can say I feel less comfortable telling, 
as it is unequivocally not mine. Discussing this important aspect of Aboriginal experience 
in Canada can lead too easily to appropriation, while adding little to the main line of 
argument of this dissertation. Thus, I have tried to maintain a voice that is authentic to 
myself, detailing a view of colonisation from my vantage point in the dominant society.  
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 Moreover, I think exception gives a good way of understanding colonisation’s 
intent. Whether it is entirely successful in removing a form of life, colonisation certainly 
seeks to violently transform life, in a way that requires the “other” to be less than human. 
So if exception leaves too little room for Aboriginal agency, then it is an exaggeration, 
but only an exaggeration of colonialism.  
It is key to understand colonisation to see what is at stake for decolonisation. 
Decolonisation, then, is centrally about restoring agency to those from whom colonisation 
sought to deny it. It must unravel a tightly bound package of political and social 
perceptions and policies.  While culture is an important source of colonialism, the 
decolonisation with which I am most concerned is centered on governmental relations, 
that is, relations between Aboriginal forms of government and the Crown. This link is 
explicitly discussed below in Chapter Five, but at its heart I take decolonisation in this 
area to mean the removal of alien structures of power and dismantling of a taxonomy of 
humanity that qualitatively separates oppressed from oppressor, without subsuming 
difference. 
 Reconciliation also centres on Aboriginal people, but requires the Canadian 
society more broadly to engage, and especially concerns the Crown. It is here that an 
ethical-political process, that at its very heart is decolonial, provides a form to follow, 
without prescribing an outcome. This agonistic politics is not co-extensive with 
decolonisation, but clearly these two concepts are linked here. Understanding the political 
nature of reconciliation importantly points to four aspects to consider in Canada: 
reconciliation is not painless, it is continually (re)enacted, it hinges on the agency of the 
transgressed, and the transgressed owe nothing. This will be important to keep in mind 
for Chapter Eight and the discussion of the sort of relationship the Canadian TRC might 







Colonisation: From Partnership to Wardship 
 
 Introduction 
To make sense of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, an 
understanding of the Indian Residential Schools system is required. While the IRS system 
was created in 1886, the seeds of the system were sown in the very early years after 
European contact in the sixteenth century. It is important to understand the reasons and 
sites of interaction, cooperation, and fracture between Aboriginal peoples and Europeans 
over the history of North America and particular Canada, to see the context out of which 
the Indian Residential School system was created. Seeing colonisation through the lens of 
exception gives a new life to discussing the historical process of colonisation in Canada. 
This historical process is key to understanding the IRS system in an intelligible context, 
and will be helpful for us not to mistaking what decolonisation seeks to redress, discussed 
in Chapter Five.  
 Every narrative must have a beginning; this chapter starts with contact between 
the English and Aboriginal peoples on the eastern seaboard of what would become North 
America. In part, this is done to limit the scope of the history discussed, as the inclusion 
of precolumbian history would make this chapter unwieldy.  But it is also because the 
history that is most relevant in the context of this overall project is the history that is 
shared between Aboriginal peoples and European settlers. Particularly relevant for my 
purposes is the interaction between the English and Aboriginal peoples, as this most 
directly informs the Canadian context. Moreover, it is important not to lose sight of the 
multiplicity of nations with whom the English Crown would gradually come into contact 
as exploration and settlement continued westward. Thus, I begin with a section entitled 
“The Start of Contact,” to remind us of this fact as we progress through what can only be 
a gloss of a long history.  
In addition, I want to be clear in stating that there were complex social, economic, 
and diplomatic arrangements within and between Aboriginal nations prior to contact with 
Europeans—and as will be seen, these continued to be important after contact. It is not 
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my intention to ignore these facts by starting my discussion in 1497, but it is contact with 
Europeans that most informed the Indian Residential School system and, thus, this is the 
context needed to understand the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. 
 The history traced is not meant to be comprehensive. Highlighting the contours 
and outline of a history dating back centuries is meant to convey a narrative that builds to 
a discussion of the residential school and can make sense of my claim above to see 
residential schools through the lens of exception. The chapter covers contact, treaties, the 
changing nature of the European- Aboriginal relationship, the legal regulation of 
“Indians,” and the Indian Residential Schools system.  It is after this history is traced that 
we can see that Aboriginal peoples have been attached to Canada through a state of 
exception. 
 
The Start of Contact 
 In 1497, five years after the famed voyage of Christopher Columbus to the “New 
World,” John Cabot, in service of the English Crown, sailed across the Atlantic to the 
shores of an isolated island that had been inhospitable to the Norse nearly five centuries 
earlier. What Cabot found there changed the course of North American history. The sheer 
abundance of large fish, specifically codfish, quickly made the area around present-day 
Newfoundland a hub of European fishing. The dietary requirements of Catholicism (i.e. 
no meat on Friday), and the long overfished Mediterranean, coupled with a population 
boom in Europe, led to a voracious need for new and reliable sources of fish.1 
  It may have been John Cabot who first discovered this source of fish, but Iberian 
fishers where among the first to exploit it. The Portuguese and Spanish who fished the 
waters around Newfoundland and Nova Scotia made few forays onto the land, as they 
had the ability to cure the fish with salt derived from their ready access to sea salt in the 
Basque country.2 English and French fishers, on the other hand, had to establish curing 
facilities on land to smoke the fish in preparation for long voyages back to European 
markets, as they lacked access to the necessary salt for preserving fish.3 This forced both 
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the English and French into contact with the Aboriginal peoples of the new land. What 
started as temporary facilities quickly morphed into permanent settlements. As a 
consequence of living on the land, the European newcomers discovered another valuable 
resource: fur. The desire for this valuable commodity propelled Europeans deeper into the 
continent and brought them into contact with more and more Aboriginal nations.  
The early relationship that developed between the natives of North America and 
the European newcomers was largely shaped by these reasons for interaction: fur and 
fish. Europeans, motivated by gain, relied heavily on the Aboriginal peoples with whom 
they came into contact to achieve their economic goals.4 Especially in regard to the fur 
trade, Europeans required the labour of Aboriginal peoples to make this trade 
economically viable. Europeans lacked the expertise and knowledge of where to find 
animals for fur and thus acted as middlemen in the trans-Atlantic fur trade; “The 
Europeans, for the most part, purchased furs gathered by others and transported them to 
overseas markets.”5 This relationship between Aboriginal hunters and European 
merchants was significantly symbiotic, where each benefited from the interaction, 
Europeans receiving furs for the trans-Atlantic trade and Aboriginal peoples access to 
goods and tools. 
 The economic basis of the early relationship between Europeans and Aboriginal 
peoples may have been mutually beneficial, but the Europeans’ very survival was 
dependent upon their trading partners.6 Even in the economic relationship, the significant 
power lay in the hands of Aboriginal peoples. For example French fur traders seeking to 
do business with the Wendat had to do so in the language of the Wendat, who refused to 
“lower themselves to learn the newcomers’ language.”7  
 In the early period after contact between Aboriginal peoples and the newly arrived 
Europeans, there was a considerable exchange of goods and technology between them. 
Profits were made on both sides, but Aboriginal peoples engaged in trade and used 
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European technologies for traditional reasons, such as hunting and internal commerce. 
For as long as these motives “remained dominant, trade and European goods did not 
fundamentally remake Indian societies.”8 By the late seventeenth century, however, 
European methods and incentives began to change some Aboriginal ways. For example, 
in what is now the Atlantic region of Canada, the Mi‘kmaq began to take scalps from 
their traditional enemies, a practice learned from their French allies.9 Moreover, the 
bounties offered by both the French and English, designed to reduce certain Aboriginal  
populations, fostered this new technique of terror and caused it to expand in the region.10  
  What is important to note in this brief discussion of contact between the 
inhabitants of North America and Europeans is that European explorers and traders found 
sophisticated, well organized societies in the “New World.” It is neither the case that the 
land was empty, nor that what was found were backward savages. In the case of Australia 
for example, the rationale used for settlement was that of terra nullius wherein the 
continent was considered to be empty territory, and the British colonized and settled there 
without considering the original inhabitants.11 This was not the case in Canada. Whether 
the newcomers to the continent were there for fish, fur, evangelism, or exploration, at 
every turn they required the help and cooperation of the native peoples they encountered; 
fishing needed the approval of Aboriginal peoples —this task would have been at least 
extremely dangerous in the face of opposition—and fur, evangelism and explorations 
required their cooperation.12 Aboriginal peoples encountered by Europeans had much to 
teach these newcomers about surviving and flourishing in an often-hostile environment.  
 Moreover, the exchanges between Aboriginal peoples and Europeans were not, in 
this early period, one-sided. That is, Europeans were not the unquestioned purveyors of 
technology, language, and culture. In the case of the French dealing with the Wendat it 
was, in fact, the French traders who learned the language and customs of their trading 
partners, not vice versa.  Aboriginal peoples were not the savage ‘Indian’ seen in the 
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images of the Saturday matinée Westerns popular in the 1950s, in which wagons were 
burned and women and children killed, the cowboy or homesteader usually being the 
hero, while the Aboriginal peoples were usually portrayed as villains. It is important to 
understand that Aboriginal peoples had agency. As historian J.R. Miller has put it, 
“Indian people were not the passive victims that were found in so many of the older 
accounts of Canadian history.”13 Rather, they actively engaged with Europeans, deciding 
in the early years especially, what tools and technologies to adopt from their new allies 
and trade partners. By understanding the cooperative early interaction between European 
and Aboriginal peoples in North America alongside the agency that Aboriginal peoples 
possessed in these interactions, the seeds are sown for understanding the arguments of 
decolonisation proposed by many Aboriginal scholars and activists (discussed in Chapter 
Five).   
 
Treaties 
Perhaps the most visible signs of the respectful and cooperative nature of early contact 
are the treaties that European crowns concluded with Aboriginal peoples with whom they 
dealt. In some colonial exploits, Europeans did not consider the peoples they found to 
constitute entities with whom they could negotiate.14 Yet, in North America the Dutch, 
French, and English crowns all dealt with Aboriginal peoples through treaty and 
recognized the need for the support of the Aboriginal peoples in pursuing trade, war, and 
peace.15 It must be understood that even in the time before treaties as we know them 
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today, Europeans—importantly for Canada, the British—concluded agreements with 
Aboriginal peoples.16  
 Miller argues, “the nature of a relationship between two people of different 
backgrounds is largely determined by the reasons they have for interacting.”17 The main 
reason for interaction in the early contact and post-contact period was commercial, owing 
to the pursuit of fish and fur by Europeans. However, this commercial relationship was 
not left ungoverned, as Europeans needed access to territory and agreements for the 
purchase and exchange of goods. Europeans did not create trade in North America. 
Rather, they found pre-existing trade networks and rules governing trade to which they 
needed to adhere.18 Because trade was premised on peace for the Aboriginal peoples 
encountered in north-eastern North America, treaties were an important part of 
commercial interactions. The simple commercial compacts that were established to allow 
trade between Aboriginal nations and Europeans, and the need for good relationship to 
establish these compacts, quickly drew Europeans into political alliances with Aboriginal 
people.19 
 The Europeans found well-developed political systems existing in Aboriginal 
nations in North America well before contact between Aboriginal peoples and Europeans. 
The clearest examples of these political systems are the Wendat and the 
Haudenosaunee.20 The Wendat formed at some point between 1440 and 1550, although 
the Wendat themselves place its creation around 1440.21 While the Confederacy was not 
empowered to conduct war, it was a political arrangement put in place to end the blood 
feuds between the nations that constituted it.22 The relationship was built first between 
the Attignawantan and Atigneenongnahac and was later expanded. In essence, it was a 
dispute resolution mechanism, a council that met regularly to resolve the disputes that led 
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to blood feuds.23 It represented a sophisticated constitutional arrangement between 
Aboriginal nations, and was negotiated and maintained in traditional ways.  
 The Haudenosaunee, originally located in what became present-day New York 
State, and whose territory stretched to the east as far as the St. Lawrence River, was 
created to maintain peace amongst its members, much like the Wendat.24 It was a 
complex relationship with a division of labour between unequal members of the 
League.25 The original members consisted of five First Nations: Mohawk, Seneca, 
Oneida, Cayuga, and Onondaga. The prophet Deganawidah and his follower Hiawatha, 
sometime in the sixteenth century, brought these five nations together into a relationship 
of mutual benefit in order to end blood feuding amongst them.26 This was achieved, as in 
the case of the Wendat, through a complex and ceremonial relationship of kin and 
entente, which drew the nations together into peaceful coexistence and mutual 
protection.27  
 More than sophisticated constitutional structures within Aboriginal communities, 
Europeans found treaty relationships between Aboriginal communities. A prominent 
example for Ontario is the Dish With One Spoon wampum. The two great powers of this 
region, the Haudenosaunee and the Wendat, established this treaty to share resources and 
the land that was common to both. This treaty “acknowledged that both the Nishnaageg 
and the Haudenosaunee were eating out of the same dish through shared hunting territory 
and the ecological connections between their territories.”28 It established certain protocols 
that regulated the interaction with the goal of maintaining peace. As Sherman notes “it 
would have been expected that upon leaving one’s own territory to cross into someone 
else’s territory, that an individual or group would build a fire to announce that they were 
‘waiting in the woods’ or waiting ‘at the wood’s edge’ to be welcomed.29  What would 
follow was well understood and expected by both sides. A white wampum would have 
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welcomed the guest and feast prepared for them.30 After the protocols required by the 
Dish With One Spoon treaty were complete “the visitors would have gone on to what they 
had come to do.”31 The ritualization of interactions here is identical to forms of 
diplomatic interactions, protocols, and norms developed by Europeans, the legacies of 
which are still seen in formal diplomatic encounters today. And like treaties in the 
Western sense, it is important to note that this arrangement “did not involve interfering 
with one another’s sovereignty as nations.”32 
 This is all to say that the Aboriginal peoples encountered by Europeans in the 
northeastern woodlands of North America had already established sophisticated political 
and economic relationships of which the newcomers needed to take account. As 
discussed above, the French fur traders who sought to do business in the land of the 
Wendat carried out their transactions in the language and by the native custom. These 
transactions, however, were impossible outside of an agreement of peace and friendship 
secured with the treaties that became more formalized in the late eighteenth century. The 
“forest diplomats” of the French and English crowns were enormously successful in 
building trade networks and alliances with the Aboriginal peoples they encountered, 
specifically because they were able to adapt to “Aboriginal rituals and behavior.”33 These 
diplomats were so-called as they travelled the forests and interacted with Aboriginal 
peoples on behalf of their respective crowns, learning the language and customs of those 
with whom they interacted. The most famous British “forest diplomat” was Sir William 
Johnson, who helped cement British ties with the Haudenosaunee, and whose grandson 
would negotiate many of the Upper Canadian treaties.34  
 These early dealings and alliances made using Aboriginal ways and Aboriginal 
languages prefigured how future agreements would be made between Europeans and 
Aboriginal peoples and gave Aboriginal negotiators to understand that Aboriginal nations 
would be full partners in these agreements and that Aboriginal ritual and customs in 
making these arrangements would be followed, at least until the numbered treaties of the 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 214. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Simpson, “Looking after Gdoonaaganinaa,” 37.S 
33 Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant 43, 
34 For a comprehensive study of Sir William Johnson see David S. Igneri, Sir William Johnson: The Man 
and his Influence (New York: Rivercross, 1994). 
82 
 
West that began in 1871.35 In the alliances built between Aboriginal peoples and 
European powers, “the one consistent theme was that Indians chose their fighting 
partners... according to their own definition of where their interest lay.”36 During the 
Seven Year’s War between the French and the English, many Aboriginal nations took 
sides and fought for their interests, mainly alongside the French against the English and 
their colonists in New England. The New England colonists, soon to become Americans, 
tellingly called this the “French and Indian War.” The alliances and wars fought in North 
America are important in understanding the changing relationship of Aboriginal peoples 
and Europeans. After the Seven Years’ War, for example, Aboriginal peoples 
increasingly allied with the British, as they gained the upper hand in the European contest 
for North America. Where the seventeenth century was characterized by commercial 
relationships, by the eighteenth century, the site of Aboriginal and European interaction 
was military alliance.37 
 By the end of the Seven Years’ War, and under the Peace of Paris in 1763,38 
Britain had gained control over vast swathes of French North America north of the Great 
Lakes, and with these territories, a number of new Aboriginal peoples with whom to deal.  
The aftermath of this conflict with France brought an important commitment by the 
British Crown to dealings with the Aboriginal peoples in proximity to and within the 
territory of New France. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 opened “a new chapter in 
treaty-making between Aboriginal peoples and the British Crown.”39 While the 
Proclamation dealt with a host of issues related to the newly acquired colonies of France, 
of primary importance for this discussion are the provisions made for “Indian lands.” The 
Proclamation sought to regulate the conditions under which land could be acquired from 
Aboriginal peoples, reserving for the Crown alone the ability to so deal.40 The “Indian 
Provisions” of the Proclamation start by setting the terms by which colonial authorities 
could deal with Aboriginal peoples, stating that:   
the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and who 
live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of 
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such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or 
purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds.41 
 
It is significant that King George specified the conditions under which land, supposedly 
owned by the Crown—as indicated by the language of Aboriginal peoples living under 
the protection and in the dominion of the King—could be acquired. Moreover, the 
process of acquiring land by purchase and negotiation between Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples formed the basis of the more familiar treaty relationship that was begun in the 
early nineteenth century.  This policy implicitly recognized the fact of Aboriginal title to 
and sovereignty over the land which they used.  This is important, as the interactions 
between Crown and Aboriginal nations after the American Revolution turned 
increasingly on issues of land.42 Moreover, the Crown did not simply issue this 
Proclamation, but through the famed forest diplomat Sir William Johnson, convened a 
conference of over 2000 Aboriginal leaders at Niagara to discuss and garner approval for 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763.43  
 The significance of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 bears further investigation. 
John Burrows argues that the role of First Nations people in the process of the preparation 
of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has gone little noticed even by recent scholars and that 
it must be recognized as “a fundamental document in First Nations and Canadian legal 
history.”44 While the Proclamation itself was issued by the British Sovereign to settle 
issues that remained after the Seven Year’s War and to assure lawful and fair exchange of 
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property,45 the convening of the Niagara conference demonstrates a treaty-like approach 
to Crown-Aboriginal relations. In fact, the Crown’s representative, Sir William Johnson, 
saw this as a treaty exercise.46 It is exactly because of the conference at Niagara and the 
manner in which the Proclamation was presented that it is clear it represents a treaty: 
“The Royal Proclamation became a treaty at Niagara because it was presented by the 
colonialists for affirmation, and was accepted by the First Nations.”47 It was, in a sense, a 
“treaty of treaties,” in that it laid out a systematic approach for future dealings between 
the Crown and Aboriginal nations, specifically in regard to land that must be purchased 
and negotiated for by the Crown alone. Significantly, the meeting at Niagara in 1764 
ended with the creation of a “two-row wampum belt” which reflected the Aboriginal 
nations’ understanding of what been concluded there.48 A wampum belt is a ceremonial 
belt used to record important diplomatic dealings. In this beaded belt, two parallel white 
lines run along a blue background, representing two ships traveling the same river, yet 
not interfering with each other.49 For Burrows and other scholars the Royal Proclamation 
represents “the foundation-building principles of peace, friendship, and respect agreed to 
between the parties [to the Proclamation].”50 
 The military basis of the European- Aboriginal relationship continued through the 
American Revolution, and had one final appearance in the War of 1812. Like the colonial 
wars fought in North America between the English and the French, during these conflicts, 
many Aboriginal nations allied themselves and fought for reasons of their own interest; 
this time, Aboriginal nations joined the British cause against Britain’s erstwhile colonists 
in New England. The contribution of Aboriginal warriors to the War of 1812 was both 
significant and decisive in helping the British to win the most important battles of that 
war, including the battles of Michilimackinac, Detroit, Queenston Heights and Beaver 
Dam.51 Aboriginal forces bolstered the numbers of the scant British imperial and colonial 
militia troops then present in British North America; in fact Robert Allen argues that the 
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employment of Aboriginal warriors was “the single most important factor in the 
successful defence of Upper Canada.”52 However, with Tecumseh’s death at the Battle of 
the Thames in 1813, Aboriginal military support waned.53 This battle between the new 
American republic and the British was significant as it was the last conflict between these 
powers, and the last time Britain called on its Indian allies to defend its colonies in British 
North America.54 
 The peace ushered in by the Treaty of Ghent in 1814 (which ended the War of 
1812) and the subsequent Rush-Bagot treaty of 1817 between Britain and the United 
States largely secured peace in northern North America. This security led to a boom in 
settlement that increasingly brought colonists into close contact with Aboriginal peoples 
in Upper Canada and elsewhere. In 1812, Upper Canada had a population of 95,000.  
However, by 1851, that population had increased to 952,000.55 This rapid increase in 
immigration necessitated the opening of new lands to settlement and agriculture, thus 
changing the imperatives of the relationship of alliance and commerce, turning to focus 
mainly on issues of land. In the treaties concluded in Upper Canada in the first decades 
after the War of 1812, the key consideration for the Crown was access to land, negotiated 
in accordance with the Royal Proclamation of 1763.56 
 Between 1815 and 1827, seven treaties were negotiated in Upper Canada, through 
which “the Crown secured access for non-Natives to almost all the remaining arable land 
in southern Ontario.”57 Access to land for new settlers gained by one such treaty 
concluded in eastern Ontario in 1819 also had a strategic motive to secure land for the 
construction of the Rideau Canal: to secure a supply line to the capital of Upper Canada 
at Kingston.58 The issue of land figured prominently in Indigenous-settler relations, 
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which contrasts with the earlier treaties that had focused on peace, alliance, and 
commerce. In these early treaties in Upper Canada, while the subject matter had changed, 
much of the form remained consistent with the earlier expression of peace and friendship. 
Rather than strategic alliances, these treaties increasingly sought to secure land for 
settlement. In meetings between the Crown’s representative, William Claus grandson of 
Sir William Johnson, and Aboriginal leaders in 1818, the same ceremony of earlier pacts 
was continued: “Employing the rhetoric of family and relationship, invoking the deity, 
and distributing gifts from the Crown were all reassuring indicators that familiar practices 
were being continued.”59  
 
Relationship in Transition: Towards Wardship 
Something important, however, had changed in these treaties, despite the familiar form of 
their negotiation and promulgation. In the seven treaties negotiated between 1815 and 
1827, the payment meted out by the Crown for the lands to which it gained access 
changed in a subtle but significant way: in the older agreements, when the Crown gained 
land, the payments for that land were made as a one-time payment.  For example, the 
1806 Head of the Lake Treaty with the Mississauga near present-day Toronto exchanged 
85,000 acres for £1000, “...Province currency, in goods at the Montreal price...”60 By the 
time of the 1818 surrender of territory at Smith’s Creek (near present-day Port Hope), the 
terms for the purchase price were transformed into an annuity, pledging that “...a yearly 
sum of seven hundred and forty pounds Province currency in goods at the Montreal 
prices to be well and truly paid yearly, and every year...”61 
 This shift in payment, while subtle, was significant in that it sought to shift the 
cost of settlement (acquiring land as only could be done by the Crown due to the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763) to the colonies themselves by, in effect, purchasing by installment 
these lands and establishing a continuing financial relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples. In the case of the Smith’s Creek surrender of 1818, the sum of £740 
(in goods) was to be paid annually in perpetuity for the land the Crown acquired as a 
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result. This decreased the current cost of settlement, allowing future revenue from 
settlement activity to pay the annuity, with the by-product of establishing a long-term 
fiscal relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal nations. The logic on the part of the 
Crown was clear: to shift the burden of settlement off the Imperial Crown, and to fund it 
out of colonial economic growth and tax growth.62 This desire on the part of the Crown to 
limit its immediate financial liability for Aboriginal peoples foreshadows the 
underfunding and outright derogation of its fiduciary responsibility concerning 
Aboriginal peoples detailed below. That is to say, it seems at this point Aboriginal 
peoples became an expense to be minimized.  
 Miller’s argument that “the nature of a relationship between two peoples of 
different back-groups is largely determined by the reasons they have for interacting”63 
further helps us to understand the shifting relationship between Aboriginal peoples and 
the Crown. The relative peace and security brought by the Rush-Bagot treaty all but 
eliminated Aboriginal allies from the strategic equation in British North America. Simply 
put, the services of the warriors, who had largely saved Upper Canada from American 
invasion during the War of 1812, were no longer required in this new time of peace.  
 This peace brought further change in the composition and demographics of Upper 
Canada. Prior to the War of 1812, what European settlement existed in Upper Canada 
was either self-generating (that is, its population increase relied mainly on the birth rate) 
or resulted from flows of refugees following the Revolutionary War in the form of the 
“United Empire Loyalists.”64 Once established, Loyalist communities spread by 
establishing “daughter colonies” comprised of new generations of Loyalists.65 However, 
once peace was secure in northern North America in the years after 1817, this slow 
pattern of settlement changed in important ways. The steady growth of self-perpetuating 
settlements of largely Loyalist stock was eclipsed by the rapid growth of immigration 
from the British Isles.66 This expanding population pushed settlement deeper and deeper 
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toward present-day Northern Ontario.67 The population of Upper Canada in 1810 was 
approximately 60,000 people, but by 1827 it had increased to somewhere around 200,000 
people.68 The amount of land under cultivation tells a similar story and confirms the 
appetite for such tracts that were arable and needed to be acquired by the Crown. In 1805, 
prior to the War of 1812, there were 179,000 acres under cultivation; by 1836 there were 
over 1.2 million acres under cultivation in Upper Canada.69 Little wonder that a land-
hungry Crown was keen to let the agricultural development of Upper Canada pay the bills 
for the acquisition of the land needed for settlement by shifting to annuities rather than 
one time payments for land. 
 The transformation in the land base also transformed the economy of the 
Aboriginal peoples from one of traditional hunting to a more agrarian economy helped by 
the policies of the Indian Department’s “civilization policy,” as it had become known by 
the 1830s.70 In 1830, Britain transferred the responsibility for Indian affairs from the 
imperial military authority to civilian administrators in Upper and Lower Canada.71 This 
transfer was the final signal that their Aboriginal allies had outlived their usefulness in 
the defense of British North America and brought a new cadre of colonial personnel into 
contact with Aboriginal leaders.72  The approach to Aboriginal relationships begun by Sir 
William Johnson was changed by bureaucrats who had been raised in the settler society, 
who had not come to appreciate the military, diplomatic and commercial skills of the 
Aboriginal peoples with whom their forebears had dealt.73 Practically, this meant many 
changes to the interactions between the Crown (through this new cadre of bureaucrats) 
and Aboriginal peoples. This new “civilization policy” meant encouraging a more 
sedentary lifestyle for Aboriginal peoples—which is as much to say encouraging 
Aboriginal peoples to emulate the settlers, to homestead and grow crops—convert to 
Christianity, and send their children to school, where they would be educated in the 
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English (or French) language and schooled in the ways of western European 
Christianity.74   
 What in Upper Canada was a policy of civilization increasingly became part of 
the treaties negotiated between the Crown and the western plains peoples. That is to say, 
this civilization strategy became part of the fundamental relationship between the Crown 
and Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian West.  In the 1850s, there was little settlement in 
the West outside of the Red River colony (at present-day Winnipeg).75 However, an 
increasing influx of missionaries into the north-west sought to convert the peoples of the 
boreal forest and the plains to Christianity.76 The Christianization of the Aboriginal 
peoples provided an important source of authority for churches that pushed them to the 
negotiation table and secure their loyalty to the Crown.77  
 Throughout the 1850s, missionary work and settlement in the West provided the 
need and impetus for treaty negotiation, which started in 1871. With the creation of the 
North West Mounted Police in 1874, Canada increased and consolidated its control over 
the former Rupert’s Land domain of the Hudson’s Bay Company.78 However, as in Upper 
Canada, the motivation of the colonial government was somewhat self-serving in its 
desire to avoid the crippling expense of fighting an Indian War—as the United States was 
then doing in its interior plains—and secure the peaceful relations that would allow the 
construction of the Pacific-bound railway.79 That is to say, like the Upper Canadian 
concern for arable land for agricultural settlement, the overreaching policy of the 
Dominion government to avoid an expensive guerrilla war while expanding the railway 
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loomed large in its motivations for treaty-making in the West.80 Moreover, peace was 
necessary as a precondition to large-scale settlement of the Canadian West. And land—as 
in Upper Canada—was needed for agricultural development.81 
 The contents of the “Numbered Treaties,” so-called as they were numbered rather 
than named, concluded between 1871 and 1877 in the southern Great Plains area of 
Western Canada, were primarily centered on land.82 The first three treaties, between 1871 
and 1873, significantly subjected the signing Aboriginal nations to the law and authority 
of the British Crown: the “new treat[ies] tended to reinforce government control over 
reserve lands and resources.”83  
While the trend was toward more total control over the welfare of Indians, the 
numbered treaties had an uneven approach to education. The desire of the various 
Aboriginal peoples of the West (Saulteaux, Cree, and Ojibwa, among others) to “learn the 
cunning of the white man” was as clear as the government’s desire to reduce the costs of 
this provision as more treaties were negotiated.84 In the first treaty, education was 
covered by the commitment of the Crown to “maintain a school on each reserve hereby 
made [in the treaty] whenever the Indians of the reserve should desire it.”85 By the time 
Treaty 7 was concluded in 1877, the Crown only agreed to “pay the salary of teachers to 
instruct the children of said Indians as to Her Government of Canada may seem 
advisable, when said Indians are settled on their Reserves and shall desire teachers.”86 
This demonstrates a small, but significant, change in the willingness of the Crown to fund 
the education of the Aboriginal peoples who were by then living on reservation lands, 
over the course of Western treaties. It furthered the strategy that had been pursued in 
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Upper Canada to defray and minimize the cost of controlling Aboriginal peoples by 
limiting Dominion liabilities for Aboriginal welfare.  
 Essential to the western experience of treaty making—like that of Upper 
Canada—was the agreement and participation of Aboriginal peoples in the process. That 
is to say, Aboriginal peoples were both present for, and agents in, treaty making. Whereas 
in Upper Canada it was the influx of settlers that pushed Aboriginal peoples to accept less 
than favourable treaties (especially concerning payments), in the West it was more 
deceptive. The pressure put on Aboriginal peoples by agricultural settlement in Upper 
Canada was expressed by Buckquaquet, Chief of the Mississauga of Rice Lake, saying:  
From our lands we receive scarcely anything and if your words [responding to 
Deputy Superintendent General for Indian Affairs William Claus’ offer of 
purchase] are true we will get more by parting with them than by keeping them. 
Our hunting is destroyed and we must throw ourselves on the compassion of our 
Great Father the King.87 
 
The encroachment on fisheries and hunting lands in Upper Canada had pushed the 
Aboriginal peoples there into a situation by which they could not refuse any but the most 
objectionable terms of the Crown.  
In the West, however, there was a significant discrepancy in what the Indian 
Department officials told Aboriginal peoples and what the treaties actually contained. Sir 
Adam Archibald, Lieutenant-Governor of Manitoba, left Aboriginal peoples of southern 
Manitoba at the negotiation of Treaty 1 with the impression that the treaty only sought to 
make room for new settlement and that Aboriginal peoples could continue to hunt and 
roam over much of land as they always had.88 However, the written text of the treaty 
required that “The Chippewa and Swampy Cree Tribes of Indians and all other the [sic] 
Indians inhabiting the district hereinafter described and defined do hereby cede, release, 
surrender and yield up to Her Majesty the Queen and successors forever all the lands 
included...” in the treaty.89 The discrepancy between what promises were made orally by 
the Treaty Commissioner and what the treaty document stated was a problem whose root 
lay in the epistemological difference of Europeans and Aboriginal peoples. Europeans 
gave authority to a written tradition that recorded events in textual documents, while for 
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Aboriginal nations on the plains “history was transmitted orally in stories passed on by 
elders.”90  
This difference between treaty discussions, remembered in the Aboriginal 
tradition of storytelling and treaty documents is a hallmark of the Numbered Treaties of 
the Canadian West. At the 1889 adhesion to Treaty 6 the Indian Commissioner promised 
that the Woodland Cree would be able to continue their traditional way of life, hunting 
and trapping. However, this understanding is significantly at odds with the written text of 
the adhesion which contains a “blanket extinguishment clause,” which removed these 
rights.91  Pressed by the necessity of economic conditions as the Upper Canadian tribes 
had been, the western plains peoples were often duped into signing restrictive treaties. Or, 
as Neu and Therrien argue, Aboriginal peoples were given “choices,” the logical 
selection of which would “fit neatly into the government’s managerial design, a design in 
perfect accord with the mother country’s imperialistic strategies.”92 Even if we should 
want to be less skeptical than this, the problems of language, concepts, and priority of 
written over oral records created significantly different understandings between the 
agreeing parties.  
In each case there were significant differences in understanding of access to 
traditional resources, such as game, fish, and other food. In the negotiation of Treaty 9, 
Chief Missabay expressed concern that by signing the treaty his people would lose access 
to the land used for hunting and fishing. Having been assured this was not the case by the 
Crown representative, the treaty was signed, but guarantees of access were not quite as 
robust as the promises, and, of course, there was the same extinguishment of title as all 
the previous treaties.93 Treaties 3 through 11 actually contain language to the effect that 
Aboriginal nations would be able to continue their traditional way of life on the land.94 
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Although these treaties were explicit that the Aboriginal peoples “shall have right to 
pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout the tract surrendered,” they 
were equally clear in the restriction of this right, “subject to such regulations as may from 
time to time be made by Her Government of Her Dominion of Canada, and saving and 
excepting such tracts as may, from time to time, be required or taken up for settlement, 
mining, lumbering or other purposes by Her said Government of the Dominion of 
Canada, or by any of the subjects thereof duly authorized therefor by the said 
Government.”95 Again each treaty from Treaty 3 to Treaty 11 contains similar caveats to 
the right to pursue traditional modes of life on the land. In each case the caveat makes 
explicit reference to land that might “from time to time, be required or taken up for 
settlement, mining, lumbering or other purposes.” The caveat is not only startling in its 
scope, but as much so in that it comes immediately after the announcement of the right in 
the very same paragraph. The imperial hand gives what is not in its power to give and the 
dominion hand takes what is not its to take. The only arbiter being the Crown itself in the 
form of the courts, the litigation of disputes arising from these treaties seems to have been 
“the lot of First Nations in twentieth-century Canada.”96 
Stemming from the epistemological differences between the treaty parties “it is 
questionable whether a ‘mutually understood agreement’ was ever arrived at between a 
people representing a written culture on the one hand and a people representing an 
essentially oral culture on the other.”97 Treaty 7 is instructive here as by the time Treaty 7 
was signed in 1877, the degree to which the Crown considered its Aboriginal allies and 
trading partners of the past to be wards or charges had increased substantially. The Indian 
Act was in place to legislate and regulate “Indians,” to say nothing of the civilizing policy 
begun in the 1830s, which continued apace throughout the 19th century. The once 
militarily and economically important First Peoples of British North America now 
became children of the “Great White Mother.”98 Thus, the intent of Crown 
representatives negotiating Treaty 7 to gain access to the land and resources is at odds 
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with understanding of the elders who “have said that Treaty 7 was a peace treaty; none of 
them recalled any mention of a land surrender.”99 As Chief John Snow puts it “certainly 
we requested, and understood that we had been promised, the continuation of our 
traditional life of hunting, trapping, fishing, and gathering berries, plants and herbs in our 
traditional hunting grounds. We had no idea we would be forced to settle on small pieces 
of land and become agriculturalists.”100 The Aboriginal peoples of Treaty 7 acted in good 
faith in the negotiations, but the Crown significantly failed to honour the spirit of the 
treaty and promises made by the treaty commissioners. Instead, as Snow puts it “we now 
realize that the treaties were the vehicle through which the government achieved its 
objective of opening the North West Territories to settlement and commercial 
exploitation.”101 The numbered treaties, especially the later northern treaties from Treaty 
8 on, clearly demonstrated the Dominion government’s approach to Aboriginal relations, 
it “consistently acted in the interest of non-Native economic concerns. It ignored early 
requests from First Nations for treaties to evade financial responsibility for relieving them 
when hardships inflicted by southern development undercut their livelihoods, and 
initiated treaty talks when northern lands became vulnerable to southerners.”102  
 
Legal Regulation of “Indians” 
This shift in how the Crown conceived of its erstwhile allies can be read as based more 
on necessity than principal. That is, the colonial attitude of control and expansion is ever 
present even in the early relationship of respect, undertaken by the Crown from reasons 
of survival. Robert Williams argues North American colonialism grows-out of and is 
consistent with the Western legal tradition.103 In detailing the roots, or first experience 
with, British colonialism in the Elizabethan conquest of Ireland, Williams highlights the 
story of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, military governor of Ireland.104 Gilbert was reputed for his 
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harsh treatment of the Irish, and as Williams argues, Gilbert believed this treatment to be 
perfectly within his right as governor and in keeping with the laws of England.105 
Williams quotes Gilbert’s justification in a letter to his superior, Lord Deputy Sir Henery 
Sidney, that “the Prince had a regular and absolute power, and that which might not be 
done by the one, I would do it by the other in cases of necessity.”106 The key here is 
necessity, and as I have argued above in Chapter Three, necessity’s connection with 
exception. That the prerogative powers, those proper only to the sovereign, can be 
invoked to preserve or construct the order of society, we can see Agamben’s force-of-law 
without law, the state of exception. It is both in Gilbert’s hideous means and his support 
from the prerogative powers that we see the state of exception at the very beginning of 
colonialism, revealed in the case of Ireland in its de facto invocation for the maintenance 
of the stated order, an Elizabethan order complete with English law, nobility/gentry, and 
plantations.  
In the case of Canada the exception becomes the rule in the system of laws 
constructed to regulate “Indians.”  This system, importantly, set Aboriginal peoples 
outside the norm of Canadian society and can be seen especially in two pieces of 
legislation: The Gradual Civilization Act and The Indian Act. Both arose in the midst of 
treaty negotiations. While the Upper Canadian treaties were still being negotiated, and 
well before any discussion of the western treaties began, the legislature of the United 
Canadas (Upper and Lower Canada) passed the 1857 Act to encourage the gradual 
civilization of the Indians in the Province.107 The goal of this legislation, better known as 
The Gradual Civilization Act, was to transform Aboriginal peoples into Europeans, rather 
than to give them means and technology to deal with European settlement as had been the 
policy since the 1830s. The new goal was for Aboriginal peoples “to become European 
and to be fully indoctrinated with European values and thereby made capable of being 
assimilated.”108 However, the Act contained the paradox that was embodied by the 
civilization policy itself: to at once transform the “savage” into a civilized European and 
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yet separate and categorize the “Indian” as distinct from the white colonial society. 
Despite its preamble committing to the removal of legal distinctions and integrating 
Aboriginal peoples into colonial society, The Gradual Civilization Act went on to define 
who was an “Indian,” and who among this community could and could not be given the 
rights and privileges of white subjects in the colony.109  This tension between annexing 
Aboriginal peoples to the colonial society while keeping them apart from it follows the 
exception that Agamben outlines and importantly signals the deeply problematic 
approach of colonisation.  
 The Gradual Civilization Act started a system known as “enfranchisement” that 
later became consolidated under the Indian Act (1876) and its subsequent amendments. In 
defining the contours of membership in the white colonial society, the Act provided a 
process by which Aboriginal peoples would be transformed into colonial subjects. If an 
“Indian” were to meet standards of literacy in French or English, be debt free and be of 
high moral standards, he would be transformed into a legal subject no different from a 
white settler, albeit by attaining a standard that few of the white settlers themselves could 
meet.110 This enfranchisement policy was a clear attempt to assimilate Aboriginal peoples 
into colonial society, yet still managed to hold to a racist pre-supposition that Aboriginal 
peoples were pre-disposed to immorality.111 It was no longer sufficient to provide the 
knowledge and technology of the European to Aboriginal peoples, as had been the aim of 
the civilizing policy until this time.  Rather, the need was felt to provide for the orderly 
destruction of Aboriginal communities through transformation of Aboriginal peoples 
themselves into legal subjects. Under the terms of enfranchisement, Indian males112 who 
met the above criteria would become citizens with all right and duties thereto, but, as 
significantly, would receive a grant of free-hold land out of the land set aside in reserve 
for his tribe.113 The allotment of twenty hectares for a male who qualified would serve to 
give him a basis for agricultural production and also alienate what land base was left to 
his people as a source of identity and traditional practice. 
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 The Gradual Civilization Act was based on the assumption that to be a subject of 
the Crown, in the sense that white settlers were, Aboriginal peoples would have to have 
the ability to possess private property, in distinction to traditional communal 
ownership.114 The significance of the colonial Act was threefold for the constitutional 
arrangements between Crown and First Nations, according to Milloy. First, the Act 
overstepped the “traditional constitutional relations anchored to the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763, for it removed the exclusive tribal control over reserves for the sake of 
enfranchisement.”115 Second, it threatened the very existence of Aboriginal communities 
by changing the goal of civilization to “the disappearance of [Indigenous] communities as 
individuals were enfranchised and the reserves were eroded, twenty hectares by twenty 
hectares.”116 Third, the Act represented the first legislative salvo in what would become a 
continuous effort to take total control of Aboriginal government.117 
 Once the Dominion of Canada was created by the British North America Act of 
1867, responsibility for “Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians” was given to the 
federal government of the new Dominion.118 The Gradual Civilization Act and other acts 
of the colonial governments, now collected into the Dominion of Canada, were 
consolidated and restated in federal Dominion statutes.  However, in 1876, the Act to 
amend and consolidate the laws respecting Indians119 was passed, significantly regulating 
Indians as a legal category, and set the foundations for Crown-Aboriginal relations that 
persist at the time of writing.120  
 An important innovation for the colonial strategy of assimilation, according to 
Tobias, was the “location ticket.” The location ticket provided another hurdle to 
enfranchisement—in addition to the requirements of earlier legislation—and involved 
something like an apprenticeship to complete the transformation into subject from 
savage. Once an Indian male was literate in French or English, debt free, and of high 
moral character, he would be given provisional title to twenty hectares on a probationary 
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basis for three years “during which he had to demonstrate that he would use the land as a 
Euro-Canadian might and that he was fully qualified for membership in Canadian 
society.”121 Successful completion of the three-year probation entitled the Indian man to 
the land.  
 Moreover, The Indian Act abolished traditional forms of Aboriginal government 
on the reserves and replaced it with a type of “municipal government” over which 
officials in Indian Affairs exerted unprecedented control.122 It became clear from The 
Indian Act that the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal nations was unilaterally 
changed forever, and that Aboriginal peoples were not necessary to the creation of 
Canada nor were their cultural aspirations tolerable.123 Subsequent amendments to The 
Indian Act in the 1880s outlawed Aboriginal cultural practices throughout Canada. From 
the “potlatch” to “sundances” and “giveaway dances” practiced by various Aboriginal 
people, important sources of tradition and culture were outlawed and authority given to 
Indian Agents and police to stop Aboriginal peoples from participating in these 
institutions.124 
 This system of laws, the system of legal administration of Aboriginal people, 
established in the late 19th century and refined over the course of the 20th century 
highlights a central paradox in the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples of 
northern North America: namely, that attempts to assimilate Aboriginal peoples—to 
destroy their separateness—ultimately involved continued distinction and separation as a 
category distinct from that of Canadian citizen. It further points to the means by which 
the state of exception, in which I argue above Aboriginal peoples are placed by 
colonisation, becomes lodged as the rule.  
 
 
The Indian Residential Schools 
It is in the context of the history sketched above that the Indian Residential School system 
(IRS system) emerged in 1886 as perhaps one of the clearest sites of destruction of 
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Aboriginal difference in the assimilationist aspirations of Canadian policy towards 
Aboriginal people. As discussed in Chapter Three above, this was the site of the “camp” 
as Agamben describes, as the localization of the exception, where a force of law without 
law subjects inmates to the caprice of the guards and makes permanent the exception.125 
In one of the most detailed histories of the Indian Residential School system, Milloy 
characterizes the system as a “national crime” that involved the state, several powerful 
Christian churches, the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist churches and, 
later, the United Church, and the ignorance of ordinary Canadians. The IRS system was 
operated through a church-state partnership that involved these Christian denominations 
and orders running the schools, but the federal government was always the senior partner 
providing operational support and funding.126 The enabling philosophy behind the system 
was a violently colonial one that relegated Aboriginal peoples to subhuman levels of 
barbarity and sought to “‘kill the Indian in the child for the sake of Christian civilization. 
In that way, the system was, even as a concept, abusive.”127 As Milloy describes it, the 
colonial project of residential education can be found in a 1908 statement by Frank 
Oliver, then minister of Indian Affairs, who described the design of education as seeking 
to “elevate the Indian from his condition of savagery.”128 But this elevation from 
savagery, for too many within the schools, involved their subjection to treatment that was 
dehumanising. 
 Like the colonial legislation of 1857 and the Dominion acts of the 1870s and 1880s, 
the IRS system ultimately had its own destruction (or at least obsolescence) in mind from 
the outset. The goal of enfranchisement was both to ensure the disappearance of 
Aboriginal peoples as cultural groups and to destroy the evidence of their separate 
existence, as the last “Indian” enfranchised would take with him the last twenty hectares 
of reserve land.129 That is to say, once the government of the Dominion sought to exercise 
its newfound exclusive control over Aboriginal peoples, it “had as its purpose the 
eventual extirpation of this jurisdiction by doing away with those persons and lands that 
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fell within the category of Indians and Indian lands.”130 The goal of the residential school 
was to remove all traces of Aboriginal identity from the youth educated there.131  From 
language to knowledge, even food, the substitution of European ways for Aboriginal 
ways was the expressed purpose of the system. The schools functioned so that “one 
culture was to be replaced by another through the work of the surrogate parent, the 
teacher.”132 The schools would eventually provide their own obsolescence by ensuring 
that the children of the uncivilized “Indian”—who the government had failed to 
enfranchise into extinction or civilize—would be raised from the depths of savagery and 
take their place as an indistinguishable citizens of Canada.  
 This goal in itself constitutes a certain epistemic violence, violence against 
Aboriginal knowledge and ways of knowing.  However, as is now well known, there 
were many instances of physical, sexual, and emotional violence perpetrated against 
children in the care of these schools.133 While not every school abused the children in its 
care or neglected their sanitary, nutritional, and emotional needs, neglect and abuse were 
sad facts of many students’ experience. The system itself mediated against care through 
chronic underfunding, blame shifting between individual school administrators, churches, 
and the Department of Indian Affairs. Far from serving their goal of a civilized education 
for Aboriginal youth, the schools were more often transformed into sites of extreme 
inhumanity and neglect. For example, disease, especially tuberculosis, ran rampant in 
many schools, which were badly built and poorly maintained, providing a furtive 
environment for “a dreadful crisis in sanitation and health.”134 An Anglican lawyer, S.H. 
Blake, who conducted an audit of Anglican schools in 1908, bluntly reported to the 
Minister of Indian Affairs Frank Oliver: “The appalling number of deaths among the 
younger children appeals loudly to the guardians of our Indians. In doing nothing to 
obviate the preventable cause of death, brings the Department [of Indian Affairs] within 
unpleasant nearness to the charge of manslaughter.”135 
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 This disturbing lack of concern for the spread of disease, especially tuberculosis, on 
the part of both the Department and schools led to endemic illness that followed students 
even after they left the schools. Dr. P. Bryce of Indian Affairs, who first published a 
report on disease in the schools is 1907, found in a subsequent report that of 1,537 
children studied, 24% of those children had died, almost all had their cause of death listed 
as “consumption or tuberculosis,” and almost invariably these children had been listed as 
healthy upon their admission to the school.136  Meaning it was the schools themselves that 
were the source of the disease for many who were infected. 
 Infection was often spread through the exposure to bovine tuberculosis in 
unpasteurized milk produced and consumed at the schools.137 Many schools needed to 
produce foodstuffs for consumption or sale—the labour for which was carried out by 
students and often substituted for more scholastic pursuits at the schools due to 
underfunding by the state.138  Thus, students were forced into producing the source of 
their own affliction in many cases. While the condition of individual schools was the 
result of decisions made by local school administrators or individual churches, the 
Department of Indian Affairs consistently “turned its back on its own wards [the 
Aboriginal children at the schools] and refused to hear or support the children’s real 
parents when they protested conditions in the schools and the treatment of their 
children.”139 John Burrows discusses his family experience with Indian Residential 
Schools and that of his community elders, some of whom “have chosen not to 
acknowledge deep loss but instead focus on what they gained. They report having 
positive and uplifting experience… despite being neglected, starved, and degraded.”140 
But the key here is their neglect, starvation, and degradation.  
 Worse than neglect of the children’s health, there was a general background of 
violence in the schools in the form of corporal punishment often administered by the 
principal for infractions of school rules.141  While corporal punishment was not unusual 
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for much of the time the schools operated, even in dominant society schools, it is clear 
that principals of IRS system schools had nothing like a monopoly on the use of force in 
their schools. In 1934, at the Anglican Onion Lake school the school engineer was 
dismissed for violating the rule that no staff member, aside from the principal, was to 
administer corporal punishment.142 In this particular instance, the details of the violence 
used are not known.  However, in many other cases, they are document and are all too 
disturbing. Even when administered by proper authority, punishment was often excessive, 
as was the case with the principal of the short-lived Crowstand Presbyterian school in 
Saskatchewan, where runaways who had been recaptured were forced to run behind his 
buggy, tied to it by a rope around their arms.143 In other instances “excessive” could only 
hope to capture the nature of the punishment as some of the staff were outright sadists: 
 A Sister of Charity at Shubenacadie school ordered a boy who had accidentally 
 spilled the salt from the shaker while seasoning his porridge to eat the ruined food. 
 He declined, she struck him, and told him it eat it. When he downed a spoonful and 
 then vomited into his bowl, the sister hit him on the head and said, ‘I told you to eat 
 it!’ A second attempt produced the same result. On his third try, the student fainted. 
 The sister then picked him up by the neck and threw him out to the centre aisle in 
 the dining hall.144 
  
 Moreover, physical abuse was not the limit of abuse suffered by students in 
residential schools as many were also sexually abused by their caretakers and supervisors. 
At a Presbyterian school in 1910-1911 in northwestern Ontario, girls reported that the 
principal forced them to put their hands under his clothing and play with his breasts, and 
he was reported to often kiss the older girls in his care.145 At Shingwauk Residential 
School in Sault Ste. Marie Ontario in the 1950s, one male supervisor was “in the habit of 
sitting little boys on his lap and moving them about until he became sexually aroused.”146  
 It was not only school officials who were sources of sexual abuse for Aboriginal 
wards of the schools. As one woman reported in later life, sexual abuse by a visiting 
doctor saw the pelvic exam of a fourteen year old take fifteen minutes, rather than the 
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usual minute or so it ought to have taken.147 Sexual abuse was not simply an instrument 
of gratification for the pedophiliac abusers inside and outside the school, but was also 
used as method of punishment. A former student of the Elkhorn school described his 
experience of sodomy after a harsh beating by the principal as punishment for speaking 
his native language.148   
 The sexual and physical abuse the students suffered in the schools created an 
environment where they could never feel safe, and they learned they never really were 
safe. Having been informed that her brother had died, one female student was taken to a 
room where she was bound and raped.149 Many children were not safe, even away from 
administrators and staff. At the File Hills school a female student recalled a boy she had 
known who was “the victim of repeated sexual assaults, sometimes gang rapes, by bigger 
boys.”150 These abuses, too, were known by school and Indian Affairs officials, yet 
nothing was done. In 1922 an Oblate brother from a Prairie school advised his church 
superiors to take precautions and to supervise the student threshing crew which camped 
away from the school, writing that “I know that in a bunch of nine big boys & [sic] eight 
small boys fearful immorality would result if not carefully watched by myself or a 
teacher.”151 The complicity, however, of some school officials went beyond the 
knowledge of student on student sexual and physical abuse.  In some cases, this abuse 
was organized to support the rule of supervisors. For example, in Albert Bay in the 
1950s, the school allowed a gang of girls to control the girls’ quarters and impose 
arbitrary and abusive rule:  
A former student recalled that a group of bullies would beat up girls on command 
by Barbara, ‘the head honcho’ in the junior girl’s dormitory. One evening the girls 
were informed one by one that ‘Barbara wants to see you in the bathroom.’ When 
she got to the lavatory, she found out that Barbara ‘had a mirror on the floor and 
she was looking at everyone’s vagina.’152 
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There were often no school supervisors to be found when such violations took place, and 
school officials were as happy as not to have school rules enforced by these gangs of 
children, even if it came with the enforcement of their own whims and dictates.153  
 These specific instances of physical and sexual abuse are not exhaustive and are but 
examples of what was suffered by some students in the residential school system. They 
are not offered here to be sensational or salacious. Rather, it behooves us to understand in 
an unequivocal way that some students suffered the most dreadful and inexcusable abuse. 
We must confront the sordidness of the residential school system in some detail to 
appreciate what is contained in the terms “physical and sexual abuse” that the survivors 
allege. These examples should make us uncomfortable, and help us to understand just 
how appalling was the treatment of some children. To avoid these examples of abuse is to 
sanitize the discussion and risks treating too lightly the abuse suffered by students.   
 Moreover, the physical and sexual abuse suffered in the schools was emblematic of 
the perceived inferiority of Aboriginal people, but, ultimately, incidental to the 
assimilationist colonial project undertaken by imperial and dominion governments in the 
aftermath of the changing utility of Aboriginal peoples to the dominant paradigm of 
settlement. The Indian Residential School system must be considered alongside the 
process of wardship begun in the decade after the end of the War of 1812 and the 
abrogation of governmental duties contained in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. In a 
sense, the IRS system represents the fulfillment and the failure of the assimilationist 
project: fulfillment as it was the most comprehensive and concerted attempt to destroy 
Aboriginal culture and community; and failure, as, even after a hundred years in 
operation (1886-1996), Aboriginal peoples continue to exist and are in a process of 
reclaiming elements of lost or degraded traditions. That is to say, while the IRS system 
sought to “kill the Indian in the child” the resistance and resilience of these supposed 
savages was too great for the IRS system and the assimilationist project. Indeed even 
within some of the schools themselves children were able to create a counter-culture. For 
example in the Kamloops Indian Residential School, the students built a “separate culture 
of their own within the school. Much of this culture was built around opposition to the 
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severity of the rules and regulations guiding students’ daily lives.”154 This culture 
included the stealing of food, because of its inadequate provision, and as Haig-Brown 
found in interviewing former students from the school “camaraderie created by the 
common involvement in the crime,” and that “it became an integral and exciting part of 
daily life—one in which children unless they were caught, could feel some sense of 
power and control.”155 We must be careful to mark the students’ agency, their humanity, 
as this simple example of resistance reminds us.  
 
Conclusion 
This brief history of colonisation shows the exclusion of Aboriginal peoples from the 
political, economic, and social construction of Canada. It is here that Agamben’s concept 
of state of exception can be helpful in understanding colonisation, and what is at stake in 
decolonisation. It may be unremarkable to point out Aboriginal peoples’ exclusion in this 
way; however, Agamben’s state of exception gives us an idea of the systemic reach of 
colonisation. Seeing Aboriginal peoples as drawn outside Canada, culturally, 
economically, and politically, does not capture the true complexity of the situation. 
Rather, seeing the interaction between inside and outside in Agamben’s state of exception 
helpfully complexifies this relationship and gives us an accurate view to engage with 
decolonisation.   
 It is important here not to see exception as a simply set of discriminatory laws or 
superior attitude in determining policy. Far more insidiously, it is the suspension of not 
only ordinary statutory law and ancient rights of subjects (not least to be secure in one’s 
own possessions), but also of the very constitutional order established in the treaties and 
through The Royal Proclamation. Accepting for a moment the contention of the coloniser 
that they had absolute right to legislate for and regulate the colonised, the method of 
exclusion amounts to a localised exception that denied Aboriginal peoples access to the 
law, and their rights guaranteed in the treaties and proclamation, as well as their rights as 
subjects of the colonial system. It may be an exaggeration to contend that this subjugated 
Aboriginal peoples to the whim of their guards (Indian Agent, magistrate, peace officer, 
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even Parliament), but is only an exaggeration. In the case of Indian Residential Schools, 
however, it is all too clear that this location of exception did exactly that.    
 More centrally, exception in the form of the camp gives us a theoretical lens with 
which to see Indian Residential Schools. This concept not only connects the Indian 
Residential Schools system to the broader process of Aboriginal exception, but also 
highlights the systemic qualities of Indian Residential Schools. To appreciate what was at 
stake for the TRC it is key to understand the concerted, coordinated effort to erase 
Inigeniety the IRS system represents. While the TRC was not empowered to address 
colonialism writ large, seeing the IRS system connected to the larger colonial picture can 
only give us a more accurate view.  
 It is important to note in discussing the “history” of colonialism that it is also 
present. That is to say that Canada is still a colonial country. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 5 there have been attempts at decolonisation in Canada, but the very legal 
structure discussed above remains intact, as well as the cultural structures and attitudes of 
European superiority. It is evident that Aboriginal people in Canada continue to suffer 
from injustice and disadvantage, the basis of which is colonialism.  
 Moreover, this reading of colonisation outlines the transforming relationship from 
early contact’s cooperative approach to complete control over Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada. This is important as it highlights the prior existence of a constructive relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. While this is not meant to provide an overly 
romantic view, it does provide a framework for, or least idea of, the relationship between 
Crown and autonomous Aboriginal peoples. This theme is taken up in Chapter Five, but 
here it is significant as there was once a time of “peace and friendship” between Crown 
and Indigenous people. 





Decolonisation: Representation and Autonomy 
 
Introduction 
Colonisation’s impact on Aboriginal peoples is profound and is still felt. Aboriginal 
peoples who live on reserve, often have reduced access to healthcare, education, and 
economic opportunity. From tainted water, to regular flooding, to substandard housing, 
many Aboriginal peoples on reserve live in conditions that are vastly inferior to those in 
the majority of the settler society. The unsuitable location of reserves and lack of 
resources are due to the logic of colonialism that seeks to destroy difference, to starve the 
colonised out, so to speak. This colonial approach engenders dependence, or forces 
Aboriginal people into environments that more fully demand assimilation. Substandard 
housing and over-population contribute to lower life expectancies for Aboriginal 
peoples.1 The 2001 Canadian Census found that First Nations men live 8.1 years less than 
the average Canadian male, and First Nations women 5.5 years less than the average 
Canadian female.2 These conditions are the direct result of inadequate government 
funding and interference in the affairs of First Nations through the Indian Act which 
actively mediate against self-sufficiency, to say nothing of the effort to destroy 
Aboriginal ways of being and knowing, most visibly in the IRS system. 
 Addressing the legacy of colonialism in Canada is a pressing issue with 
potentially far reaching implications for the quality of life of Aboriginal peoples. While 
determinants of health and longevity are one important aspect of colonialism’s legacy, 
this chapter is mainly concerned with formal political arrangements. In particular I am 
interested in two kinds of responses to the formal political arrangements between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown, namely inclusion in, and autonomy from, these 
political institutions. Below I seek to detail these two approaches, which substantively 
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include Aboriginal peoples in the formal structures of Canadian democracy on the one 
hand, and provide autonomy from the power of the Crown through self-government on 
the other hand. I call these “representation” and “autonomy,” respectively. These are de-
colonial approaches to the formal process and structure of colonisation. However, this is 
not the entirety of the colonial project, as a cultural support exists to license the 
subjection of peoples to a structure of power. Colonialism fundamentally sees two people 
as qualitatively different and licences the subjection of one to other rhetorically through 
art and culture, and substantively through formal political mechanisms. This 
underpinning of the colonial project was outlined in Chapter Three above, and is 
important to keep in mind here, so as to not lose the true complexity of colonisation. This 
chapter puts flesh on the bones of the theory of decolonisation, and will be helpful to 
have in mind for Chapter Six and Seven as I asses reconciliation in Canada. This tension 
of Aboriginal peoples being drawn into the centre of Canadian institutions, or increasing 
their autonomy from these institutions, is key in understanding the challenges of 
decolonisation in Canada.  
Understanding that colonisation is about more than representation in the 
Commons or lack of control over local communities, I now turn to a discussion of 
decolonisation in the context of these formal political arrangements. That is, I want to 
understand how the colonial arrangements could be undone in the most effective way. 
The following section discusses different approaches to decolonisation that have been 
proposed and evaluates their potential utility against the contours of the colonial project 
outlined above. 
 
Dominant Approaches:  “Representation in” 
One mechanism of decolonisation that seeks to alter the domination of Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada by structures of formal political power is simply the inclusion of 
Aboriginal peoples within the structures from which they have been previously excluded. 
This approach is what I call “representation in,” meaning that Aboriginal peoples could 
simply be granted representation in the existing institutional arrangements. The 
representational approach has been used historically to ensure the “peace, order, and good 
government” of the Canadian federation. Since the inception of the Canadian state, issues 
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of regional, religious and ethnic representation have been defining the political landscape. 
From the very beginning, the inclusion of a largely French Roman Catholic population in 
the province of Quebec within a larger Anglo-Protestant state precipitated discussion of 
representation at the federal level. While regional representation is a hallmark of 
Canadian federalism, discussions of broader representation have come to the fore only 
relatively recently. There has been a push from some quarters to have the Canadian 
population reflected more closely within Parliament and other institutions of government, 
in terms of diversity and race, and especially gender. Aboriginal representation in 
legislative assemblies, both provincial and federal, in a substantive (institutional) way is a 
species of this drive for representative inclusion. There have been three major initiatives 
over the last two decades that have sought to provide Indigenous representation in federal 
institutions of the Canadian state: the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party 
Financing (also known as the Lortie Commission) proposal for Aboriginal Electoral 
Districts (hereafter AEDs); the Charlottetown Accord proposal for protected Aboriginal 
Senate seats; and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) proposal for an 
Aboriginal house of Parliament. All these were proposed but never enacted. They 
represent substantive approaches of the dominant society to provide Aboriginal 
representation within the central institutions of Canadian democracy, in response to 
historic Aboriginal exclusion.  
 
Aboriginal Electoral Districts 
Among the options for the increased representation of minority groups in legislatures is a 
technique known as “affirmative gerrymandering.” In affirmative gerrymandering, 
electoral boundaries are drawn in a way that produces a “majority-minority” electorate in 
that riding. That is to say, the majority of the riding is from a minority group who 
historically has been underrepresented.  It has been used in the United States to increase, 
especially, black representation in legislatures. This type of electoral district reshaping 
has occurred in the Canadian context, at the provincial level in New Brunswick.3  In New 
Brunswick, this method has been used in the creation of provincial ridings and 
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redistricting to provide greater representation for both black and Acadian minorities in 
the province.4  
 The Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (the Lortie 
Commission) recommended a similar sort of response to the under-representation of 
Aboriginal peoples in the Parliament of Canada, in the form of Aboriginal Electoral 
Districts (AEDs). Underlying this suggestion was a notion of democratic equality that has 
been increasingly prominent in Canada since the 1970s. It envisioned that Aboriginal 
peoples would be elected to Parliament in numbers more reflective of their proportion of 
the population as a whole, which is between three to four percent.5 The difficulty with 
standard constituency boundaries is that very few ridings contain a sufficiently large 
Aboriginal population to constitute a majority, and thereby have a greater ability to elect 
an Aboriginal representative to Parliament. During the Lortie Commission’s work there 
were only two federal ridings where Aboriginal peoples constituted a majority of electors, 
one in the Northwest Territories and the other in the Manitoba riding of Churchill.6 
 In order to increase the number of Aboriginal members in the House of 
Commons, Lortie recommended the creation of specific electoral districts for Aboriginal 
peoples. By using the “communities of interest” redistricting criteria found in the 
enabling legislation for provincial boundary commissions, Aboriginal Electoral Districts 
(AEDs) could be set up “in which Aboriginal populations would be sufficient to wield 
enough electoral strength to influence or even determine election outcomes, even to the 
point of electing ‘one of their own’ to the House of Commons.”7 Lortie recommended the 
creation of up to eight electoral districts in total, to be awarded to provinces “when the 
number of voters on a specially mandated Aboriginal register met a minimum 
requirement of 85 percent of the per seat electoral quotient for the province.”8 
Specifically the Commission recommended that “the Canadian Elections Act provide for 
the creation of Aboriginal constituencies by electoral boundaries commissions in any 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 
5 Tim Schouls, “Aboriginal Peoples and Electoral Reform in Canada: Differentiated Representation versus 
Voter Equality” in Canadian Journal of Political Science, vol.29, no.4, (Dec., 1996), 729-30. 
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province where the number of self-identified Aboriginal voters enrolled on an Aboriginal 
register warrants the establishment of one or more constituencies in relation to a 
provinces electoral quotient.”9 And that the number of these constituencies be “equal to 
such integer obtained by dividing the number of voters on the Aboriginal voters register 
by a number equal to 85 percent of the electoral quotient for the province.”10 This 
formula conforms to the federal Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act limit of 15 
percent deviation from the provincial electoral quotient for communities of interest, 
which would mean that Aboriginal peoples would be only slightly over-represented as a 
portion of the population.  
 David Small points out that because of the distribution of the Aboriginal 
population, only British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, northern Ontario 
and northern Quebec would qualify for AEDs.11 The Atlantic provinces lack sufficient 
populations and population concentrations of Aboriginal peoples to qualify for AEDs. 
These eight AEDs would further be part of the overall seat allotment of the province, 
rather than being a “top-up.”12   Small’s plan called for AEDs to be integrated into 
qualifying provinces by redistributing and readjusting existing seats to allow a majority, 
or at least a large minority, of Aboriginal electors in the riding, thus making them 
territorially contiguous and containing both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal electors.13 
Lortie’s suggestion was, conversely, for these AEDs to comprise non-territorial districts 
for Aboriginal peoples, giving individuals the choice to self-identify as members of 
Aboriginal districts or to remain in a traditional electoral riding.14 This was expressly the 
case if the calculation detailed above yielded only one AED in a province, “the 
boundaries of the province would serve as the boundaries of the Aboriginal 
constituency.”15 In the case of more than one AED, Lortie recommended that “a special 
boundaries commission be created, composed of the chairperson of the boundaries 
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commission for the province, who shall also act as chair for this special commission, plus 
two Aboriginal voters appointed by the Speaker of the House of Commons, with the 
mandate to determine the boundaries and names of the Aboriginal constituencies.”16 
It is a matter of speculation whether AEDs would come about as Small suggests, 
or as Lortie envisioned, because the issue has failed to gain traction at the federal level. 
Especially since the advent of the Charlottetown Accord, and its subsequent defeat, and 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), AEDs have, as Courtney points 
out, “become little more than an academic question.”17  This might be because AEDs have 
been superseded by other institutional reforms. However, as Schouls argues, the creation 
of AEDs is more complex than it appears at first glance. Aboriginal peoples are not a 
monolithic group; there is a wide range of difference within the rubric of Aboriginal 
peoples. “There are status and non-status Indians, urban and rural dwellers, a diversity of 
tribes, nations and linguistic groups, treaty and non-treaty Indians, and men and 
women.”18 In short, Aboriginal peoples are a diverse group that might not be well suited 
to coalescing in one riding (as Lortie suggests) for the representation of their interests. 
Schouls helpfully gives examples in a series of rhetorical questions: “For example, does 
the Shuswap nation of south central British Columbia possess sufficiently compatible 
objectives with the Musqueam nation of Vancouver to be represented by a single MP? 
Or, similarly, if a Metis politician were elected in Saskatchewan, would status Indians in 
the province feel represented?”19  Surely going too far down this line of argument we 
would get to the position that one could only be represented by oneself; however, the 
point is well made. That is to say, this solution contains, at least in part, a colonial attitude 
toward Aboriginal peoples as homogeneous.   
To further muddy the AED waters, Aboriginal nations not only often cross 
electoral boundaries, but also provincial boundaries and international ones. Under the 
Lortie proposal, AEDs would not be able to provide representation across provinces, as 
seats would be apportioned to provinces directly. These complexities might have been 
very much at work in the lack of federal enthusiasm for AEDs.  However, it is not just the 
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technical problems of representation that might have led to the failure of AED’s to 
materialise. While diverse interest from Aboriginal peoples themselves and geographic 
dispersion are significant, although not insurmountable, Schouls highlights the further 
problem of institutional mistrust on the part of many Aboriginal peoples. Specifically, it 
is the application of “communities of interest” criteria that raises “the assimilationist 
sensitivities of Aboriginal peoples” as “Aboriginal peoples regard themselves as distinct 
nations within Canada, with the concurrent political authority and power that flows from 
their claim to inherent sovereignty.”20 From Residential Schools to the 1969 Trudeau 
government White Paper, Aboriginal peoples in Canada have good cause to be suspicious 
of proposals that “bring them in” and, therefore, hold the possibility for degrading their 
unique position in Canadian society or assimilating their culture into the dominant one.21 
Schouls’ criticism is certainly understandable, but the Committee for Aboriginal Electoral 
Reform, whose recommendations for AEDs found their way into the final Lortie 
recommendations, was clear that its visions was that “specific measures be taken to 
ensure that the legislative enactment of AEDs in no way derogates from Aboriginal and 
treaty rights of Aboriginal people.”22 What was meant by reference to this vague 
constitutional language is not entirely clear, but Lortie certainly did acknowledge the 
distinct claims and rights Aboriginal peoples have in Canada.  
Notwithstanding the above concerns, in 2001, the federal boundary commission in 
New Brunswick, a province with experience in affirmative gerrymandering as mentioned 
above, proposed the creation of one AED to represent all of New Brunswick’s reserves. 
This AED would have been non-territorial and would have linked the province’s 11,000 
to 12,000 residents of Indian reserves “to one another and to one single MP in a new and 
different fashion: racial ancestry would trump geography.”23  Due to its opposition by 
Aboriginal peoples in New Brunswick, this proposal was dropped in the final report of 
the Boundary Commission.24 Courtney points out that “most Native leaders called for its 
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rejection on the grounds that it was better to keep the province’s reserves within the 
federal riding that territorially encompassed them. That way Natives would be able to 
seek the services of several different MPs…”25 
What is clear is that AEDs represent an innovative, yet problematic, means of 
enhancing Aboriginal representation in the House of Commons. Due to the complexity of 
Aboriginal identity, Aboriginal population distribution, and the goals of different 
Aboriginal groups, the issue of AEDs has largely been set aside to consider other means 
of Aboriginal representation and to concentrate on a project of Aboriginal self-
government—most recently in the form of the Nisga’a Treaty.26  While New Brunswick 
considered creating an AED as recently as 2001, Aboriginal peoples in that province 
ultimately rejected it, in favour of a more strategic option. 
 
Charlottetown Accord 
The 1982 constitutional reforms recognised the rights of Aboriginal peoples in the form 
of Sections 25 and 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. It is Section 25 that guarantees that 
rights upheld by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms “shall not be construed so as to 
abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to 
the aboriginal peoples of Canada.”27 Section 35 recognises and affirms existing treaty 
rights of Aboriginal peoples, while Section 35.1 commits the federal and provincial 
governments to a consultative process in the event of changes to land or land claims.28 
While these measures represent significant guarantees for Aboriginal peoples, the 
proposal made in the Charlottetown Accord “would have radically transformed the 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 See Lisa Dufraimont, “Continuity and Modification of Aboriginal Rights in the Nisga’a Treaty,” 
University of British Columbia Law Review vol. 35 no.2 (2002), 455-510 and Douglas Sanders “‘We Intend 
to Liver Here Forever’: A Primer on the Nisga’a Treaty,” University of British Columbia Law Review 
vol.33 no. 1(1999), 103-128.  
27 Constitution Act 1982 sec. 25. 
28 Constitution Act 1982 Section 35.1 reads: “The government of Canada and the provincial governments 
are committed to the principal that, before any amendment is made to Class 24 of section 91 of the 
"Constitution Act, 1867", to section 25 of this Act or to this Part,  (a) a constitutional conference that 
includes in its agenda an item relating to the proposed amendment, composed of the Prime Minister of 
Canada and the first ministers of the provinces, will be convened by the Prime Minister of Canada; and  (b) 
the Prime Minister of Canada will invite representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada to participate 
in the discussions on that item.” 
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constitutional status of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.”29 The Accord would have made 
broad changes to the constitutional place of Aboriginal peoples, such as recognising an 
inherent right to self-government. The Charlottetown Accord was ultimately defeated by 
referendum in 1992; however, the proposed legislative representation for Aboriginal 
peoples, like the Lortie Commission’s proposal, was a novel one, if flawed. The 
substantive representational proposal for Aboriginal peoples was that of Aboriginal seats 
being set aside in the Senate of Canada. 
 Articles 7 and 8 of the Charlottetown Accord provided for a “triple-E” senate,30 
with Article 9 concerning Aboriginal representation in this new senate. It called for 
Aboriginal representation to be “guaranteed in the Constitution. It stipulated that 
Aboriginal Senate seats should be additional to provincial and territorial seats, rather than 
drawn from any province’s or territory's allocation of Senate seats.”31 While short on 
other details, Article 9 stated that specifics “[would] be discussed further by governments 
and the representatives of the Aboriginal peoples in the early autumn of 1992.”32 It was 
unclear under the Accord how many Aboriginal representatives would be in the Senate; 
however, these senators would have acted in the same capacity as all other senators. 
Further, Charlottetown “proffered the possibility that on issues of Aboriginal concern a 
double majority would be required to pass legislation.”33 
 Although exact representation for Aboriginal peoples in the Senate was unclear in 
the Charlottetown Accord, Williams argues “it seems sensible to suppose that 
[representation] would be at the same level as the provinces. Following the Charlottetown 
proposal, then, there would [have been] six Aboriginal senators.”34 Williams saw little 
problem with putting Aboriginal representation on par with provincial representation—
the proposal was for an elected, equal and effective senate—as the population of 
Aboriginal peoples “exceeds that of the smaller provinces.”35  
 For the Charlottetown proposals, the problem did not lie in a lack of interest on 
the part of the central government or possible objections on the part of Aboriginal groups, 
                                                          
29 Williams, “Sharing the River,” 98. 
30 “Triple E” refers to a senate that is equal, elected, and effective.  
31 Charlottetown Accord, Section 9. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Williams, “Sharing the River,” 98. 
34 Ibid., 111-2. 
35 Ibid., 112. 
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as all major national parties supported the Accord, as did many Aboriginal leaders. The 
failure of Charlottetown, and with it the innovative proposal for Aboriginal senate seats, 
was due to the rejection of the Accord by a 54.4 to 44.6 per cent vote in the national 
referendum held on 26 October 1992.36  
 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
Where the Lortie Commission and Charlottetown Accord failed to provide the legislative 
representation that each proposal contained for Aboriginal peoples, the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) sought to renew the legislative 
representation debate, from the position of a nation-to-nation relationship.37 This change 
in the conceptual starting position for legislative representation was, at least in part, due 
to the concerns of Aboriginal peoples with regards to shared institutions, as detailed by 
Schouls above. The Lortie Commission and the Charlottetown proposals both proposed 
changes within existing institutional structures of Canadian democracy. However, 
“RCAP’s response to justifiable Aboriginal distrust of existing parliamentary institutions 
was not to seek reform within those institutions but to create an altogether new institution 
that would stand alongside them in the legislative process.”38  
 Rather than bringing Aboriginal peoples into existing institutions, RCAP’s 
proposal was to radically remake the orders of government in Canada by creating an 
Aboriginal order that was “not a replica of the second provincial order, as it differs from 
it in numerous ways.”39 The complexity of Aboriginal peoples was, again, here, a 
prominent feature in discussing congruence with a traditional understanding of 
legislatures and institutional relations. Ultimately RCAP’s recommendation was “the 
creation of a third chamber of Parliament to go with the third order of government: a 
House of First Peoples. This third chamber would [have been] comprised of between 75 
and 100 Aboriginal representatives.”40 
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37 Alan Cairns, “Report on the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Aboriginal Nationalism, 
Canadian Federalism, and Canadian Democracy” Saskatchewan Law Review, (2007) vol.70, no.1, 113. 
38 Williams, “Sharing the River,” 100. 
39 Cairns, “Report on the Royal  Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,” 113. 
40 Williams, “Sharing the River,” 100. 
117 
 
 This third chamber of Parliament would have needed to have substantial power in 
order to provide adequate representation for Aboriginal peoples and to be something 
more than merely a symbolic nod to Aboriginal inclusion in Parliament. RCAP 
understood that the proposal of legislative representation in the past suffered, in part, 
from this apparent lack of credibility and efficacy. This House of First Peoples, according 
to RCAP, would need “real power… [by] this, we mean the power to initiate legislation 
and to require a majority vote on matters crucial to the lives of Aboriginal peoples. This 
legislation would be referred to the House of Commons for mandatory debate and 
voting.”41 That is to say, RCAP saw the House of First Peoples as a partner with the 
House of Commons and the Senate (and presumably the Crown), in the Parliament of 
Canada.  
 With the experience of the failed “mega-constitutional” reforms, Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown,42 fresh in their minds, and realising that the creation of a House of First 
                                                          
41 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Final Report, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1996),  375. In Williams, 100. 
42 The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords were failed attempts in 1987 and 1992, respectively, to 
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(Majories Montgomery Bowker, The Meech Lake Accords: What it will mean to you and to Canada (Hull, 
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Canadians be a Sovereign People? First Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992) especially Chapter 
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public without the possibility of change. Russell argues that the narrow focus of Meech Lake made it 
unpopular outside Québec (154). The Charlottetown Accord, or the “Canada Round” of constitutional 
change, was a more expanded proposal for change that dealt not only with issues related to Québec as 
Meech did, but, also, proposed a triple-E Senate (elected, equal, and effective), Aboriginal self government 
and guaranteed representation in the upper house, changes to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to 
include property rights, and clear up federal-provincial divisions of power (Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, 
171-3). In addition to the legislative approval that Charlottetown required and received from the 10 
provinces, federal government, and the territories, the Accord was also endorsed by the four main national 
Aboriginal groups, Assembly of First Nations, the Native Council of Canada, the Inuit Tapirisat, and the 
Métis National Council. Charlottetown, unlike Meech, however, required the endorsement of the people of 
Canada through a referendum. The referendum was rejected by 54% of the national electorate and 
decisively rejected in the West and Québec on October 26, 1992 (Martin Westmacott, “The Charlottetown 
Accord: A Retrospective Overview,” in Challenges to Canadian Federalism Martin Westmacott and Hugh 
Mellon eds. (Scarborough, ON: Prentice Hall, 1998), 109). For an expanded discussion of Meech Lake see 
Michael D. Behiels ed., The Meech Lake Primer: Conflicting Views of the 1987 Constitutional Accord 
(Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1990) and Andrew Cohen, A Deal Undone: The Making and Breaking 
of the Meech Lake Accord (Vancouver: Douglas and MacIntyre, 1990). For an expanded discussion of the 
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Peoples would require constitutional amendment, RCAP suggested an interim measure 
through normal legislation to construct a consultative house.43 The main purpose of this 
house, as opposed to the fully constitutional one RCAP envisioned, would be to “advise 
the House of Commons and the Senate on legislation and constitutional matters relating 
to Aboriginal peoples.”44 However, this interim house has never come close to fruition 
and has become, as a means of legislative representation, a non-issue for the federal 
government and the public at large.  
 Williams argues that the traditional frame of Aboriginal issues sees binary 
opposition and incongruence with increased representation for Aboriginal peoples on the 
one hand and meaningful self-government on the other.45 Through the course of her 
analysis, Williams argues that this is not a necessary incongruence, and that both self-
government and representation may be useful in many policy areas.46 Indeed, in both the 
Charlottetown Accord and the RCAP report, self-government is affirmed, while at the 
same time, representation of Aboriginal peoples in the central institutions of Canadian 
democracy is provided. However, each of these proposals’ commitment to Aboriginal 
self-government would have subjected these Aboriginal governments to ultimate 
authority of the Canadian state. In the case of RCAP, the final recommendation fell 
significantly short of the vision of empowered self-government the Commissioners 
themselves held. As Ladner argues, this view of self-government represented “negotiated 
inferiority or an unequal partnership”.47 This is due to the conflict between the assertion 
of an inherent right to self-government at the same time as an insistence on the 
negotiation of certain agreements because Aboriginal jurisdiction and the reliance on 
existing orders of Canadian government. Moreover, this view of self-government would 
subject Aboriginal jurisdiction to judicial mechanism of Canada, including the Charter of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Charlottetown Accord see Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan eds., The Charlottetown Accord, 
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Rights and Freedoms.48 This would have provided some local authority, but substantially 
bring Aboriginal governments into an existing framework of federalism, which would 
implicitly mean a failure to recognise the sui generis relationship that Aboriginal nations 
have with the Crown, as outlined throughout this project. 
 Thus, while these proposals advance a complex approach of representation at the 
centre and some measured autonomy at the periphery, ultimately the approaches outlined 
above represent an “inclusion in” approach to decolonisation that sees Aboriginal peoples 
as one minority group among many within a multicultural Canada. To be clear, both the 
RCAP Report and the Charlottetown Accord contained mechanisms for increased 
representation within the federal democratic structure of Canada, as well as some 
measured autonomy—not unlike the measure of autonomy of Canadian municipalities, 
except Aboriginal governments would be more creatures of the federal level rather than 
any respective provincial government. These movements, however, seek ultimately to 
provide representation in the democratic and federal structure of Canadian government, 
with the full implications thereof. 
 
Alternative Approaches: “Autonomy from” 
Within the above approaches to representation there are affirmations of a right of self-
government for Aboriginal peoples. However, this commitment raises some doubt about 
the meaning of the concept of self-government when read alongside the arguments for 
self-government made by several other scholars. These arguments, as advanced by 
Ladner, Henderson, and Tully, conceive of a relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal nations that subjects neither one to the authority of the other.49 This contrasts 
with other approaches articulated by mainstream scholars such as Courchene and Powell, 
Cairns, and LeSelva, who posit a form of self-government that submits to the ultimate 
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authority of the Canadian state rather than conceiving co-autonomous entities.50 The 
following discussion of “treaty federalism” and approaches to delegated government 
seeks to highlight the definitional differences in the contest over self-government and 
provide a thorough understanding of autonomy-motivated decolonisation. In the case of 
scholars advocating “treaty federalism,” as discussed below, we can see most clearly an 
alternative approach to decolonisation from the one outlined above, which features 
representation within the central institutions of Canadian democracy. Here we see 
decolonisation as autonomy from the central institution of Canada, rather than the re-
articulation of representational approaches that I argue we see in Courchene and Powell, 
Cairns, and LeSelva. It is important to draw out these difference as the line between 
intention and result is not always straight, especially when dealing with colonialism.  
 What Henderson, and Ladner following him, call “treaty federalism” and what 
Tully terms “treaty constitutionalism” is a historically rooted understanding of the 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. As the term treaty 
federalism indicates, this relationship is based on the treaty order established by European 
crowns upon the arrival of Europeans in North America. For Canada, the relevant crown 
is that of Britain, which concluded many treaties in the period after contact with the first 
peoples of North America. As Ladner argues “treaties were signed between nations as 
incoming Europeans (at least initially) recognized Indigenous polities as constituting 
nations and dealt with them as such.”51  In fact, Henderson argues that without this 
understanding, the whole treaty process makes no sense.52 The analogy here is of the 
“two row wampum” discussed above in Chapter Four, where two parallel beaded rows in 
a ceremonial belt represent the paths of two distinct vessels traveling the same river; 
where one ship is for the newcomers and the other for the natives, each traveling in their 
own boat while agreeing: “Neither of us will try to steer the other’s vessel.”53  
                                                          
50 See Thomas Courchene and Lisa Powell, A First Nations Province (Kingston: Queen’s University 
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 As Henderson outlines, treaty federalism as a historical relationship was 
concerned with “(1) protection of inherent Aboriginal rights; (2) distribution of shared 
jurisdictions; (3) territorial management; (4) human liberties and rights; and (5) treaty 
delegation.”54 Significantly, these treaties provided land for the incoming settlers, yet 
retained all rights and privileges for Aboriginal nations not expressly ceded in the treaty, 
including the right to self-determination and sovereign authority.55 These treaties are seen 
as being reciprocal, with each party responsible for both the rights and duties guaranteed 
at the time of signing. In a sense the treaties not only confirm the sovereign autonomy of 
Aboriginal nations, but also license the authority—to say nothing of the land base—of the 
Crown over its subjects on the continent. As Ladner puts it: “Treaties not only recognize 
and affirm a right to self-government and a continuation of sovereignty for Aboriginal 
peoples, but they also recognize and affirm a right to self-government and create 
sovereignty for ‘aliens’ within Indigenous territories.”56 Recall the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, which reserved to the Crown of Great Britain alone the authority to deal with 
Aboriginal nations, and specified that all lands were to be purchased from Aboriginal 
nations by the Crown.57 
 Moreover, this relation, through the mechanism of the treaty, created a 
constitutional framework for interaction, one that the Crown came to unilaterally alter.  
This is a constitutional framework in the most fundamental sense, as it established the 
terms of reference for sharing the territory covered by the treaty. It also established a 
federal, or, more precisely, confederal, type of relation, as both the Crown and Aboriginal 
nation constituted distinct and sovereign authorities. “Because the treaties established the 
terms by which nations would co-exist as sovereign entities and because they delegate 
power and jurisdiction from Indian nations to the Crown, it has been argued that the 
treaties constitute a constitutional arrangement of federalism.”58 However, this federal 
constitution was quite different from the one created by the British North America Act 
1867. This treaty federalism was quite a bit looser and less institutionalized than the 
federation of the British colonies, which occurred later.  Significantly, the treaties did not 
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create superior and subordinate orders of government, as the British North America Act 
did.59 Henderson argues that the transfer of authority over Aboriginal peoples to the 
Crown would have been inconsistent with the notions of authority held at the time the 
treaties were concluded. “Only positive law empires created around centralized rulers or 
aristocratic society can transfer total control to another ruler. This attribute was missing 
in First Nations.”60 Thus, it would not have been possible to include something like 
Section 90 of the British North America Act 1867, which provided the federal 
government considerable—although little used—powers of disallowance and reservation 
over the provinces, in the constitutional framework of Crown-Aboriginal relations.  
 This understanding of treaty federalism as “an agreement on a framework for 
mutual coexistence of two sovereign entities within the same territory”61 is consistent 
with the history of the relationship, before the transition towards a system of colonial 
control. However, this relationship was unilaterally altered by the advent of the Indian 
Act and the policy of civilization, detailed in Chapter Four. Ladner, then, argues for a 
return to this form of treaty federalism in order to overcome the colonial project, for it is, 
she argues, “[b]y replacing the existing state of oppression, subordination, genocide, and 
colonisation, [that] treaty federalism would enable all to live together on this land in 
peace and friendship.”62 As we have seen, this would significantly entail a return to a 
relationship of peace and friendship, unilaterally abandoned by the Crown and its agents. 
 Similarly, Tully provides a justification for a thoroughgoing understanding of 
Aboriginal self-government, which he calls “treaty constitutionalism.” Tully seeks to 
rescue the constitutional order, as a concept, from its inculturated articulation in the 
Anglo-American tradition. It is Tully’s position that constitutionalism has within it all 
that is needed for an increasingly culturally and racially diverse age; constitutionalism 
can be amended rather than rejected.63 Rather than locating the means of amending 
constitutionalism in the modern era of constitution making—and rightly so, as the 
modern agenda which underpins the constitutions of their time was at work in the drive to 
assimilate Aboriginal peoples in North America—Tully looks to an ancient 
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understanding of constitutionalism. By Tully’s understanding, three important 
conventions are of paramount importance to constitutionalism: mutual recognition, 
consent, and continuity.64  
In the first instance, he contrasts modern imposition with ancient recognition.65 
For Tully, the hallmark of the modern constitution is “an act whereby a people frees itself 
(or themselves) from custom and imposes a new form of association on itself by an act of 
will, reason and agreement.”66 The very language of modern constitutionalism was 
constructed so as to “exclude or assimilate cultural diversity and justify uniformity.”67 By 
contrast, the ancient constitution does not constitute or create a people and their system of 
relation, but, rather, recognizes “how the people are already constituted by their 
assemblage of fundamental laws, institutions and customs.”68  
 In the case of consent, Tully argues that modern constitutions establish the pre-
conditions for democracy and are not seen as a part of democracy69—which we can see 
here as a mechanism of consent. Tully characterizes this as an anti-democratic feature of 
the modern constitution which “is mitigated by the assumption that the people gave rise 
to it at some time, and by the elaborate theories of modern constitutionalism from Hobbes 
to the present which serve to persuade us that we would consent today if we were 
reasonable people.”70 This, however, only serves to reinforce the imposed nature of the 
modern constitution as it constructs within its theory a normative exclusion criteria under 
the heading “reasonability.” The ancient constitution, on the other hand, appears more 
democratic, as it is amended and changed, continually consented to by living the customs 
and conventions that it embodies.71 
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 Last, continuity is expressly denied by the modern constitution. As the 
background agreement of the foundation of democracy, the modern constitution seeks a 
once-and-for-all agreement that is a comprehensive set.72 Whereas, in the ancient 
constitution, the agreement to the constitution is “seen as one link in an endless chain, 
stretching back to what one’s ancestors have done before and forward to what one’s 
children will do in the future.”73 Linked with consent, the ancient constitution continues 
as it is continually consented to, and is a living concept, not unlike the “living tree” 
concept of constitutional interpretation.74  
 The combination of mutual recognition, consent, and continuity is most 
embodied, Tully argues, in the form of “treaty constitutionalism” between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Like the treaty federalism of Henderson and Ladner, 
above, treaty constitutionalism is a relationship of equality between Crown and 
Aboriginal nations, representing the three most basic principles of the ancient 
constitution: mutual recognition, consent, and continuity. As Tully argues, treaty 
constitutionalism “is expressly designed not only to recognise and treat the Aboriginal 
people as equal, self-governing nations, but also to continue, rather than extinguish, this 
form of recognition through all treaty arrangements over time. Indeed the legitimacy of 
non-Aboriginal governments in America depends on this continuity, for it is the condition 
of Aboriginal consent to recognise them.”75 
 Thus, in the view of Henderson, Ladner, and Tully, the proper and legal 
relationship between Crown and Aboriginal nations is a type of compact federalism, 
where each consenting party represents a separate sovereignty, and where any authority 
of one over the other can only be accomplished by express consent of both. This treaty 
federalism approach contrasts with other approaches to more autonomous relations 
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between the Crown and Aboriginal nations. While both use the terminology of self-
government, it is clear that this concept does not hold the same connotations for treaty 
federalists as it does for those who advocate what Ladner calls the “Aboriginal 
orthodoxy.”76 The proponents of the Aboriginal orthodoxy cannot relinquish the ultimate 
sovereignty of the Crown, and thus understand self-government in a more limited sense. 
 Cairns argues for a relationship between the Canadian state and Aboriginal 
peoples characterized by a “citizens plus” model. This view sees “Aboriginal difference 
fashioned by history and the continuing desire to resist submergence and also recognize 
our need to feel that we belong to each other.”77 This concept of “citizen plus” was first 
articulated in the 1966-7 Hawthorn Report. The report was prepared for the Minister of 
the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to inquire “into the socio-economic, 
political, and constitutional conditions of status Indians, with the task of advising policy 
makers of the route to a better future for the Indian peoples of Canada.”78 The main thrust 
of this position, as the name indicates, is that status Indians—although Cairns sees little 
problem with extending this to all Aboriginal peoples79—are full citizens of Canada, but 
also possess other special rights as founding members of the Canadian community.80  
 The “citizens plus” conception contains within it measures of self-government for 
on-reserve Aboriginal peoples. However, self-government cannot fully address the 
complex relationship of interdependence between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian 
state, according to Cairns.81 Moreover, like other transitional societies, and here Cairns 
mentions post-communist Czechoslovakia and post-Apartheid South Africa, the 
conditions are not always going to be favourable to self-government in First Nations 
communities. In this context: 
 Self-government will be partial, not total. Even where the maximum of   
 self-government is possible, it will fall far short of total independence. The small 
 size of all Aboriginal nations limits the jurisdiction they can wield. The citizens of 
 self-governing nations will continue to be intimately linked to federal and 
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 provincial governments for services, funds, and so on. Part of the Aboriginal 
 future then resides in their civic relations to the non-Aboriginal governments of 
 the federation.82 
 
Thus, overall, Cairns rejects the type of thoroughgoing self-government advocated by 
Henderson, Ladner, and Tully. The two-row wampum model is “unworkable,” according 
to Cairns, as it “would lack staying power as its sensitivity to Aboriginal difference is not 
matched by an equal concern for the cohesion of the Canadian community. We need to 
strike a balance.”83 Historically, however, this “balance” has involved the Canadian state 
steering both ships. 
 It is in this “concern for cohesion”84 that we can see the problematic kernel at the 
centre of Cairns’ solution. Cairns’ “citizens plus” formula still seeks to subsume 
Aboriginality under the rubric of Canadian nationalism and belonging, which is central to 
the colonial project. While Cairns discusses the history of colonial relations in this work, 
he does not accept the proposition of treaty federalism—with its maximum of autonomy 
for self-governing nations—rather, he favours the inclusion of Aboriginal peoples 
through the mechanism of citizenship, albeit as “citizens plus.”85 That is to say, this view 
of self-government advanced by Cairns is admittedly limited. It also, I argue, fails to 
transcend the colonial relationship. The rejection of the two-row wampum as 
“unworkable” misses the centrality of the de-colonial position of two row wampum that 
posits Aboriginal peoples as not Canadian, per se, but, rather, in a relationship of peace 
and friendship with the Crown. Under bargains made for the land and the loyalties of the 
people first found upon it, the Crown has continuing responsibilities, under treaty, to 
Aboriginal peoples. Cairns rightly points out that even self-governing First Nations “will 
continue to be intimately linked to federal and provincial governments.”86 However, he 
misses that this relationship would exist in a treaty federalism arrangement as well, 
because of the treaty relationship. 
 Moreover, Cairns is concerned with economies of scale in asserting that self-
government called only be partial, due to the small size of some communities. The treaty 
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federalism argument, however, nowhere specifies that each of the over two thousand 
reserves would be self-governing. This comment seems to replicate a latent paternal 
attitude that supposes Aboriginal peoples cannot make associational and governance 
decisions for themselves. This could not be further from the truth. Not only do Aboriginal 
communities have a right to determine the shape of the institutions which govern them, 
but they also have, even by metrics of the dominant society, an increasing capacity to 
carry out the functions of government, whatever shape that government might take.  
There is a relationship between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian state, however, 
conceived of as a “citizenship” relationship that does not provide an autonomy-motivated 
de-colonial approach, but, rather, an implicitly representational one. 
 Cairns, clearly, does not represent the entirety of the “Aboriginal orthodoxy,” and 
the self-described limited self-government that he proposes is by no means the most 
extensive self-government advocated from that quarter. Courchene and Powell advance a 
much more extensive proposition for self-government of First Nations in Canada, in 
detailing the workability of a First Nations province.87 As these authors are both 
economists, the main concern of their work is the fiscal viability of such a province, 
which is not an unimportant concern for any approach to self-government.  
 Courchene and Powell argue that, “[s]ince a federal system is, by its very nature, 
designed to accommodate the sharing of ‘sovereignty’ and/or self-government, one 
obvious ‘Canadian’ solution to aboriginal aspirations for self-government is to integrate 
the First Nations fully into the federal structure—that is, to grant provincial status to the 
First Nations.”88 The balance of their work is dedicated to elaborating the shape and 
character of the First Nations province. First, the province would, like the other provinces 
of the federation, be a territorially bounded one. However, unlike other provinces, this 
First Nations province would not be contiguous. The more than 2,200 reserves across the 
country would form the territory of this new province, which is, as Courchene and Powell 
point out “largely how the reserves are currently administered...”89 Second, this First 
Nations province would have all the powers accorded under Section 92, 93, and 109 of 
the British North America Act, 1867, having control over property, civil rights, direct 
                                                          
87 Courchene and Powell, A First Nations Province.  




taxation, borrowing, regulation and incorporation of companies, and resource 
management.90 In other words, the First Nations province would be as much a 
constitutional partner as any other province. Third, this First Nations province would 
have jurisdiction to exercise its power within its territory and over all the people within 
that territory. That is to say, there would be “a territorial definition of an FNP [First 
Nations province] resident.”91 Like any other province there would be a very 
straightforward application of jurisdiction over any person within the territory, Aboriginal 
or non-Aboriginal. Last, Courchene and Powell recognize a substantial financial 
commitment from the federal government is necessary “for it [the First Nations province] 
to be viable fiscally.”92 While the authors spend considerable time detailing under which 
model of fiscal transfer—whether the existing equalization program or the Yukon 
Territorial Government93—fiscal viability might be secured, suffice it to say here, 
Courchene and Powell argue that the First Nations province would be treated similarly to 
other provinces in its ability to provide “reasonably comparable levels of public services 
at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.”94  
 Thus, they make an argument for what seems to be a thoroughgoing self-
government for First Nations in Canada.95 Indeed, the powers afforded to the proposed 
province would be equal to those of the existing provinces. It should be noted, however, 
that the concentration on the reserve of status Indian population is not only a more limited 
category than what Cairns proposes, but also would subject urban Aboriginal peoples 
(status and non-status) to the full authority of the province in which they live, which 
would not be the First Nations province. While Courchene and Powell do not discuss 
whether the differentiated rights of status Indians would be continued in the existing 
                                                          
90 Ibid., 7. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 51. 
93 Ibid., 37-46. 
94 This is the language of Section 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 which reads “Parliament and the 
government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization payments to ensure that 
provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services 
at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.” 
95 It should be pointed out explicitly here that Courchene and Powell are only looking at Indians, as defined 
under the Indian Act, who live on reserve. While Cairns uses the more inclusive category of Aboriginal, as 
do Ladner, Henderson, and Tully, the solution considered by Courchene and Powell for Aboriginal claims 
(specifically land and self-government) is directed to on-reserve status Indians. 
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provinces after the creation of the First Nations province, it would not be inconsistent to 
their argument to continue these rights.  
 More to the point, however, Courchene and Powell propose a system that seeks to 
represent First Nations within the existing provincial/federal system, as a largely 
undifferentiated province in the federation. I do not dismiss the considerable nods to self-
government contained in this proposal; indeed, the authors acknowledge the role of 
Aboriginal consent required to establish the proposed system.96 The major problem, 
however, is in the lack of reflection on sovereignty, which is central to a truly autonomy-
based approach. Courchene and Powell assert that a federal system is “designed to 
accommodate the sharing of ‘sovereignty.’”97 In the context of the current Canadian 
federal system, however, it is the sharing of Crown sovereignty with itself.  The Crown of 
the province and of the federation, like a reducible fraction, resolves to the same 
personage of the Queen of the United Kingdom, Elizabeth II, and the same office of 
Queen. That is to say, properly speaking, it is the Crown-in-right of a province and the 
Crown-in-right-of-Canada—the same office, embodied by the same person, in Canada 
occupied by delegates—that is the font of sovereignty in Canada. It is a matter of 
convenient fact that these different offices are held de jure by the same person and 
subsumed under the superior office of Queen of the United Kingdom, held today by 
Elizabeth II. To fit a First Nations province into this Crown-based federation without 
problematizing or thoroughly discussing the basis of sovereignty within it fails to 
transcend the representational approach. In fact, one of the virtues of this approach, 
according to the authors, is the seat that the first minister of this First Nations province 
would have at the table of other provincial first ministers.98 However, in the absence of 
being integrated into the federation as a province, Aboriginal peoples in Canada have 
achieved executive federalism-like representation through the lobbying of the Assembly 
of First Nations. That is to say, the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations 
already has a conventional (de facto) seat at the table of first ministers.99  
                                                          
96 Courchene and Powell, A First Nations Province, 51. 
97 Ibid., 5. 
98 Ibid., 14. Since this work came out, a more regularized Council of the Federation has evolved and 
presumably the first minister of the First Nations province would represent there as well. 
99 While there is no statutory obligation to consult in recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
Hiada and Taku River decision of 2004 and the Mikisew Cree decision of 2005, there has been found to be 
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 Moreover, this proposal of a First Nations province ignores the advocacy of 
Aboriginal peoples themselves to become thoroughgoing self-governing nations. Not 
only would this First Nations province subsume the difference of the 60 to 80 distinct 
Aboriginal nations into one structure of government within the existing Canadian federal 
structure, it would also sidestep the existing constitutional relationship between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown contained in the treaties and reinforced in Section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and further shielded by Section 25 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Setting aside the impossibility of constitutional change in the wake of 
Meech Lake and Charlottetown, as this proposal would require the agreement of the 
federal government and seven provinces with fifty percent of the population, a First 
Nations province would short-cut the complex nation-to-nation relationship contained in 
the treaties and reinforced in the Constitution Act, 1982 in favor of a streamlined 
integration into the existing federal structure.100  
 Thus, while initially Courchene and Powell’s proposal seems to be an autonomy-
motivated approach, since a First Nations province would provide substantial provincial 
powers to one governing body of all First Nations reserves, this proposal ultimately seeks 
to represent only First Nations within the existing federal structure. It would give this 
order of government substantial executive federalism-like representation within the 
federation, as well as constitutional influence over the central institution of Canadian 
democracy. It is a proposal that would “bring in” First Nations—and remember that this 
would included only status on-reserve First Nations people—rather than provide the 
thoroughgoing autonomy of Henderson, Ladner, and Tully’s approach to self-
government. 
 LaSelva’s discussion of Aboriginal self-government arises from a strand of liberal 
minority-rights, and gives a theoretic underpinning for the “Aboriginal orthodox” view of 
self-government.  That is, LaSelva is arguing from a modern-liberal perspective. “What 
                                                                                                                                                                             
a constitional obligation to consult with Aboriginal people when Crown conduct might adversely impact 
Aboriginal or treaty rights. For more information on federal policy on consultation see Government of 
Canada, “Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guide for Federal Officials to Fulfill the 
Duty of Consult,” (March 2011) http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/arp/cnl/ca/intgui-eng.pdf (accessed 5 Sept. 
2011). 
100 Peter Russell has suggests that in the defeat of Charlottetown the mega-constitutionalism begun in the 
1980s is over, and that opening up the constitution for a specific amendment would be the only workable 
change, however, keeping the constitutional agenda so limited would be difficult. (See Peter Russell, 
Constitutional Odyssey, 3rd edition, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004, especially Chapter 2). 
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makes the right to self-government so important is that it prevents non-Aboriginals from 
interfering in the affairs of Aboriginal communities.”101 Thus, self-government is 
premised on a mutual and reciprocal duty of non-interference, very much in the liberal 
vein of thought, and consistent with minority protection. 
 This modern-liberal perspective is the subtext of the discussion that LaSelva 
undertakes. For LaSelva “democracy is crucial because self-government dispels the 
legacy of paternalism and restores Aboriginal dignity.”102 Thus, there is some link 
between self-government and democracy. LaSelva puts this more strongly: “For 
[Aboriginals], self-government is associated with democracy.”103 This connection 
overdetermines Aboriginal self-government, as no necessary connection exists between 
self-government and democracy, for one can be self-governed non-democratically.  
However, for LaSelva “Canadian Aboriginals reject such [a non-democratic] 
understanding of self-government.”104  Aboriginal self-government, then, is bound up in 
democracy, in a discourse that is intelligible to a modern-liberal perspective of 
individuality and autonomy. Here we can see why a type of self-government that 
represents Aboriginal orders of government within the Canadian structure of government, 
or virtually guarantees direct representation within the central institutions of Canadian 
democracy, is so natural to the orthodox view. 
 Furthermore, LaSelva sees that “Aboriginal self-government has as its goal 
Aboriginal emancipation.”105 In the pursuit of emancipation, it first appears that 
Aboriginal peoples are pursuing de-colonisation. However, LaSelva points out that 
“[w]hat Aboriginals appear to want is not decolonisation as such, but equal partnership in 
a reconstituted Canada.”106 That is, Aboriginal peoples are not seeking to throw off the 
yoke of colonial oppression, but, rather, to strike a better bargain within the colonial 
regime. It is an implicit submission to the sovereignty claims of the Crown; it does not 
threaten the current federal order in a meaningful way. Thus, self-government for 
                                                          
101 LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism, 139. 
102 Ibid., 143. 
103 Ibid., 144. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., 147. 
106 Ibid., 151. emphasis added. 
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Aboriginal peoples seems to exist in a “freedom” to participate in and replicate the 
prevailing colonial democratic order. 
 Thus, the term “self-government” has quite different meanings for autonomy and 
orthodox approaches to self-government.  The autonomy approach makes a claim for 
self-government-as-treaty-federalism that places sovereignty with Aboriginal nations, 
while the orthodox approach supports the current conception of sovereignty emanating 
from the Crown. The particular historical understanding of treaties that Henderson, 
Ladner, and Tully expound is the basis of the sovereignty claim made by them.  In being 
sceptical of this historical perspective, or simply ignoring it, the approach of Cairns, 
Courchene and Powell, and LaSelva supports the sovereignty claim of the Crown and 
sees self-government as a didactic process that delegates authority from the Crown to 
Aboriginal nations.  The fundamental difference here is the directionality of sovereignty, 
either from Aboriginal peoples to the Crown or from the Crown to Aboriginal peoples. 
Thus, while both use the term ‘self-government’ the content of the term is quite different 
in each approach.  This significantly changes the level of autonomy from central 
institutions that each approach can expect. Moreover, this discussion helps us to further 
understand the problem of escaping latent colonialism in decolonial approaches, as these 
orthodox views fail to deal with the source of Aboriginal subjugation in the governmental 
context. That is to say, by failing to centrally interrogate Crown sovereignty, the orthodox 
view cannot hope to address the unilateral extension of Crown sovereignty over 
Aboriginal peoples, which lies at the heart of formal political colonisation.  
  
Conclusion 
Decolonistion as I outline it is a reform-oriented approach to the removal of alien 
structures of power from Aboriginal peoples in Canada, as well as the degradation of a 
hierarchical taxonomy of humanity. Whereas decolonisation in former European colonies 
in Africa and South East Asia has involved the withdrawal of imperial power and forces, 
decolonisation in Canada cannot practically involve millions of people leaving this 
country, and the Canadian state (vested with the authority of the imperial Crown) ceasing 
to exist. Thus, finding a way to share the land with the first peoples of what has become 
Canada is of the utmost importance to overcoming the colonial constellation of power. In 
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the context of government relations, as I have argued above, the only approach that gives 
the very autonomy necessary for a thoroughgoing de-colonial approach is the treaty 
federalism or treaty constitutionalism argued for by Henderson, Ladner, and Tully. The 
representational mechanism and the “self-government” offered by the orthodox approach 
fail to adequately address the claims of Aboriginal peoples and ultimately reinforce a 
colonial constellation of power where the supremacy and sovereignty of the Crown go 
unquestioned.  What is important is that self-government is conceived of as a nation-to-
nation relationship, in which the sovereignty of neither the Crown nor any Aboriginal 
nation is unilaterally or fraudulently extended over the other party.  
 To be clear, however, this kind of self-government will not be a panacea for what 
ills persist in Aboriginal communities as a result of the IRS system and colonialism 
generally. Self-government by itself will not reverse the cultural representations of the 
“Indian” as other. But, self-government can be an important symbol and act of moral 
leadership on the part of the Crown in removing its alien power over Aboriginal nations 
and dealing equitably with these governments as legitimate nations. Having a space to 
deal with issues surrounding culture, language, and empowerment is an important aspect 
of self-government. A study conducted by Hallett, Chandler, and Lalonde reported that 
increased Aboriginal language knowledge in Aboriginal communities results in a 
decrease in youth suicide rates at the “band” or reserve level.107 Moreover, Chandler and 
Lalonde find in another study that the more local control is had over aspects of self-
government such as education and healthcare, the lower the youth suicide rate on reserve 
will be.108 These are preliminary findings to be sure, and the generalizability from the 
British Columbia cases is unclear; however, they point to the social and cultural impact 
that autonomy might bring to Aboriginal communities.  
 Overall, Canadian decolonisation will require the autonomy-motivated approach 
to self-government represented by treaty federalism or treaty constitutionalism. It is only 
in this approach that specific legal claims of authority in Aboriginal structures of 
governance can be addressed and only by dealing with the issue of sovereignty, as this 
                                                          
107 Darcy Hallett, Micheal Chandler, and Christopher Lalonde, “Aboriginal Language Knowledge and 
Youth Suicide,” Cognitive Development vol. 22(2007), 392-399. 
108 Michael Chandler and Christopher Lalonde, “Cultural Continuity as a Hedge against Youth Suicide in 
Canada’s First Nations,” Transcultural Psychiatry, vol. 35, no. 2( June 1998), 192.  
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approach does, that the removal of alien power structures can be accomplished; at least at 
one level—that of government relations—the hierarchy of humanity explicit in the 
colonial project can be removed. While the representational approach and the orthodox 
approach seem sincerely motivated to address the claims of Aboriginal peoples, they 
ultimately fail to transcend the colonial paradigm that can see no authority equal to the 
Crown. Keeping this in mind as background for the discussion of reconciliation in 
Chapter Eight is important, as I have drawn the conceptual link above between 
decolonisation and reconciliation. In analysing toward what the Canadian TRC might be 
a transformation in Chapter Eight, again this distinction outlined here between 
approaches of representation and autonomy is important to understand as background to 
the possibility of change and what kind of change there might be. While lengthy it is 
important to delimit these two approaches, both of which are ostensible decolonial, 
exactly because the representational approach fails so utterly to transcend a colonial 
paradigm. Moreover, that well intentioned advocates unwittingly reinscribe colonialism 
into their decolonial approach should give us pause to consider the very construction of 








Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: A Comparative Perspective 
 
Introduction 
It is out of this context of decolonisation that The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada (Canadian TRC) emerged, where some approaches to dealing with Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada have failed to transcend the colonial paradigm of Crown sovereignty; 
have not significantly undermined a hierarchical taxonomy of humanity; and pose little or 
no risk to the constellation of colonial power which created the IRS system. Thus, we 
should consider these very issues when looking at the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, in its design and operation.  
   This chapter mainly concerns how we can see the prevailing constellation of 
power at work behind the construction of truth and reconciliation commissions, with the 
view of analysing the specific Canadian manifestation with which I am chiefly interested.  
Below, I compare the post-Apartheid South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the still-colonial Australian approach to interrogate where the dynamics 
of power may be seen in the construction of such temporary institutions as truth 
commissions, especially where that constellation remains colonial.1 South Africa and 
Australia were selected here because both countries have a history of British colonisation 
and both have undertaken truth commissions to deal with mistreatment of indigenous 
peoples.2 With South Africa being, arguably, the most successful truth commission 
comparison to it is instructive. With Australia sharing many features with Canada, 
including the Crown, federalism, a history of British colonisation, and a similar 
demographic split between native and newcomer, comparison to it will yield directly 
applicable insights to Canada. These two cases, I argue, represent two quite different 
conditions in the constellation of power at the time of their respective truth-seeking 
exercises as part of their efforts at decolonisation. In this way, the experience in these 
                                                          
1 While Australia’s approach was not technically a truth commission it shares affinities with such a body 
and following Freeman and Stanton below can be categorized as such for my purposes here (see Mark 
Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (New York: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2006), 
125-126, Kim Stanton, “Truth Commissions and Public Inquires: Addressing Historical Injustices in 
Established Democracies” (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2010), respectively). 
2 For a list of truth commission to date please see Appendix IV. 
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cases can provide valuable analysis for, and insight into, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada. First, however, something needs to be said about what a truth 
commission is and where it comes from.  
 
From Restorative Justice to Truth Commissions 
Mechanisms of transitional justice such as truth commissions seem quite divorced, on 
their face, from justice as we colloquially understand it, in the familiar form of 
prosecution, court proceedings, and imprisonment. Indeed, the whole philosophy of 
justice that licenses truth commissions is of a different sort than the one we see at work in 
domestic courts and justice systems, and which is sometimes termed “retributive.” This 
retributive form of justice is about “the actual definition of harms awarded legal 
recognition and about the connection between punishment and desert.”3 However, this 
formal process of justice leaves out certain harms that we know “do not have 
corresponding legal remedies.”4 The retributive approach is often seen as the first best 
option for the punishment of crimes, and anything less than a court proceeding and 
imprisonment for offenders is seen as a dilution of justice.5 The retributive form of 
justice, while it has a general background concern for victims, is not directed towards 
victims.6 Rather, it is concerned with punishing offenders for transgressions. Moreover, 
only when seen through the lens of retribution—the desire to retaliate in response to 
wrongdoing, through which we express “our basic self-respect”7—is something other 
than criminal prosecution seen as second best. As Jennifer Llewellyn and Robert Howse 
                                                          
3 Nancy L. Rosenblum, “Justice and the Experience of Injustice,” in Breaking Cycles of Hatred: Memory, 
Law, and Repair, edited by Martha Minow (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 81. 
4 Ibid. Such harms as the degradation of relationships, or trust.  
5 At the intuitive level there is a desire to see crime punished, a desire that Michael Moore argues goes 
beyond utilitarian arguments to prevent repeat offense or deter others (Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A 
Theory of Criminal Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 99).  That wrongdoers get “what they 
deserve” is an important emotional response and constitutes “a strategy designed to see (and let the victim 
see) that people get their just deserts” (Jeffrie Murphy, “Hated: a qualified defense,” in Forgiveness and 
Mercy, Jeffire Murphy and Jean Hampton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 95). 
6 Rosenblum, “Justice and the Experience of Injustice,” 83.  
7 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 10. 
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argue, when justice is seen through a restorative lens, mechanisms such as the truth 
commission become first best solutions.8  
 Distinct from familiar retributive approaches to domestic criminal prosecution, 
restorative justice “is about restoring both the victim and perpetrator of crimes back into 
harmony with the community.”9 Rather than eschewing the victim in favour of 
concentrating on the perpetrator, as the retributive approach does, restorative justice seeks 
to address the unique needs of victims and perpetrators, to bring their relationship back to 
some form of equilibrium.10 It provides for a living-together that retributive justice 
disrupts with imprisonment and a continuation of a cycle of violence through punishment. 
As Minow describes, this approach seeks a middle path between retribution and 
forgiveness that can foster healing, or strengthen human rights, or provide closure—and, 
indeed, may seek to do all of these.11  The emphasis of restorative justice is “on 
reintegrative measures that build or rebuild social bonds, as opposed to measures such as 
imprisonment and the death penalty that isolate and alienate the perpetrator from 
society.”12 The hallmark of restorative justice is the inclusion of both victim and 
perpetrators in a process “giving centre stage to both victims and perpetrators,” that seeks 
a dignity and empowerment of the formerly degraded and disempowered.13 Minow 
supports this view of restorative justice, describing it as seeking “to repair the injustice, to 
make up for it, and to effect corrective changes in the record, in relationships, and in 
future behavior.”14 While Minow may agree with the basic outline of restorative justice 
and the idea that truth commissions can afford many benefits to a society in addressing 
mass human right abuse,15 she argues that there are still benefits inherent in prosecutions, 
in terms of closure, that may be afforded. That is to say, a truth commission “severed 
                                                          
8 Jennifer Llewellyn and Robert Howse, “Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission,” University of Toronto Law Journal vol. 49 (1999), 356. See also Priscilla 
Hayner Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001), 88; and 
Minow Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.  
9 Joanna R. Quinn, “Transitional Justice,” in Human Rights: Politics and Practice, ed. Michael Goodhart 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 368. 
10 Llewellyn and Howse, “Institutions for Restorative Justice,” 357. 
11 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 22-23. 
12 Llewellyn and Howse, “Institutions for Restorative Justice,” 357. 
13 Joanna R. Quinn, The Politics of Acknowledgement: Truth Commissions in Uganda and Haiti 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 15. 
14 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness and Forgiveness, 91. 
15 Ibid., 57. 
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from prosecutions, avoids vengeance and even retribution... [but] it fails to create the 
potential closure afforded by criminal trials that end in punishment.”16 In fact one study 
has found that truth commissions have a negative impact on human rights when used 
alone, rather than when accompanied by trials and amnesties.17 Olsen, Payne, Reiter, and 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm calculate the scores of three widely accepted human rights measures, 
measuring changes over time in these measures in countries that have experienced truth 
commissions, and conclude that “only two combinations of transitional justice 
mechanisms show statistically significant, positive effects on human rights: (1) trials and 
amnesties, and (2) trials, amnesties and truth commissions.”18 To be clear the authors do 
conclude truth commission have a benefit when combined with trials and amnesties to 
“increase accountability by exposing systematic patterns of abuse” and “by providing a 
blueprint for reform.”19 What is significant, however, is their finding that truth 
commissions alone do not have a positive impact on human rights. 
 Whatever the status of their efficacy, truth commissions are established in this 
restorative justice context as bodies to “look at widespread human rights violations that 
took place during a specified period of time, on a temporary basis.”20 That is to say, truth 
commissions are non-permanent bodies that look at a specified period of rights violations 
defined according to their terms of reference. This contrasts with ordinary judicial 
proceedings, which seek to punish law-breakers and constitute a permanent apparatus of 
the state, whose ability over time to prosecute crimes is only bounded by statutes of 
limitation. This, however, does not separate truth commissions from other ad hoc state 
sponsored investigations such as commissions of inquiry or in the Canadian context royal 
commissions, which are often struck in developed democracies. In fact, Kim Stanton 
argues that truth commissions are a specialised form of public enquiry.21  While sharing 
attributes with a commission of inquiry, a truth commission differs in its “symbolic 
quality that aligns with its explicit social function of public education about human rights 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 127. 
17 Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, Andrew Reiter, and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, “When Truth Commissions 
Improve Human Rights,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, vol.4 (2010), 462. 
18 Ibid., 464. 
19 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness and Forgiveness, 475. 
20 Quinn, “Transitional Justice,” in Human Rights: Politics and Practice, edited by Michael Goodhart  
(London: Oxford University Press, 2008), 368-9. See also Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions--
1974-1994: A Comparative Study,” in Human Rights Quarterly, vol.16, no.4 (1994), 604. 
21 Kim Stanton, “Truth Commissions and Public Inquires,” 7-8. 
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violations.”22 Mark Freeman similarly sees truth commissions as a special case of 
commissions of inquiry, one that focuses on the victim, rather than being lawyer driven, 
and on recent human rights abuses.23 In Canada it is this social function that makes the 
TRC a true truth commission for Stanton, but we can also see how the TRC fits Freemans 
criteria, as it concentrates on interviewing survivors of the IRS system, which persisted 
until 1996.24 
 Perhaps the most famous truth commission was the one conducted in post-
Apartheid South Africa starting in 1995.  However, there have been many others around 
the world, beginning in Uganda in 1974.25 Between 1974 and 1994, fifteen truth 
commissions were established, including eight in Africa, five in South America, one in 
Asia-Pacific, and one in Europe. In the space of a year and a half alone, from March 1992 
until late in 1993, six truth commissions were established.26  While 1992 to 1993 was an 
intense period of truth commission creation, there have been many new ones since.  The 
International Centre for Transitional Justice reports approximately forty official truth 
commissions in total “as of early 2011.”27  These truth commissions have been 
established in places dealing with atrocities (or mass human rights violations) and often 
are seen in transitions from an authoritarian form of governance to a democratic one. It is 
in this sense that in addition to being licensed by a restorative approach to justice, truth 
commissions are instances of an emerging field of study called “transitional justice.”28  
 Starting with the work of Neil Kritz, in his three volume work Transitional Justice: 
How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former Regimes,29 there has been an explicit 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 22. 
23 In seeking to refine Hayner’s definition of a truth commission Freeman offer a number of additional 
criteria, with these two being most helpful in distinguishing TRCs from  commissions of inquiry more 
broadly (Freeman, Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness, 125-126).  
24 Stanton, “Truth Commissions and Public Inquires,” 126. 
25 Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” 611. 
26 Alexander Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America: Uruguay and Chile 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 2. 
27 International Centre for Transitional Justice, “Truth and Memory,” http://ictj.org/our-work/transitional-
justice-issues/truth-and-memory (accessed 26 Oct. 2011). 
28 There is quite a debate surround what qualifies as transitional justice and where the field is headed. See 
Joanna R. Quinn, “Whither the ‘Transition’ of Transitional Justice?” a paper prepared for presentation at 
the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, 16 May 2011, Waterloo, Canada. 
29 This analysis fits into one of a number of competing narratives about transitional justice. For another 
view on these narratives see: Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual 
History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly vol. 31 no.2 (2009), 321-367; Jon Elster, Closing 
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link between mechanisms of restorative justice, such as the truth commission, and a 
transition from an authoritarian regime type to a democratic one.30 It is the truth 
commission, or any of a number of similar retrospective processes such as commissions 
of inquiry, that seeks to understand and redress past crimes along with “a wider process 
of fundamental, forward-looking institutional reform to promote present and future 
accountability... that they can become a key to democratic consolidation.”31  Thus, the 
mechanism of accountability for past wrongdoing is bound up in the post-Cold War wave 
of democratization, and the mechanisms themselves—perhaps chief amongst them, the 
truth commission—are born, as it were, as a twin to infant democracy. This twin birth is 
important as it bespeaks a view that human rights violations do not occur in 
democracies—something discussed in more detail below—exactly because “consolidated 
democracies include the capacity to call the powerful to account.”32 This ability to “call 
the powerful to account” certainly was not the case in Canada during the IRS system’s 
operation.  
 Where truth commissions have been established, most often they have been the 
result of an act from the legislative or executive branch of government.33 Priscilla Hayner 
characterizes truth commissions as always possessing the following four primary 
elements: First, truth commissions are backward looking. That is, their focus is “on the 
past.”34 Second, truth commissions do not focus on a specific event, but rather look at a 
broader picture of human rights abuses.35 Third, truth commissions conduct their work 
within a specified period of time; that is, they are non-permanent bodies, which disband 
with the completion of their work.36 Fourth, Hayner argues that truth commissions are 
always vested with certain powers by their sponsor that allows them to conduct their 
work with great access to information and the ability to deal with sensitive issues.37 These 
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four characteristics differentiate the functioning of a truth commission from the ordinary 
operation of the judiciary that exists on a permanent basis to provide law and order by 
punishing individual breaches of law in many societies. Moreover, the first 
characteristic—being backward looking—differentiates truth commissions from human 
rights commissions that might be needed on a permanent basis to uphold standards of 
human rights within states. Truth commissions are backward-looking and “generally do 
not investigate current human rights conditions.”38 Freeman builds on Hayner’s definition 
and nicely encapsulates a definition of TRCs in a couple of sentences:  
A truth commission is an ad hoc, autonomous, and victim-centred commission of 
inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary purposes of (1) 
investigating and reporting on the principal causes and consequences of broad and 
relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that occurred in the state 
during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict, and (2) making 
recommendations for their future redress and future prevention.39 
 
Thus, truth commissions do not fill the need for either a permanent judiciary or a 
permanent human rights commission, and differ in their location within the restorative 
justice paradigm.  
 In addition to these more technical aspects of truth commissions, they share other 
basic objectives, one of the more straightforward of which is “sanctioned fact-finding: to 
establish an accurate record of a country’s past, clarify uncertain events, and lift the lid of 
silence and denial form a contentious and painful period of history.”40 While it is not 
always the case that events of past wrongdoing are unknown, truth commissions can have 
an important function of publicizing these facts, or, as Hayner puts it, they seek to “lift 
the veil of denial about widely known but unspoken truths.”41 Truth commissions can 
also help to build a comprehensive record of systematic abuses and human rights 
violations. Indeed, this is their “social function” mentioned by Stanton above. Overall, 
truth commissions are meant to establish an accepted and publicly acknowledged past, 
and to enable the society to move forward to establish a new way of living that respects 
human rights. That is to say that truth commissions have as a goal the creation of an 
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intersubjectively agreeable truth narrative, which can be legitimately held or believed 
among and between various groups within the society. This narrative, as has been noted 
by Borer, is not a singular one, but we can “profitabl[y] think of various truths.”42 For 
example, the South African truth commission was guided by four concepts of truth: 
factual/forensic, personal/narrative, social, and healing/restorative truth.43 However, 
Wilson argues that these four categories can be collapsed into two “paradigms of truth,” 
those of forensic and narrative truth.44 I think that we should look at these various truths 
as conceptual levels at which any commission might attempt to establish an 
intersubjective agreement on the “truth” of the past. It is in this way that truth 
commissions have as their goal the establishment of an unquestionable and publicly 
acknowledged past. While this has most often been the case in societies transitioning to 
democratic forms of rule, two prominent examples of truth commissions have occurred in 
democratic polities: Australia and Canada.  
 In seeking to establish a truth about past events, factually and narratively, truth 
commissions are open to the machinations of politics, no matter where they are created.   
They involve some of the most political aspects of human interaction: power, influence, 
and money.  Some believe that truth commissions are first best solutions to human rights 
violations.45 This, however, does not imply that a truth commission is something like 
perfect justice, as “even in the ideal or most favorable of circumstances, the 
uncompromising nature of truth and justice are compromised.”46 The shape of truth and 
justice that is created to redress past crimes is inextricably linked to the (im)balance of 
power in the society concerned. For example, in Uruguay and Chile de Brito found that 
the truth and justice produced there after mass human right violations was “intricately 
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tied up with and shaped by the legacy of repressive rule, the dynamics of the politics of 
transition and the balance of power under the new democratic governments.”47  
 To more carefully understand the dynamics and (im)balance of power in the 
construction of truth processes, a brief study of the experiences of South Africa and 
Australia is provided below.  With this discussion we can better understand the case of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada.  
 
South Africa 
Although by no means the first truth commission that was created, the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has become the most famous instance of 
such a mechanism. The South African TRC was established to create a record of the 
crimes committed under the Apartheid regime of South Africa.48 Adopted by the National 
Party government of South Africa in 1948, Apartheid was a system of racially 
differentiated citizenship, which lasted until 1993. Apartheid, the Afrikaans word for 
“separateness”, established a legal hierarchy of “races,” wherein white South Africans sat 
at the pinnacle of economic, political, and social power. By far the demographic minority 
in South Africa, the white regime employed extra-legal (even under its own racist laws), 
violent and repressive tactics to enforce the separation between blacks and whites, and 
produced a tyranny of the minority. Racist laws enacted in 1958 stripped black South 
Africans of their citizenship and concentrated them in specially created self-governing 
“homelands” called “bantustans.” Apartheid, however, was not a unique occurrence in 
South African history, nor a break from the past. Rather it was the most institutionalized 
point of a 350-year exclusion of the black majority from political and economic life.49 
 Internal resistance and international pressure mounted against the South African 
government throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, to which the state 
response was an escalation of violence and repression. Internal violence and international 
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pressure, including embargoes, led to reforms of the Apartheid system in the 1980s. 
These adjustments, however, could not save Apartheid, and in 1990, President F.W. de 
Klerk was forced to negotiate its end.50 This led to multi-party, multi-racial elections in 
1994, which resulted in a victory for the African National Congress and the election of 
Nelson Mandela as President of post-Apartheid South Africa.51  
 While 1994 signalled an important break from Apartheid, South Africa remained 
(indeed, remains, at the time of writing) a society with deep racial cleavages. In an 
attempt to provide the basis for healing in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was created in 1995 under the terms of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act.52 The South Afican TRC represents an instance of a broader transition 
in South African society to a more equitable and inclusive community, one based on 
justice.53 While Apartheid itself represents a sort of crime against most liberal and 
democratic principles,54 the TRC was only tasked with investigating crimes in the context 
of Apartheid committed by the regime. That is to say, the TRC’s focus was on the extra-
judicial/extra-legal activities committed by officials outside the law of the Apartheid 
regime itself. Despite the fact that most resisters of Apartheid did not recognize the “legal 
order” of Apartheid as legitimate, this compromise was necessary for reconciliation to get 
underway.55 De Lange argues that this compromise was necessary to bring Apartheid 
officials to the table.56  Even in this context, the TRC had many crimes to set on the 
public record, as extra-judicial action under Apartheid law was common. It is, however, 
clear that such a compromise could be viewed negatively by those who suffered from 
abuse and discrimination, legally sanctioned under Apartheid and implicitly recognized in 
the legitimacy of the racist order of Apartheid.   
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 Similarly objectionable was the compromise over job security for the five years 
following the beginning of the TRC process that was given to civil servants (including 
security forces), and which was needed to establish the TRC process.57 In fact, the very 
people who operated the key apparatus of Apartheid, by law, retained their positions for a 
period of five years. De Lange argues, however, this was necessary to get elements of 
white South Africa to the reconciliation table.58 
 The South African TRC was possible because of an historic transition in power 
from the Apartheid regime to an inclusive democratic government that was taking place. 
This process was fragile in its infancy, as it took significant, albeit unjustly acquired, 
political power away from white South Africans, as well as threatened the unjust 
domination of the economy by white citizens. Whether white South Africans could 
legitimately claim the accrued benefits of Apartheid is entirely beside the point. Rather, 
any increase in the diffusion of economic, social, and political power to include non-
white South Africans necessarily implied a reduction in power and a threat to the interests 
of white South Africans. There was a real fear that the old regime, in the police and 
military especially, would refuse the negotiated settlement that brought about the TRC.59 
Thus, to avoid further alienation of the right-wing core of Apartheid, and rather than risk 
an outright revolt by the white security forces, the above limitation on the scope of crimes 
and job security for white-elite officials were necessary.60 
 Within this context, the TRC was tasked with addressing the legacy of Apartheid 
South Africa by promoting national unity and reconciliation to help the nation to heal.61 
To accomplish this, the TRC set out to undertake four main tasks. First, the TRC needed 
to construct as complete an account as possible of the violations committed under 
Apartheid between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994, dates established by the terms of 
reference. Second, people who were reluctant to disclose crimes they may have 
committed were granted amnesty from those crimes in exchange for testimony. Third, the 
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TRC was meant to restore dignity to victims and survivors of these crimes by locating 
them, giving them an opportunity to relate their story, and recommending reparations for 
them. Last, the TRC had to issue a report at the end of the five-year period that detailed 
the abuses and crimes, and recommended measures to prevent future abuses.62 
 The South African TRC is part of a genealogy of truth commissions that began in 
Uganda in 1974 with the Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances of People in 
Uganda Since the 25th of January 1971.63 While it shared affinities with the truth 
commissions that preceded it, the South African TRC was quite different from its 
predecessors.64 Hayner argues that the South African TRC differed in the powers granted 
to the commission, in particular the power to grant amnesty; the quality of the public 
hearings; and the emphasis on reconciliation as its main focus.65 While most Latin 
American TRCs granted amnesties, it was the South African TRC’s ability to grant 
individual amnesties that set it apart.  
 The power that was afforded to the TRC in South Africa to grant specific amnesty 
in exchange for testimony was a significant tool to secure the truth and construct a public 
record of it; in fact, it has been characterized as the most important innovation of the 
South African TRC.66 Unlike previous truth commissions in Latin America that had 
granted blanket amnesty, there was a quid pro quo in the South African case, where 
amnesty was granted individually in exchange for testimony and admissions of guilt. For 
the first time, a truth commission heard and recorded testimony from a large number of 
perpetrators regarding the crimes they committed.67 As well, the South African TRC 
heard the public testimony of over 1,800 victims, conducted over 21,000 victim 
interviews outside the public hearings, and processed approximately 7,000 amnesty 
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requests.68 This unprecedented source of information allowed the TRC to thoroughly 
build a historical record rich with detail. Moreover, its powers of subpoena and witness 
protection allowed the commission to call uncooperative witnesses and protect fearful 
ones.69 The special powers that the South African TRC possessed allowed it to access the 
truth in a way that other TRCs could not. 
 The public nature and the widely publicized South African TRC was a significant 
departure from other TRCs, the proceedings were carried live on television and radio and 
involving so many witnesses. The Uganda commission of 1986, for example, held public 
hearings, some of which were broadcast live on state television, and attracted a wide 
following,70 but the number of witnesses that came before the South African TRC 
differentiated it from other commissions.71 No other truth commission saw so many 
people testify in public proceedings, often carried live on radio and television.72 This can 
be related to the powers of amnesty and protection, as these created a safe environment in 
which perpetrators and victims could share their stories.73 
 The crafting of the terms of reference for the South African TRC was a 
collaborative and deliberative process that took over a year and involved many debates in 
the legislature of South Africa, as well as consultation with many non-governmental 
organizations and civil society groups.74 In fact, nominations for commissioners were 
taken from NGOs, churches, and political parties.75 This consultative approach dovetails 
with the TRC’s major emphasis on reconciliation. Even before the TRC was established 
there were high hopes for a mechanism that would provide a transition to a new South 
Africa, one premised on acknowledging the truth of the past, which it was felt needed to 
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be undone.76 The emphasis on reconciliation in the TRC was made to restore “a fractured 
nation and heal the wounds of its troubled soul.”77 As  Asmal, Asmal, and Roberts argue, 
reconciliation based on an acknowledgment of the crimes of the past could “trigger real 
catharsis, a word which, in its original Greek meaning, contains the idea of purification 
and spiritual renewal.”78 Moreover, it is the process of reconciliation alone that offers the 
possibility of charting a new course and “so upset any possibility of smooth sailing on a 
previously immoral course.”79 
 The South African TRC, then, represents a concerted and famous example of one 
society’s attempt to deal with a history of colonialism and mass human rights abuses. 
However, as de Lange points out, the TRC itself was only one such mechanism put in 
place to deal with past abuses. He further argues that TRCs are not objects, but 
processes.80 That is to say, a TRC can help to create an environment that can facilitate 
meaningful reconciliation and justice, but is not reconciliation or justice itself, per se.81 
The TRC here is something like a symbolic site in a landscape of processes that work 
toward the goal of creating a just society. In South Africa the TRC’s value lies in what 
Asmal calls “the impact on social consensus.”82  
   Apartheid had placed white South Africans at the pinnacle of social, economic 
and political power. Yet addressing the crimes and excesses of political power alone—the 
human rights abuses and extra-legal activity of the state—cannot facilitate the type of 
new discourse for which Asmal et al. had hoped. Rather, scholars almost uniformly agree 
that the TRC must be seen within a much broader context, along with a package of 
initiatives, such as the multi-party and multi-racial elections that brought Nelson Mandela 
and the African National Congress to power in 1994. This sea change in political power 
and the opportunity to establish the South African TRC is part of a broader process of 
redressing historic injustice in South Africa. The TRC itself recognized the holistic 
approach that a new “just” South Africa required, proposing redistributive taxation 
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policies to correct the concentration of economic power in the hands of white business 
elites.83  
 The answer to such a pernicious and society-wide set of injustices must be 
articulated at a number of levels and at different sites. As Asmal points out: “It is less 
important to me, personally and as a Minister of State, to see P.W. Botha behind bars 
than to see his ideological followers stalled in their quest to perpetuate his socio-
economic legacies.”84 Thus, the truth commission offered not a mechanism of 
punishment, but, rather, the opening of the conversation in which the fallacies and 
pseudoscience of Apartheid could be dealt with and a new social agreement made. The 
TRC was a part of “generative conversation” that could “result in new horizons of 
thought and action,”85 one ultimately begun by the change in power over the state in 
1994.  I take this change in the constellation of power, from the colonial Apartheid 
structure to a more democratic one, to be key for the generative conversation to which the 
TRC contributed. As discussed in detail later in this chapter, whether a colonial power 
arrangement remains in place importantly impacts the construction of reconciliatory 
mechanisms such as TRCs and foreshadows the likelihood of their success.  
 
Australia 
If South Africa is one of the most famous examples of a truth and reconciliation 
commission, then Australia’s approach through the inquiry by the Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission—known as the National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families—is among the least 
well known. It was an inquiry commissioned to look into the actions of the British and 
Commonwealth governments in the case of the “stolen generations.”86  While technically 
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a commission of inquiry the National Inquiry was, in essence, a truth commission for the 
reasons outlined by Stanton and Freeman. 
 Unlike the South African TRC, the truth function of the National Inquiry and the 
reconciliation process embodied by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation (CAR) 
were separated in Australia. Unique to Australia, the formal reconciliation process 
predates the truth-finding process. The CAR was established in 1991 to “undertake 
initiatives for the purpose of promoting reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islanders and the wider Australian community...”87 Moreover, the CAR was 
mandated to educate the public on the history of relations between the dominant society 
and Aborigine and Torres Strait Islander communities and provide a forum for issues 
related to reconciliation to be discussed.88 The Report of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Children Inquiry was a significant truth-establishing event within the formal 
reconciliation approach, but it was not issued until 1997, several years after the 
establishment of the CAR.89 
  
Reconciliation 
In 1991 the Parliament of Australia established the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 
to issue a report by 2001. As the final report of the CAR notes, it had become “most 
desirable that there should be such a reconciliation [between Aboriginal and Torres 
Straight Islanders and Australia]” by 2001.90 The desire was present because of the 
“unfinished business that the Aboriginal affairs policy represented.”91 As with every 
other colonial venture undertaken by the great European powers in the Age of 
Exploration, the colonial development of Australia brought settlers into direct contact 
with pre-existing communities. Unlike British colonisation in other parts of the world, the 
settlement of Aboriginal lands in Australia was made possible by legal fiat known as 
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terra nullius.92 This meant that the British literally and legally considered Australia to be 
empty land, and allowed settlement to occur without regard to the First Peoples found 
there. While Captain Cook, the first British explorer to reach the Australian continent, 
had a favourable view of the native population and suggested that the Crown negotiate 
with them as they had done with indigenous peoples elsewhere, it was the botanist Joseph 
Banks who fostered the view of the land as being effectively vacant.93 Banks’ view won 
out, and by the time the first convict settlement was established in 1788, the governor of 
the new colony was given instructions only to establish friendly relations with the people 
encountered there, and not to negotiate with them on any terms of settlement.94 
 This contrasts with the settlement of Canada by the British, where lands were 
opened up to settlement only by agreement of Aboriginal peoples through treaties and the 
purchase of land from them by the Crown alone.95 This is not to suggest that there were 
no problems with the settlement of British North America, as many treaty obligations 
were derogated almost as soon as they were signed, especially in the numbered treaties of 
the Canadian West.96 However, the legal notion of terra nullius meant that the Aboriginal 
peoples of Australia were effectively afforded status only as “non-persons.”97 They were 
not only excluded from the constitutional construction of the Australian Federation in 
1901, but I argue, were also formally and normatively excluded from the society, polity, 
and economy of the Federation, much in the same way colonisation operated in Canada, 
albeit on firmer legal footing to support this exclusion. 
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 Aboriginal land rights were denied under the rubric of terra nullius and something 
like indigenous land rights were only restored by the High Court of Australia in the 
landmark 1992 Mabo case.98 For the entirety of post-contact history in Australia, 
Aboriginal peoples faced systemic disadvantage and exclusion from the whole of 
Australian society. The terms of reference for the CAR, therefore, expressly set as an 
objective the goal of “ongoing national commitment to co-operate to address Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage.”99  
 Perhaps the clearest example of exclusion and secondary status of the Aboriginal 
peoples of Australia is what has been called the “stolen generations.” This refers to the 
rounding up of mixed-race children in the Northern Territory of Australia, which began 
in 1911 and lasted well into the 1960s. These children were separated from “full blooded” 
Aborigines and put in institutionalized settings.100 Ostensibly for their own protection, 
these “half-caste” children were removed from their families and homes to “rescue” them 
from “the prospect of a worthless and degraded life among the blacks.”101 It was the view 
of the time that full-blooded Aboriginal people in Australia were “a dying race, doomed 
in the fullness of time to extinction.”102 Moreover, it was not until the 1950s that the 
welfare of the child was considered, beyond the simple goal of improvement through 
removal from his or her indigenous culture and family.103 That is to say, until the 1950s, 
regardless of whether stable and loving home environments existed, all mixed race 
children were removed from Aboriginal homes, so as to save them from this extinction. 
As Robert Manne argues, this half-century of colonial abuse of children was motivated 
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by good (albeit racist) intentions on the part of the “removalists.”104 This fact, however, 
neither saved the children who were removed from their families over the 50 years the 
program was in existence from the squalid conditions in the institution to which they 
were removed, nor did it save the children removed in the latter years from the 
institutionally inflicted physical and sexual abuse, and moral humiliation they suffered.105 
This practice that resulted in the “stolen generations” exemplifies the deeply held racism 
in Australia that Manne argues is most clearly expressed in the inability of the dominant 
society to understand the suffering inflicted on parents and children by this policy.106 This 
policy, however, must be read as part of a history of dehumanization of Aboriginal 
Australians, the legal-philosophical genesis of which can be traced to the declaration of 
terra nullius. In fact Peter Read places the blame for the Stolen Generations squarely at 
the feet of “every generation of Australians, including the current generation, for the last 
210 years.”107 
Against this backdrop of exclusion from the Australian society, there was a desire 
on the part of the government of Australia to create reconciliation with Aboriginal 
Australians before the centenary of the Federation in 2001. The enabling legislation of 
the CAR passed by the House of Representatives on 31 May 1991 allowed the CAR to 
operate until 1 January 2001.108 This expansive, nearly ten year period allowed the CAR 
ample time to undertake the activities mandated by the Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation Act 1991. The objective of the CAR, as established in the Act, was to 
“promote a process of reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and 
the wider community, based on an appreciation by the Australian community as a whole 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and achievements.”109 To foster this 
process of reconciliation the CAR was empowered: “(a) to invite submissions; (b) to hold 
inquiries; (c) to organise conferences; (d) to undertake research and statistical surveys; (e) 
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to organise public education activities.”110 That is to say, in contrast to the South African 
TRC, the Australian Council had very limited powers to undertake its mandate to 
promote a process of reconciliation, limited to “encouraging the formation of locally 
based groups committed to shaping better relationships with Indigenous peoples.”111 
Moreover, bipartisan support for the bill that created the CAR was secured by 
“stepping gingerly around the question of a treaty.”112  Under the terms of terra nullius 
no treaty was ever concluded between Australia’s Indigenous people and the Crown, 
making this a central issue in Crown-Indigenous relations. As Ravi de Costa argues, CAR 
and the National Inquiry ensured that “reconciliation became delinked from legitimate 
Indigenous expectations for recognition and protection of rights and provision of social 
justice.”113 Like Canada, it was ultimately another facet of the Crown, the judiciary, 
which started the earnest discussion of Aboriginal title with the High Court’s Mabo cases. 
While the CAR was generally limited in its powers, it had some success in raising 
awareness of the issues of systemic disadvantage and, in particular, of the Stolen 
Generations. In 1992, along with the Labour government then led by Paul Keating, the 
CAR championed the Mabo decision “as a new history, believing that it set the record 
straight and provided a new foundation for the Australian nation.”114  Late in 1992 Prime 
Minister Keating made a now famous speech at Redfern wherein he acknowledged that 
mistreatment of Indigenous Australians and came very close to offering an apology (the 
official apology was finally offered in 2008 by another Labour prime minister, Kevin 
Rudd).115 In the speech Keating stated that Australians need: 
to recognise that the problem starts with us non-Aboriginal Australians. It 
begins, I think, with that act of recognition. Recognition that it was we who did 
the dispossessing. We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional 
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way of life. We brought the diseases. The alcohol. We committed the murders. 
We took the children from their mothers. We practised discrimination and 
exclusion. It was our ignorance and our prejudice. And our failure to imagine 
these things being done to us. With some noble exceptions, we failed to make the 
most basic human response and enter into their hearts and minds. We failed to 
ask – how would I feel if this were done to me? As a consequence, we failed to 
see that what we were doing degraded all of us.116 
 
Keating’s was a powerful speech remarked upon for its content and along with Mabo 
gave cause for hope “that the government would legislate measures to facilitate return of 
Indigenous lands to Indigenous control.”117 This may have been too much to hope for as 
the Liberals were elected under the leadership of John Howard in 1996. But, even under 
Keating this may have been mostly a dream as Elizabeth Povinelli argues Keating 
thought a “new multicultural society could be painlessly achieved,” and that 
reconciliation “meant ‘acknowledging’ and ‘appreciating’ Aboriginal Australians and 
providing a “measure of justice’ for them.”118 Whatever Keating’s approach was, the 
Redfern speech, along with a major conference held by the CAR in 1994, helped push the 
advancement of issues relating to the Stolen Generation on the public agenda.119  In 1995 
the Labour Government called for an inquiry into the issue. 
 While the National Inquiry got underway, the  CAR continued its work. Peter 
Sutton argues this work was overly bureaucratic becoming “an extension of the federal 
public service and its generous capacity for ‘metawork,’ work about work.”120 More 
damning than this Sutton argues the CAR’s approach to understanding Aboriginal 
disadvantage ignored the difference between Indigenous culture and tradition and the 
West’s, “there seemed to be a willing blindness” to past and present Indigenous ways of 
knowing and being.121 Perhaps this approach is less surprising as the work of the CAR 
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concentrated on educating non-Aboriginal Australians on their history, as Short argues 
“official Australian reconciliation focused less on the needs of the victims and more on 
the educational needs of non-Indigenous Australians.”122  
 
Truth 
The National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Children from Their Families formed the major truth telling function of the truth and 
reconciliation process in Australia. The findings of the National Inquiry were published 
in 1997 in a report entitled Bringing Them Home. It is interesting to note that the truth 
telling and reconciliation aspects of the Australian experience were institutionally 
separate, unlike those of other truth and reconciliation commissions. It is important to 
remember that in Australia the formal reconciliation process was begun before the 
National Inquiry. In South Africa the very name of the commission, the truth and 
reconciliation commission linked these two aspects much more closely than the distinct 
formal reconciliation process and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children 
Inquiry in Australia. Although as we have seen above these two aspects of Australian 
truth and reconciliation are not as tidily separated as they would first appear. 
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children Inquiry travelled the country, 
conducting private and public hearings and sought to enable Aboriginals to “represent 
their own past.”123 It received over 700 written submissions and recorded the testimony 
from Aboriginal witnesses in person who told their stories of removal and the suffering it 
caused.124 The National Inquiry was tasked with examining the laws and practices that 
led to separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, 
examine the adequacy of current policies, and the principles of determining the 
justification for compensation.125  
 In 1997 the National Inquiry issued its report, Bringing Them Home, to a now 
Liberal government in Canberra which was much less receptive to Indigenous claims 
than the previous Labour government. Among the 54 recommendations of the 
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commission was the proposal that the government of Australia should offer an apology to 
the “stolen generations” and should, further, offer compensation to victims.126 While 
many of the state governments offered apologies, the federal government under John 
Howard refused to offer a full apology.127 This refusal derailed the movement toward 
reconciliation that Bringing Them Home helped create, as the truth that Australians 
learned of the church and state practice of child removal helped “galvanise [a] movement, 
helping to form a reservoir of concern about the inherent injustice of the Australian 
story.”128 But Howard’s intransigents “helped to catalyse opposition to apology… the 
implications and assumptions of an apology: 'Why should 1 say sorry? I have done 
nothing to them — I didn't take their kids away, or steal their land, I wasn't even here, my 
ancestors didn't arrive until,,,'”129 While this position on the part of the Government of 
Australia persisted, perhaps too long, it was reversed by Kevin Rudd,  head of a new 
Labour government, who eventually apologized in 2008.130 The recommendation for 
compensation was first taken up by the government of Tasmania in 2006, and the 
government of Western Australia created a broader fund for compensation for any child 
who suffered abuse while in state care, including those of the Stolen Generation.131  
Overall the National Inquiry raised “awareness of a relatively unknown negativity in 
Australia’s past, but at the same time it enhanced victimhood as a basis of positive regard 
for Indigenous people, and polarised opinion about state or other collective historical 
guilt.”132  
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(Im)Balance of Power 
Compared with South Africa, the Australian approach seems backward, putting 
reconciliation before the pursuit of truth, ultimately making the task of reconciliation 
unnecessarily difficult. I argue the difference between these two cases shows the 
influence the constellation of power within these societies has had on the construction of 
these respective truth and reconciliation institutions, as well as their prospect for success. 
Ultimately, a colonial constellation of power results in a weak commission, lacking 
requisite formal powers and unable in itself to seriously threaten the prevailing colonial 
power which created it.  
 As discussed above, the South African TRC was just one of a number of 
concessions to Apartheid-era agents in order to include them in the overall process of 
change. The job security and amnesty provisions of the TRC, motivated by a fear of 
outright insurrection among white security forces, were among the concessions to the 
changing power imbalance between white and black South Africa at the time of the 
TRC’s creation. The dismantling of the political regime of Apartheid meant that white 
South Africans’ power over the state was being diminished and democratic principles of 
equality and proportionality in the function and creation of government was beginning. 
That is to say, post-Apartheid South Africa was a truly transitional society both before 
and during the creation of the TRC; indeed, at the time of writing, it is still wrestling with 
the legacies of inequality. Moreover, there were genuine questions that required answers 
in dealing with the legacy of extra-judicial actions by the Apartheid regime. People had 
disappeared and the whereabouts of bodies, along with details of how people had met 
their deaths and why, obviously were not in the public record. The truth generation 
process was a main function of the South African TRC, and the wide publication and 
high participation levels in, and testimony before, the TRC were among its most 
distinguishing features. The South African TRC helped to establish a public record of the 
abuses.  
 By contrast, Australia’s formal reconciliation process seems to have been 
motivated more by a symbolic celebration of the centenary of the Federation and a desire 
to clear up “unfinished business,” as Grattan puts it.133 There was certainly a desire to 
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address inequality between the minority Aborigines and Torres Strait Islander population 
and the dominant Australian society.  However, actions have not lived up to words. In 
discussing both Keating’s Redfern speech and Rudd’s apology speech Fredricks asks 
“how many more speeches do we need?”134 A significant disconnect between “good 
intension,” even by the supposedly more sympathetic Australian Labour Party, “are 
considerably diminished by the positively colonial contemporary political context.”135 
There was little desire on the part of the Howard Liberal government to discuss, 
consider, and least of all to apologize for past wrongs. Unlike South Africa, the history of 
colonialism was all too apparent in Australia, and extra-judicial, or at least unjust, acts 
such as the “stolen generations” were not a secret in the same sense that extra-judicial 
abuses in South Africa were. The CAR and National Inquiry, however, still had the goal 
of creating a public record of the history of colonialism in Australia. The CAR’s main 
truth function appears to have been the education of the general population on the history 
of government policies, to which the Australian population was largely indifferent. 
However, Gunstone contends the CAR failed to carry out the education function 
adequately.136 The National Inquiry had a much more thorough truth agenda, hearing 
testimony and making recommendations for compensation, apology, and 
commemoration.137  In fact, Chris Cunneen argues that the truth agenda of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Straight Islander Children Inquiry was “an essential measure of reparation for 
people.”138 But, to the extent that Gunstone is correct that the dominant society still 
lacked a thorough knowledge of past abuses, the truth told by the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Children Inquiry is of limited use for reconciliation.    
 The main difference in the constellation of power between South Africa and 
Australia is that in South Africa a process of decolonisation was legitimately underway. 
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The TRC became an important site for the larger transitional process that sought to 
reshape unjust political, social, and economic power dynamics of the country. In 
Australia, on the other hand, the concentration of political, social, and economic power in 
the hands of the settlers remains largely unchanged from the colonisation period and the 
time of the abuses. That is to say, the power constellation in Australia remains a colonial 
one. Indeed even after Keating’s Redfern speech the Labour government “enacted 
legislation to limit the impact of common law land rights in favour of powerful 
commercial interests to such an extent as to render them largely meaningless.”139 A 
powerful reminder of how colonial Australia remained during the process of formal 
reconciliation. 
Thus, the power arrangement, colonial or post-colonial, can significantly impact 
the process by which a society deals with historic wrongdoing. While such efforts may be 
very well-intentioned, in as much as they emanate from within the dominant part of a 
colonial society, any effort to deal with historic injustice is carried out against the general 
background of colonial hierarchy, which normatively excludes indigenous ways of being 
and knowing. This does not make the goal of dealing with historic injustice impossible, 
but, rather, imposes many constraints, both conscious and unconscious on the part of the 
colonial power, upon the process. This process may ultimately require the dismantling of 
the colonial regime itself in order to fully address historic injustice. It should not be 
controversial to say that reconciliation in South Africa under Apartheid would be 
unintelligible.  
 The legislature that created the CAR and the orders that established the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children Inquiry were effectively (dis)empowering 
these institutions to investigate the very source of its power, the colonial constellation. 
That is to say, that being a product of a colonial legislature they could never adequately 
address the legacy of colonialism. It is a process that seeks to finish the “unfinished” 
business of creating a just colonial state without seriously threatening the foundations of 
the edifice of colonial power; the bifurcation of the truth and reconciliation aspects in 
Australia hint at this point. The National Inquiry was tasked with telling the truth of one 
                                                          




instance of colonial abuse of children—and by extension their families—in a long history 
of colonial oppression, while the CAR aimed to foster reconciliation in the context of 
ongoing disadvantage on the part of Aboriginal people in Australia, without having to tell 
any truths about colonisation or oppression.  
 The clearest manifestation of the constellation of power in the institutional design 
of the National Inquiry is found in the power distribution. As discussed above, special 
powers are a key characteristic of truth commissions, according to Hayner.140 Special 
powers are all but absent from the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families. While the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Children Inquiry clearly did not need the same sorts of special powers as 
the South African TRC did in the revelation of the truth surrounding Apartheid, such as 
witness protection or subpoena, the ability to compel documents and meaningfully tell the 
truth of the actions of the colonial government throughout the history of Australia may 
have helped the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children Inquiry. However, the 
colonial power dynamic seems to have mitigated against this, lacking sufficient 
introspection or out of a more deliberate aim to maintain its supremacy. 
 For both South Africa and Australia, the formal commission was conceived as a 
part of a process of addressing inequality and disadvantage. The fundamental difference, 
however, is in the ordering of the process. In the case of South Africa, a formal handover 
of political power occurred before the TRC was struck. This was manifest in the 1994 
election of the African National Congress as the government. In Australia, the CAR was 
conceived as the beginning of a process that it was hoped would lead to a correction of 
Aboriginal disadvantage, and the National Inquiry cropped up in the middle of the 
process.  However laudable the goals of reconciliation in Australia may have been, the 
unwillingness to explore symbolic gestures of acknowledgement; and the concentration 
on current and future “practical reconciliation;” combined with the CAR’s failure to 
address key issues identified by Aboriginal peoples have led to little movement toward a 
just and reconciled society. Howard is right in certain ways when he contends that 
reconciliation cannot be legislated.141 At least certain kinds of reconciliation cannot be 
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legislated, such as the fellow feeling between neighbours, for example.142 But other 
aspects certainly can, such as overturning discrimination by the state or granting self-
determination.  However, this emphasis on practical over symbolic reconciliation—aside 
from artificially separating these two approaches—misses an important opportunity for 
the government to show moral leadership in fostering the type of reconciliation that could 
have been encouraged in “the hearts and minds of the Australian people.”143 This lack of 
leadership may have been motivated, wittingly or not, by a desire not to undermine or 
threaten the colonial power of the state. To seriously wrestle with the actions of past 
governments would threaten some of the moral foundations of the Australian community, 
and to the extent that this may lead to questioning of doctrines such as terra nullius, the 
very legal foundations of the Federation may be in danger. The dominant society in 
colonial states must come to understand the nature and history of colonialism in order to 
address the inequality that persists between native and newcomer, without replicating the 
colonial hierarchy of saviour and savage.  That is to say newcomers must understand how 
they have come to possess the land, the institutions of the state, and the fruits of the 
economy if they hope to escape the worst excesses of the colonial relationship. This may 
involve a grave threat to the power of the colonial state.  
 A final difference between the two truth and reconciliation mechanisms can be 
seen in the funding of each. In the case of the South African TRC, the funding of 
operations was accomplished by the creation of a “President’s Fund” that received money 
from Parliament under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995.144  
The guarantor of operational funds for the TRC was ultimately the Parliament of South 
Africa. In contrast, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation in Australia had no source 
of funding established in its enabling legislation.145 Moreover, the follow-on body that 
the CAR established in 2001, Reconciliation Australia, which was tasked with continuing 
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the work of reconciliation, is a not-for-profit body that is funded by private donations, 
rather than government funds.146  
 This is not to suggest that the comparison here is between unmitigated success 
and failure, but that the powers given to these reconciliation bodies, their place in the 
overall process of reconciliation, and their source of funding are, in part, a function of the 
power dynamics of their respective societies. More fundamentally, however, the way that 
the Howard government conceived of reconciliation in Australia as addressing deficits in 
education, health, and housing, meant that there was no real threat to the prevailing 
colonial power dynamic. In fact, in important ways, I argue this reinforced at least the 
cultural or social power imbalances. That is to say, the efforts in Australia and South 
Africa differed in their effectiveness by the extent to which each was already de-colonial, 
which was fundamentally affected by the pattern of power in the two societies; there are 
significant differences between colonial and post-colonial societies. This directly bears on 
any analysis of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, as it has been 
created in colonial society with the colonial constellation of power largely intact.   
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 
In Canada the Indian Residential School system was a church/state partnership, 
established in 1886, funded by the federal government and run by the churches, and 
which continued until the last school closed in 1996. The goal of the schools was to 
educate Aboriginal children in a “civilized” way, which meant education in the dominant 
society’s customs, manners, language, and the Christian faith.147 Many of the children 
lost important sources of Indigenous language, culture, and family as a result of their time 
in the schools. Often these schools were sites of extreme emotional, physical and sexual 
abuse, as discussed in Chapter Four, above. This abuse continues to cause many problems 
within Aboriginal families and communities. The abuses were little talked about in 
Aboriginal communities and all but unknown or poorly understood in the settler society. 
The effects of the abuses suffered in residential schools did not necessarily end when a 
student left, or even when the system was finally shut down. Survivors of residential 
schools, particularly those who suffered physical and/or sexual abuse, often experienced 
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problems with alcoholism, drug abuse, dependency, low self-esteem, suicide, prostitution, 
gambling, and homelessness.148  
 The negative impacts of residential school in these social pathologies not only 
affected school survivors, but also have intergenerational impacts. Jacobs and Williams 
argue that the continuing impact of the colonial mentality embodied by the residential 
school has contributed to the disappearance and murder of hundreds of Aboriginal 
women in Canada.149 Sisters in Spirit—a research, education, and policy initiative led by 
Aboriginal women—estimated that 582 Aboriginal women and girls went missing or 
were murdered in Canada between 2005 and 2011. 
150 This is not meant to dwell on the adverse effects of the Indian Residential School 
System—although they are many—but, rather, to indicate the continued nature of the 
injustices suffered. Before 2008, there had not been any compensation or meaningful 
apology made to IRS system survivors by the Government of Canada.151  
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specific trauma (never mind being remove from her family and being forcibly subjected to the Residential 
School). This ruling was appealed by the government on the grounds that she did not fit the category for 
compensation. However, issues such as these, where compensation did not seem to be motivated by 
generosity, were not the only problem with the ADR. Abuse suffered in different areas of Canada were 
compensated differently, even for the same type of abuse (See Assembly of First Nations, Report on 
Canada’s Dispute Resolution Plan to Compensate for Abuse in Indian Residential School (Ottawa: 
Assembly of First Nation, 2009), 14-5.). If abuse occurred in British Columbia, the Yukon, or Ontario the 
maximum that could be awarded was $50, 000 more than anywhere else in Canada. Churches were 
responsible for 30% of the award with the federal government paying the 70%. However, if a claim was 
awarded in a case where the religious organization had not entered into an indemnity, then the claimant 
would only get 70% of their award. At a conference held in 2004 at the University of Calgary, the ADR 
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 While the churches involved in the operation of the IRS system first began to 
apologize for their role in the schools in the late 1980s—starting with the United Church 
of Canada in 1986, the Roman Catholic Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate in 1991, 
the Anglican Church of Canada in 1993, and the Presbyterian Church in Canada in 
1994152—it was not until the summer of 2008 that the Government of Canada, in the 
person of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, offered an apology for the IRS system on 
behalf of all Canadians. The timing is significant, as it came after the effective date of the 
Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement of September 2007, when an admission 
of guilt implicit in an apology could no longer be used against the Government of Canada 
in legal proceedings. This timing, coming as it did after a deal to resolve the outstanding 
litigation and massive claim made by survivors, should give us pause to carefully 
question the sincerity and commitment of the federal government to the project of 
reconciliation, of which the TRC was meant to be a part. 
 By 2002 former students of the residential schools had launched over 11,000 legal 
actions against the Government of Canada and the various churches that operated the 
schools. 153  Either as insurance against the uncertain cost of the lawsuits,154 or for other 
                                                                                                                                                                             
was discussed and criticized by academics, elders, and lawyers. The account given by Kathleen Mahoney 
(10 Feb. 2012) is that the conference was well attended and officials, including the Minister of Indian 
Affairs, attended and were receptive to the ideas put forward. To that end, Mahoney undertook a fact-
finding mission to the Republic of Ireland where she examined the response by the Ministry of Education 
to the issue of sexual and physical abuse committed in the Industrial Schools there by Roman Catholic 
orders and organizations (for a good history of the system see Mary Raftery and Eoin O’Sullivan, Suffer the 
Little Children: The Inside Story of Ireland’s Industrial Schools (Dublin: New Island Books, 1999.)). The 
conclusions reached by the fact-finding mission were that the Irish scheme was “much more coherent, 
generous and principled than that of the Canadian model.”  (Kathleen Mahoney, Report on Fact-Finding 
Mission to Ireland Regarding Compensation Scheme and Related Benefits for Industrial School Survivors 
in Ireland, prepared for the Assembly of First Nations, 12). In Ireland victims were being paid nearly four 
times as much as in Canada on average, and the Irish government paid the full cost, while going after the 
Roman Catholic Church for compensation as a separate matter. Kathleen Mahoney credits this mission as 
providing valuable insights as to the way forward for Canada at that time prior to negotiations that led to 
the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement. Moreover, it was the willingness of the Government 
of Canada to listen to this example that helped shift the discussion toward the negotiation process 
(Interview with Kathleen Mahoney, conducted by author, 10 Feb 2012). 
152 Aboriginal Healing Foundation, “Apology and Reconciliation: A Timeline of Events,” in Response, 
Responsibility, and Renewal: Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Journey, edited by Gregory Younging, 
Jonathan Dewar, and Mike DeGagné (Ottawa: Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2009), 176-7.  
153 Ronald Niezen, Truth and Indignation: Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian 
Residential Schools (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 42. 
154 This was suggested as an act of “governmentality” in Andrew Woolford, “Governing Through Repair: 
Colonial Injustice and Aboriginal peoples in Canada,” (paper presented at the One Day Academic 
Conference at the First National Event of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Winnipeg 
Manitoba June 17, 2010).   
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reasons, the lawsuits were settled and the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement was signed on April 24, 2006 by the Assembly of First Nations; Anglican, 
Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, and United churches; and by the Government of Canada. 
Among the terms of the agreement was “Schedule N,” which provided for the creation of 
“an historic Truth and Reconciliation Commission [that would] be established to 
contribute to truth, healing and reconciliation.”155 
 The mandate of the Canadian TRC focused the Commission’s work on the past 
abuses of the Indian Residential Schools System. The Canadian TRC was tasked with 
taking statements from school survivors and creating a record of the abuse that was 
suffered in the Indian Residential School System. The TRC was, in fact, barred from 
considering other modes of discrimination against Aboriginal peoples, such as unsafe 
housing, access to clean drinking water, and so on. While this type of investigation 
requires reviewing individual rights abuses, the Canadian TRC’s focus was on the macro 
event of the IRS system, rather than the experiences of individual rights abuse per se.  
The focus of the TRC, through the articulation of the individual experiences of survivors, 
was on a system of abuse and the pain (individual and collective) caused by it, rather than 
only on the individual instances of criminal neglect and abuse. While it took individual 
statements from survivors and promised to create a record out of these individual 
experiences—just as the South Africa TRC was mandated—the Canadian TRC was not 
empowered to make individual reparations and was directed to foster community 
reconciliation between the parties to the Agreement, most significantly for this project 
between Crown and Aboriginal peoples. The commission was given a five-year time 
frame in which to complete its work and issue a report and an allotment of funding from 
the federal government.156 
  The Canadian TRC was not invested with any specific powers that allowed it better 
access to information. The commission was only empowered to “receive statements and 
documents from former students, their families, community and all other interested 
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participants.”157 But it could not compel the production of documents or testimony.158 It 
certainly had an increased ability to deal with the sensitive nature of survivor testimony 
and much of the mandate document deals with privacy and care for those giving 
testimony. In design and in practice the Canadian TRC was a body searching for the truth 
of the IRS system and striving to provide reconciliation between the signatories.159 Thus 
if not exactly matching Hayner’s definition above, it is in spirit and practice a truth and 
reconciliation commission proper. 
  
Canadian (Im)Balance of Power 
The timing of the Canadian TRC is significant, especially when examined alongside the 
truth commission in South Africa and the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and 
Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Children Inquiry in Australia. In the South 
African case, the TRC was initiated after a process of transition had begun in the country, 
and after the balance of formal political power had largely shifted with the election held 
in 1994, which brought Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress to power. In 
contrast, within the Australian context, the formal reconciliation process was meant to 
proceed or propel the society into a process of transition, and even the truth component in 
the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Children Inquiry came after the drive for 
reconciliation. This opened the reconciliatory institution to the machinations of the 
prevailing colonial power constellation. Similarly, the process of transition—indeed, if 
there is one at all—in Canada is meant to be opened up by the Canadian TRC, as the 
CAR in Australia was meant to do. As with Australia, Canada remains a colonially 
                                                          
157 Ibid., 2. 
158 Access to documents has been a problem for the TRC. The federal government has been slow to release 
documents to the commission, which prompted the TRC to take them to court in 2012. In late January 2013 
the Ontario Superior Court ordered the federal government to produce archived documents related to the 
IRS system, the presiding judge stating the federal government “is to provide all relevant documents to the 
TRC.” See Gloria Galloway, “Ottawa ordered to find and release millions of Indian residential school 
records,” The Globe and Mail Jan. 30, 2013 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-
ordered-to-find-and-release-millions-of-indian-residential-school-records/article8001068/ (accessed 18 
March 2013). 
159 The parties to the agreement as listed in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement are: the  
Government of Canada; Plaintiffs; the Assembly of First Nations and Inuit Representatives; the General 
Synod of the Anglican Church of Canada; the Presbyterian Church of Canada; the United Church of 
Canada; and Roman Catholic Entities.  
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oriented country, with the dynamics of power between Aboriginal peoples and the 
Canadian state remaining largely unchanged from the residential school era. 
 The Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) that provided for 
the creation of the TRC also created a compensation regime in the form of the Common 
Experience Payment (CEP) and Independent Assessment Process (IAP). The CEP 
provided compensation based on time spent in the IRS system. This compensation was 
straightforward and only required claimants to show they attended a school, with the 
compensation allowing many recipients to turn “their temporary financial gain into 
opportunities with lasting effects, helping out family members, clearing up debts, and 
investing in the future.”160 As Niezen points out, there were also negative impacts of the 
sudden influx of $1.6 billion into Aboriginal communities from the CEP, notably for 
those suffering from substance abuse and addiction.161 While the sudden influx of money 
had positive and negative effects, a major weakness of the CEP process was that it failed 
to recognize the intergenerational effects of the IRS system, as family members of 
deceased school survivors were ineligible for compensation.162 The IAP was more 
problematic, even though it was created as an out-of-court process that sought to 
compensate specific abuse claims more efficiently and in a less adversarial way than a 
litigation process. The Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat that was 
created to review applications and determine compensation was a body which had to 
receive evidence and investigate claims. It allowed identified abusers to respond to 
allegations, although survivors and alleged perpetrators did not come into contact as in a 
courtroom setting. Though not court-like per se, claimants were encouraged to be 
represented by legal counsel, meaning that those with the most compelling and provable 
narratives were prioritised by lawyers.163  
 Moreover, as a fact based process of proving harm, the IAP excluded those “who 
had clearly been abused in the schools but were unable to remember those basic details 
that were prerequisites of a successful claim… most commonly, the name of the person 
                                                          
160 Ronald Niezen, Truth and Indignation: Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Indian 
Residential Schools (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 44.  
161 Ibid., 44-45. For lawyers there was clearly a financial incentive to represent these survivors and 
concentrate on them as the IAP provided lawyer fee payments. 
162 Jennifer Henderson and Pauline Wakeham, “Colonial Reckoning, National Reconciliation?: Aboriginal 
Peoples and the Culture of Redress in Canada,” English Studies in Canada vol.35 iss.1 (March 2009), 11. 
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who victimized them.”164 Even in determining the level of compensation after verifying 
abuse, the approach was somewhat cold, relying “upon a point-based scale that calculates 
monetary value via the reduction of traumatic experience to itemization within a clinical 
taxonomy of injuries.”165 The compensation regime, while an important symbolic gesture 
and part of broader reconciliatory approach, was framed within a Western legal 
construction that proved problematic for some Aboriginal peoples to access. It prioritized 
colonial attitudes about the scope of harm and how to verify and compensate it.  
 The consideration of how the colonial power constellation has affected the 
Canadian TRC is neither ephemeral nor theoretical. After the appointment of the first 
slate of commissioners, including Justice Harry LaForme as chair, in 2008, the TRC ran 
into a series of problems that led to Justice LaForme’s resignation in October of 2008 and 
the resignation of the other two commissioners over incurable problems that they 
believed would doom the commission to failure.166 Justice LaForme believed that the 
Canadian TRC would not be able to focus on reconciliation but, rather, would operate as 
a strict truth commission and “leave reconciliation for another day.”167 The Canadian 
TRC, especially in the form of the negotiated settlement, was seen from the beginning as 
an exercise in “governmentality” where uncertainties for the Canadian state could be 
mitigated and direct financial liability could be quantified with greater certainty then in a 
proceedings of the court.168 This is, in fact, what was at work in the IAP process of 
limiting and classifying harm so that government knows in advance what its liability will 
be, using a scale of abuse that it determines. The construction of the TRC itself left 
unquestioned agents and institutions of the IRS system, eschewing a “more aggressing 
fault-finding focus… [that] might serve more effectively to confront Canadians with their 
historical  and ongoing complicity in the residential schools agenda.”169   This desire to 
narrow focus and limit liability importantly pre-sages and constrains reconciliation before 
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a discussion has begun. This is more than one party staking out its position as in a 
negotiation, as the state has significant powers to set the very conditions of the discussion 
of reconciliation. 
 Moreover, this is not a unique approach to Crown-Aboriginal relations in Canada. 
Negotiations in British Columbia between First Nations, the British Columbia provincial 
government, and the federal government have increasingly focused on matters of 
practical certainty—on questions of land base, treaty rights, and government 
obligations.170 As Woolford argues, for governments especially, certainty is created by 
transferring existing Aboriginal rights to the current normal constitutional order of 
government and citizen interaction.171 In the process of treaty making in British 
Columbia, Aboriginal rights are transformed into constitutionally protected treaty rights, 
under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, while all undefined rights are deemed to be 
released, thereby normalizing Crown-Aboriginal relations within the existing 
constitutional order, without undermining or threatening that order, and thus leaving in 
place its colonial constellation of power.172 The approach in the British Columbia Treaty 
Process is one of extinguishment and assimilation, according to Taiaiake Alfred and the 
Office of the British Columbia Regional Chief for the Assembly of First Nations.173  
 This is just one example of the continuing colonial relationship between the 
Government of Canada and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Another is that the expressly 
colonial Indian Act remains in place, constraining and regulating the lives of Aboriginal 
peoples. A number of other examples could be named here. The point remains that, given 
that the colonial power constellation is little altered from the time of residential schools, 
finding traces of this power inequality on the institution of the Canadian TRC in itself is 
not surprising.  
 First, there is the issue of funding. The level of funding was established by the 
Settlement Agreement and pegged at $60 million for the five years the Canadian TRC 
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was mandated to operate.174 Moreover, the Canadian TRC could not spend the funds 
independently, as the transfer of the bulk of the money to the Commission—some $58 
million—was contingent upon the Government of Canada approving the commission’s 
budget at each stage of its work.175 While $60 million seems on its face to be a large sum, 
given the geography of the country and the remoteness of many First Nations and Inuit 
communities, high travel costs were incurred just to send statement takers to these 
locations to collect survivors’ stories. Add this to the mandated requirement to hold seven 
national events, at the expense of the Canadian TRC, in various regions of the country,176 
and it is easy to see the limited funds available to the commission. Hayner points out that 
the $18 million per year budget in South Africa was seen as insufficient by many 
observers of that commission in 1995.177 Factoring in the Canadian TRC’s longer 
mandate and inflation, the allocation to the Canadian TRC should have approximated 
something closer to $117.5 million, or nearly twice the allotted funds, just to bring it on 
par with the South African commission’s budget.178 In addition, at the end of its five year 
mandate, out of the $60 million budget, the Settlement Agreement mandated the 
establishment of a permanent research centre.179 In 2010, then-Director of Research for 
the Canadian TRC John S. Milloy expressed frustration over the level of funding for the 
research division and indicated the near impossibility of conducting the research function 
of the commission with funds available, let alone establishing a research centre at the end 
of the Canadian TRC mandate.180   
 Exacerbating these inadequacies in funding for the Canadian TRC was the decision 
made by the Conservative government in 2010 to discontinue funding to the Aboriginal 
Healing Foundation, which was created in 1998 as part of the federal government’s 
response to the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.  The 
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mission of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation was to “provide resources which will 
promote reconciliation and encourage and support Aboriginal people and their 
communities in building and reinforcing sustainable healing processes that address the 
legacy of physical, sexual, mental, cultural, and spiritual abuses in the residential school 
system, including intergenerational impacts.”181 While not directly linked to the Canadian 
TRC itself, the task of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation to provide funding to support 
community-led healing initiatives clearly was complimentary to the work of the Canadian 
TRC. The decision to cut funding, however, meant that the Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation had to cut back significantly on its operations and had no new funds available 
for healing processes developed within Aboriginal communities.182 Even with the $125 
million set aside in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, the Aboriginal 
Healing Foundation was forced to close completely in September of 2012, at which time 
the twelve regional healing centres that operated under its auspices were no longer 
funded.183 This closure occurred before the Canadian TRC finished its work and left a 
massive funding void in the support of healing initiatives, thus making the Canadian TRC 
the only “well-funded” source of healing.184 This may have the effect of increasing 
demands on the statement taking and support capacity of the Canadian TRC, ultimately 
increasing costs—in the form of increased on-hand counsellors at nation events for 
instance—just at the time that the commission ran out of its funds ceded under the Indian 
Residential School Settlement Agreement. 
 The other major instance of power imbalance that can be seen in the institution of 
the Canadian TRC was the limited powers given to the Commission. The South African 
TRC received several special powers, discussed above, while the Australian process had 
no special powers to speak of at all. Here there is a striking similarity with the Canadian 
TRC, which was not allocated special powers. The terms of reference for the Canadian 
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TRC only empowered it to “receive statements and documents.”185 Moreover, the 
commission could not act in the fashion of a public inquiry, had no subpoena power to 
compel participation or attendance, and the commissioners are compelled to perform their 
duties “without making any findings or expressing any conclusion or recommendation, 
regarding the misconduct of any person, unless such findings or information has already 
been established through legal proceedings.”186 This last prohibition is then elaborated 
upon in a subsequent subsection where the “naming of names” is expressly forbidden, 
unless that individual consents to be so named.187 In effect, the Canadian TRC can only 
record the stories of those who wish to volunteer them and thus can only create a truth 
document without the ability to compel documents or testimony from school operators. 
This leaves an important aspect of understanding the IRS system out of the analysis of the 
Canadian TRC, namely that of the federal government and churches. That is to say, while 
it is valuable to record and archive the experience of survivors, important explanations 
for the failure of Canada and the churches to safeguard children are lacking as a result of 
the TRC’s inability to access documents from these organizations.  
 Moreover, the motivations for the entire system remain unaccounted for by those 
who operated or supported it. The lack of powers here can be seen as a major concession 
to the prevailing colonial constellation, as the truth that was constructed in the Canadian 
TRC process was anecdotal, narrative, and derive largely from survivors alone. While it 
is important for survivors to tell their stories, it is exactly the form of personal experience 
and story that the “truth” from this Commission will take that will allow it to be 
discounted in the legalistic and positivistic dominant society.  That is to say, if the “truth” 
established by Canadian TRC can be seen as one experiential truth among others—
especially more compelling truths within the Western tradition, such as empirical truth—
lacking a broad coalition of intersubjective belief, then the Canadian TRC will have little 
effect outside Aboriginal communities. This would represent a tragic loss of an 
opportunity to change the colonial dynamics of Crown-Aboriginal relations in Canada. 
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To write that dynamics of power affect the character of institutions should be a relatively 
uncontroversial statement; but it is certainly not a trivial one. For the Canadian TRC, 
noting that an imbalance of power between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown was an 
important, if obvious, observation for considering the construction of the Canadian TRC 
and the possibility and probability of its success. We have seen that the prevailing 
arrangements of political power have shaped other truth commissions, as noted above in 
the case studies of South Africa and Australia. Where the colonial constellation of power 
remains unchanged from the period of abuse, as in Australia, we have seen limited 
success and policy measures taken that do not significantly challenge the prevailing 
order.  When we turn to consider the Canadian context, understanding the still-colonial 
state of relations between Crown and Aboriginal peoples importantly leads us to consider 
how colonial power first manifests in the institutional design of commissions and how it 




Transformative Opportunities: The Canadian TRC and the Possibility of Change 
 
Introduction 
With various understandings of reconciliation explored in Chapter Three, it is important 
to investigate what the TRC sought to accomplish and whether it was able to do so. 
Following from my research question: “Does the TRC represent a transformative 
opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations in Canada?” it appears that the answer is ‘yes.’ 
Interviews conducted with civil servants, former politicians, and Aboriginal leaders 
indicate that the TRC is a transformative opportunity in the history of Crown-Aboriginal 
relations. The people with whom I spoke were asked a series of questions about the 
nature of reconciliation, impediments to its success, and ultimately about the relative 
sincerity of the Government of Canada in its commitment to reconciliation. When the 
interviews were conducted the government was led by Stephen Harper. Despite 
misgivings over the sincerity of the Harper government in their approach and 
commitment to reconciliation the interviewees expressed optimism for the possibility of 
change. With the change in federal government in October of 2015 there is every reason 
for increased optimism of improvement in Crown-Aboriginal relations toward a more 
positive and equitable relationship. While the new Liberal government led by Justin 
Trudeau has to date only managed a change in tone, their commitment to implementing 
the findings of the TRC gives hope that a new relationship will result from the TRC. The 
commitment of the Liberal government, even in the absence of concrete action, and the 
optimism of the interviewees gives us some evidence to suppose that the TRC did in fact 
represent a transformative opportunity. In addition, as discussed below, the condition of 
existing potential in the wake of the TRC leads strongly to the conclusion that the TRC 
does represent a transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations.  Before 
discussing the possibility of transition in more detail, however, the term “transformative 




What is a Transformative Opportunity? 
The TRC brought with it a special opportunity to transform particular aspects of 
Canadian society and change the way that the Crown and Aboriginal peoples interact and 
view their relationship within the shared land and as political entities. To be sure this will 
not occur all at once. A transformative opportunity is a time of potential. Its 
accomplishment is not a foregone conclusion; the transformative opportunity is one of 
potentiality, a potentiality that separates one mode of being from another in a threshold 
that both unites and separates what is and what could be. In defining this time of 
potential, I want to adapt Agamben’s interpretation of the Aristotelian conception of 
potential to a localized “time,” rather than having it as a sort of standing reserve of all 
action. That is to say I am concerned with a specific potentiality bounded by a certain 
time. 
 At one level the meaning is fairly clear. A transformative opportunity can be seen 
after a point of change, perhaps not unlike the idea of a “tipping point” popularized by 
Malcolm Gladwell, as he describes a “moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling 
point.”1 In idiomatic English there is this idea, as well, of a liminal position at which a 
great change occurs. For instance, we might use the expression “the straw that broke the 
camel’s back,” or in allusion to this idiom, “the last straw” and the “the final straw.” 
These expressions indicate that something on its own, in this instance the addition of a 
single piece of straw to a laden camel should have no great effect. But, placed at the right 
time, and given the right sequence of events, any given straw can bring about a most 
dramatic and observable effect: in the case of the camel, the unfortunate outcome of a 
broken back. This moment of actuality, the broken back, discretely separates two modes 
of being for the camel; before the straw, the camel is whole; after, its back is broken. 
These two modes, however, need not be so dichotomous, and as we will see, even after 
transformation the camel continues to contain at least the specter of the possible.  What is 
important here is that this is the accomplishment of the transformation from one mode of 
being to another—the existence of the moment of potentiality exists before the 
accomplishment of the transformation, in a sort of threshold while the straw is being 
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piled. This is what I take to be the transformative opportunity, a time of potential that can 
be seen as separate from actuality, but nonetheless related to it.   
 Identifying the actuality of a transformation can only be done post hoc, which is 
clear, perhaps even tautological. Crossing over the threshold can be said to be 
accomplished once it is done, once one is on the other side. But identifying the 
potentiality that also is part of the transformative opportunity is possible, given that we 
can identify certain conditions for a transformation: that is, for its potential. In discussing 
the senses, Aristotle puts it this way: “sensibility is not actual but only potential. This is 
why it does not give sensation, just as the combustible does not burn by itself, without a 
principle of combustion; otherwise it would burn itself and would not need actual fire.”2 
Potentiality is both a positive and negative act-in-becoming, as the combustible material 
is potentially fire and not-fire. In our ability to do and not do we have potential, the 
potential exists in complex relationship to being and not-being actualised.  
Following Aristotle, Agamben points out there are two potentialities, the generic 
and existing, and Agamben is concerned with the latter.3 The generic potential is just that: 
generic. It is the potential of a child to learn, or we might say colloquially all children 
have the potential to grow up and be prime minister. The existing potential consists of the 
ability to use—or not—some ability already gained through a prior actuality of the 
generic potential. Aristotle discusses this distinction in terms of wisdom, “we might 
speak of man as wise, because man is one of the genus of beings which are wise and have 
wisdom; secondly, in the sense in which we at once call the man wise who has learnt.”4 
Each human, human as genus and individual human as possessor of wisdom, has the 
potential for wisdom, “but in a different sense: the one because the genus to which he 
belongs, that is to say, his matter, is potentially wise; the other because he is capable, if 
he chooses, of applying the wisdom he has acquired.”5  
 It is the existing potential that is more salient and interesting for both Agamben 
and Aristotle, and for Agamben it crucially allows for the relationship between 
potentiality and impotentiality to be explored. The architect having the potential to build, 
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or the poet the potential to write, has in it this choice of use of an ability that Aristotle 
highlights above. For Agamben potential is potential because of the possibility of not 
using, of impotential: “we say of the architect that he or she has the potential to build, of 
the poet that he or she has the potential to write poems… the architect is potential insofar 
as he has the potential to no-build, the poet the potential to not-write poems.”6 This is to 
say that the potential exists in its relation to impotential, the potential to build or write is 
only significant in relation to the impotential to build or write. Potentiality is “a 
potentiality that is not simply the potential to do this or that thing but potential to not-do, 
potential not to pass into actuality.”7  
 The relationship between potential and impotential, however, is not that the one 
negates the other in its realisation of actuality or non-actuality.  For Agamben the often 
quoted section of The Metaphysics is misunderstood: “A thing is capable of doing 
something if there is nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that which it is said 
to have potentiality.”8 This is not, Agamben argues, the simple tautology that whatever is 
not impossible is possible. Rather, recognizing that impotentiality belongs to all 
potentiality points us toward something more complex. As Aristotle puts it “it is possible 
that a thing may be capable of being and yet not be, and capable of not being and yet 
be.”9  Agamben argues that what Aristotle means here is that “if potentiality to not-be 
originally belongs to all potentiality, then there is truly potentiality only where the 
potentiality to not-be does not lag behind actuality but passes fully into it as such.”10 
Thus, impotentiality turns back on itself in actualisation, creating an impossibility of not 
doing this or that. This potentiality to not-be (impotentiality) passing fully into actuality 
“does not mean that it disappears into actuality; on the contrary, it preserves itself as such 
in actuality. What is truly potential is thus what has exhausted all its impotentiality in 
brining wholly into the act as such.”11  
 The potentiality of the transformative opportunity, then, consists of an existing 
potential to disengage from the current state of affairs, without negating it, with the 
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(im)potential to create something new, with the specter of what could have been always 
beside it. The actualisation of which exhausts its own impotentiality in its act of 
realisation. But the potential of the transformative opportunity itself is a threshold that 
both unites and separates pre and post, what came before and what will come after, in the 
fullness of each. This potential is significant, or at least all the more significant, in its 
impotential. Its actualisation in the form of product is separate, but connected to, the 
potential; the transformative opportunity is not transformation, but it is a threshold.   
The parties to the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement, most 
importantly, here, the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, have the existing (im)potential to 
transform their relationships. To be clear this opportunity is nothing less than 
transformational, but it is also the impotential of transformation. That is, they can chose 
or not chose to transform this relationship, with the implications of potentiality noted 
above. Whether one party is unwilling or another party needs to do more to accomplish 
this transformation is immaterial here. Both have existing capabilities to accomplish this 
transformation; it is not a generic potentiality. But, it seems to sit as a sort of standing 
reserve of potential. I do not take a transformative opportunity to be potential, but to be a 
time of potential. It is a specific concept of time that helps to focus the potentiality of 
transformation, in the transformative opportunity.  
By time, I do not refer to simple chronological time, the sequence of historical 
events. I do not mean, for example, that the transformative opportunity is potential for 
transformation from December 2015 to December 2018. What I have in mind is a concept 
of time called kairos. The ancient Greeks had two understandings of time:  chronos, the 
normal time of sequential events; and kairos, a special time of possibility. Some might 
wrongly conclude that chronos and kairos are therefore opposing concepts.  In 
translation, kairos is usually conveyed as “occasion,” which hints at its connection to 
chronos, and underscores that kairos is not a concept that is heterogeneous or opposed to 
chronos.12  Agamben’s understanding of kairos in its complex relation to chronos is the 
most helpful for elucidating this point: quoting the collection of ancient Greek medical 
texts often associated with Hippocrates, the Corpus Hippocraticum, Agamben defines the 
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relationship this way: “chronos is that in which there is kairos, and kairos is that in which 
there is little chronos.”13 Put differently, kairos is an occasion in which there is little time, 
but a momentous opportunity for transformation. As Agamben states, “kairos does not 
have another time at its disposal; in other words what we take hold of when we seize 
kairos is not another time, but a contracted and abridged chronos.”14  
In the example of the camel, above, the kairos of piling a camel with straw with 
the (im)possibility of transformation, a decisive change for the camel, which now has a 
broken back, is more than just a certain chronological time. Like Ernest Hemingway’s 
“moment of truth,” the final sword thrust in a bull fight, the transformative opportunity 
has a timeliness, it is a time of occasion.15 For Hemingway “the whole aim and 
culmination of the bullfight was the final sword thrust, the moment of truth.”16   This, 
however, is not the solitary pursuit, as Hemingway has it, that “all art is only done by 
individuals.”17 Rather, as Malcolm Cowley points out “the matador’s performance would 
be impossible without the collaboration of nameless people, dozens of them, hundreds, 
thousands.”18 The kairos of this moment of truth is not individual, constructed of one 
piece of time out of chronos, nor necessarily even sequential. But it does involve a 
concrete time of chronos in timeliness and occasion. This is because, as Agamben points 
out, “kairos does not have another time at its disposal.”19 It is in this sense of urgent 
timeliness that I mean transformative opportunity. That is to say, the time of the 
transformative opportunity is the time of kairos.  
A transformative opportunity is a moment of transformational potential, where 
transformation can begin rather than be accomplished all at once. But it is just that: 
potential. This means it is also impotential. In the context of reconciliation, a 
transformative opportunity is a potential turn toward reconciliation, a turn toward a 
relational concept that must be renewed continually.  This transformative opportunity is 
the “point of rupture” with which transitional justice is so concerned, but it does not 
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suppose the tidy linear progression that transitional justice does.20  The occasion of the 
TRC can be understood as the transformative opportunity where the Crown-Aboriginal 
relationship sits in a threshold of potential, in a time where there is not much time, there 
is a sense of urgency.  
 
Transformation and Reconciliation 
Answering ‘yes’ to the research question “Is the TRC a transformative opportunity in 
Crown-Aboriginal relations?” I refer to a momentous time of potential from which 
transformation can begin to occur. Because the potentiality of the opportunity created by 
the TRC has an existing (im)potential to change Crown-Aboriginal relations, indeed the 
recommendations of TRC call for it, we can say that it is indeed a transformative 
opportunity. What is more interesting, perhaps, is whether the change will be actualised 
and what that change will be. I return to these questions below and in the following 
chapter, respectively.  For this section it is important to understand that transformation in 
the relationship is linked to reconciliation. Those whom I interviewed for this project 
across the spectrum of stakeholders—from the government sector, the churches, and the 
Aboriginal community—all defined reconciliation necessarily involving a shift in the 
Crown-Aboriginal relationship. In a sort of ordering, then, we can see that transformation 
and reconciliation are distinct, but related, in a similar way to which transformative 
opportunity and transformation are linked, but distinct. 
 Former Minister of Indian Affairs Andy Scott stated that reconciliation works 
through a change in how Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians see one another. It 
involves bridging the gap in knowledge in Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal histories. That 
is, “reconciliation has to contain a shared history and we, at this point, do not have a 
shared history.”21 Mario Dion, former Executive Director and Deputy Head, Office of 
Indian Residential Schools Resolution of Canada (2003-2006), similarly argued that 
understanding history is an important place to start; he held that reconciliation needs “a 
better understanding on the part of all Canadians about what exactly [Indian Residential 
                                                          
20 Jennifer Balint, Julie Evans, and Nesam McMillian, “Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing 
Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach,” The International Journal of Transitional Jutice vol. 8 
(2014), 200-1. 




Schools] were, and what impact they have had.”22 When this history of Indian Residential 
Schools is commonly shared, Scott said, it will give people “a better sense of this awful 
period in our country” and “there will be a greater appreciation of the challenges the 
community faces.”23 Similarly, former Prime Minister Paul Martin views the change in 
the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples as being precipitated by a 
transformation of how Indian Residential Schools and the negative consequences they 
caused are understood by both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities. This would 
mean “a recognition by both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities of the very real 
tragedy that occurred.”24 Once this is understood more broadly, Martin contends, the 
relationship will change, as many Canadians he has talked to on the subject “really are 
interested.”25  
 Jane Morley, one of the Commissioners appointed to the TRC in its first iteration, 
talked about the reconciliation aspect of the TRC as being expressly concerned with 
changing relationships. Indian Residential Schools, she said, affected relationships at 
various levels, and reconciliation is about the “repairing of relationships.”26 While there 
will be reconciliation at a local level, among families for example, what “justifies [the 
TRC] as a truth and reconciliation commission for Canada is the idea of reconciliation 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada, or between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Canadian state.”27  
 For the Aboriginal people whom I interviewed, changing relationships are an 
important part of reconciliation, and of the Canadian TRC, and are very much linked to 
healing. Phil Fontaine described a continuum all “about healing.”28 Each of the key 
components Fontaine lists is linked in this understanding, as Fontaine noted because “you 
can’t have healing without reconciliation, you can’t have reconciliation without apology, 
                                                          
22 Mario Dion, former Executive Director and Deputy Head, Office of Indian Residential Schools 
Resolution of Canada (2003-2006), telephone interview with author, 12 Dec. 2011. 
23 Andy Scott, former Minister of Indian Affairs (2004-2006), telephone interview with author, 25 Oct. 
2011. 
24 Paul Martin, former Prime Minister of Canada (2003-2006), telephone interview with author, 9 Jan. 
2012. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Jane Morley, former commissioner of the TRC, telephone interview with author, 6 Feb. 2012. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Phil Fontaine, former national chief of the Assembly of First Nations (1997-200, and 2003-2009), 
interview with author, 6 Sept. 2012, Ottawa. 
183 
 
and you can’t have apology without acknowledgement.”29 For Fontaine, reconciliation is 
about being “better partners” in relationships, whether at the family, community, or at the 
national level.30 Mike DeGagné, former Executive Director of the now-defunct 
Aboriginal Healing Foundation, described reconciliation as “the repair of a relationship,” 
and saw the Healing Foundation’s work as helpful in this regard.31 Ghislain Picard, 
Quebec Regional Chief of the Assembly of First Nation’s, argued reconciliation is 
“finding ways to build new relationships... [and] how do we plan for the years forward.”32 
Bob Watts, former Interim Director of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada, recounted a story in which a friend “who is in his sixties [only] told his daughter 
that he loved her for the first time a few years ago because he didn’t know that that was 
part of the father-daughter bargain.”33 These types of moments, for Watts, are what can 
lead to changed relationships “on more a regional basis or national basis.”34  
 Moreover, this understanding of changing relationships as operating through 
reconciliation is supported in the literature on reconciliation. Many scholars consider 
reconciliation’s main concern to be “positive relationships between opposing parties.”35  
Changing relationships are also an operative factor in the political reconciliation outlined 
above. As Doxtader details, acts of reconciliation are often speech acts that have the 
“power to turn one kind of relationship into another.”36 As Schaap argues, reconciliation 
is directed toward the (re)founding of a political community, which must entail 
dynamism and a certain ethical-relational interaction.37As I note in discussing political 
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reconciliation in Chapter Three, it should be understood as a generative and 
transformative ethic: one which enters a dialogue of possibility with urgency but without 
prescribing the ultimate outcome of what that reconciliation would look like. 
Furthermore, political reconciliation aims at decolonisation. That is, the possibility of 
great change in the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples exists when 
reconciliation is thought of in this political sense, and follows a relational understanding. 
In the Canadian context, the TRC presented a potential of transformation in the 
relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples, bound closely to reconciliation. 
 
The Prospects for Change 
Perhaps more interesting than whether the TRC was a transformative opportunity is the 
implicit question contained therein of if the legacy of the TRC will fulfill its potential for 
change. Each person I interviewed was asked how likely he or she thought it was that the 
TRC would foster reconciliation, as is required by its mandate. While there was some 
variation in answers, a basic division emerged within the interviews. Members of the 
dominant, non-Aboriginal society, government officials, and former politicians, were 
fairly optimistic about the prospect of the TRC succeeding in fostering reconciliation. 
The Aboriginal leaders I interviewed, though hopeful, remained more guarded about the 
TRC’s ability to foster reconciliation in the form of a new relationship of respect and 
dignity between Canadian and Aboriginal societies. It is important to note that those 
whom I interviewed were circumspect about what the TRC itself could achieve in terms 
of reconciliation. Many described the TRC as merely laying the groundwork for 
reconciliation. Bob Watts presented the image of the TRC as a caterer: “They’re going to 
get the table set, they’re going to have this banquet prepared, and as a country we’re 
going to have to decide whether or not we’re going to sit down and eat together and share 
together.”38 
 Officials close to the negotiation of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement were quite optimistic about the possibility for success. Mario Dion contended 
that the TRC was very likely to succeed because of the “very able leadership... with 
                                                          




strong experience” that has been at work on the project.39 Michael Wernick, Deputy 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, said he was optimistic 
because “other people are making attempts at reconciliation from whatever lens they 
can.”40 The federally appointed representative in the Indian Residential School Settlement 
Agreement process, Frank Iacobucci, was similarly optimistic about the TRC’s chances 
for success: “I'm optimistic... I think there will be a lot of input into this commission. 
There will be lots of food for thought. And I'm confident that the product will be a very, 
very important component of going ahead and living together.”41 
 In the interviews carried in late 2011 and early 2012, former members of the 
Martin government were optimistic about a successful TRC contributing to reconciliation 
as well. Martin himself expressed the highest level of confidence among the former 
cabinet ministers interviewed, feeling “pretty optimistic” about it.42  Anne McLellan, 
former Deputy Prime Minister, and Andy Scott, former Minister of Indian Affairs, 
expressed hopefulness rather than the more enthusiastic optimism of Martin. McLellan 
was “certainly hopeful that [reconciliation] is an ongoing process.”43 Scott expressed that 
“in the end I’m hopeful that I will be able to characterize the exercise as a success.”44 
Interestingly, though, Scott noted that he did not “believe it will be as comprehensive as 
my fondest wish, but I don’t think I would hold this exercise to that threshold to be 
successful.”45 For Scott, it was important that the TRC aspire to “even the impossible and 
fall somewhat short, than to go into an exercise like this from the very beginning, 
lowering expectations.”46 While Scott’s opinion seems pessimistic, his hope springs from 
his trust in the Canadian public’s transformation via learning about the troubling history 
of the Indian Residential Schools through the activities of the TRC.  
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 In fact, this link between the public and government action in the context of 
reconciliation is present in all three of these former cabinet colleagues. Martin put the 
view clearly as he described the reaction of students to whom he has spoken: 
I go into a lot of universities and high schools and I talk with students. I get asked 
to talk about some of the things I’m involved in, such as the G20. I would be 
happy to talk about Aboriginal Canada, but mostly I get asked about things such 
as the G20. Whatever I am there to talk about, I will normally try and take some 
time at the end of my remarks and talk about something else: Aboriginal issues. 
Then I find that 90% of the questions are on Aboriginal issues. Once you open it 
up to Canadians they really are interested.47 
 
As Scott noted, while there is hope that the general public will become interested in 
Aboriginal issues, the importance of this to reconciliation is clear: “the more people who 
can be informed, the more support government will have to do the right thing” because if 
“the population is not there with them, governments will very often withdraw by virtue of 
that.”48  
 Those leaders from within the Aboriginal community whom I interviewed had a 
different view of the prospect for the success of the TRC. While hopeful, overall the 
opinions of these individuals were more tepid than those of the government officials and 
politicians I interviewed. Regional Chief Ghislain Picard was unqualified in supporting 
the TRC, having “no reason to believe that [the TRC] will not be successful.”49This 
seems like a stronger statement than those outlined above. However, in answering my 
question regarding the possibility of the TRC achieving any success, Picard drew a link to 
the truth aspects of the TRC, and in particular pointing to survivor statement-gathering. 
There might be a link here to reconciliation or to changing the relationship, but Picard 
commented specifically on statement-gathering. And with that as a measure of success, 
he expressed optimism.   
DeGagné, former director of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation, argued that the 
TRC, under the leadership of Murray Sinclair, was more concentrated on truth and 
document gathering than on reconciliation. On this basis, DeGagné was “not very” 
                                                          
47 Paul Martin, former Prime Minister of Canada (2003-2006), telephone interview with author, 9 Jan. 
2012. 
48 Andy Scott, former Minister of Indian Affairs (2004-2006), telephone interview with author, 25 Oct. 
2011. 
49 Ghislain Picard, Regional Chief of the Assembly of First Nations (since 1992), telephone interview with 
author, 14 Dec. 2011. 
187 
 
optimistic about the TRC fostering reconciliation. Instead, for DeGagné, success would 
lie in the ability of the TRC to “acknowledge and say ‘Hello, we’re not in the 
reconciliation business. We’re more in the truth business, and the truth is supported 
through documentation and stories. So we feel truth will lead to reconciliation.  So don’t 
judge us on the reconciliation outcomes.’”50 Watts, likewise, was circumspect about what 
the TRC might accomplish, noting “there’s only so much that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission can do in the time period that it’s been mandated.”51 Almost 
necessarily, the TRC was going to “leave at least a partially unfinished project in terms of 
reconciliation.”52 It would be too much to expect any single commission to achieve 
reconciliation, especially when dealing with a complex and long-lived phenomena like 
colonisation. As noted in Chapter Six, above, even South Africa continues to struggle 
with the legacy of colonialism embodied in Apartheid. Similarly, Fontaine described 
reconciliation as “a work in progress, and the effects might not be felt for some years.”53  
 These moderated expectations from these Aboriginal leaders are understandable 
in the context of other commissions and efforts that have been convened, and earlier 
attempts to place issues facing Aboriginal peoples in Canada at the top of the political 
agenda. DeGagné, Fontaine, and Watts all mentioned the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples, expressing, in one way or another, the hope that “it [the TRC] 
doesn’t go the way of RCAP.”54 There is more discussion on RCAP in Chapter Five, 
above, but the importance of it here is that the Royal Commission’s report was largely 
ignored. The report contained many recommendations for creating a new relationship 
between the Government of Canada and Aboriginal peoples, such as treaty-making, 
respecting existing treaties, protecting Aboriginal land bases, and understanding the 
fiduciary responsibility on the part of the Government of Canada, among others.55 John 
Borrows argues that the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples is a 
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relevant and significant document. However, for Borrows the way it has been used 
represents a “domestication of Aboriginal and treaty rights” in a way that is “another 
stage in the development of colonialism for indigenous peoples.”56 This is often the case, 
with the more expansive view of Aboriginal peoples and their place in Canada expressed 
in the report being down played.57 While the Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples has other issues aside from being largely ignored by the general 
public as well as policy makers,58 it is against this background of promise and possibility, 
which RCAP embodied, that the impact of the TRC continues to play out, and which may 
inform the cautiousness of those in the Aboriginal community whom I interviewed. 
 It is important to note that there is this circumspection, on the part of many whom 
I interviewed, about the extent to which the TRC, within its mandated time period, can 
create reconciliation. This underlines the idea discussed earlier that reconciliation is both 
a process and a goal that must be constantly acknowledged and renewed to be 
successful.59 In many regards, the commission itself is the start of a conversation, or at 
least designates a time and place in which a conversation about the IRS system and its 
legacy can happen. Gerry Kelly from the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops 
characterized the TRC as “a framework for success,” where it started a conversation that 
“will take fire... and be a catalyst” for reconciliation.60 Former commissioner Morley saw 
the TRC in a similar light, stating that while reconciliation will involve “a shift in public 
opinion” and a changing “relationship with indigenous peoples in Canada,” the TRC was 
“no more than a catalyst to that happening.”61 Both Martin and Scott, also, see 
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reconciliation continuing beyond the completion of the TRC’s mandate. This is an 
important point to highlight, as it is doubtful the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada, with a $60 million budget and a five-year mandate, could have accomplished 
reconciliation, assuming that reconciliation is attainable at all.62  
It is important not to overdraw this distinction between those who are hopeful 
about a new relationship, and those who are more measured in assessing the likelihood of 
creating a new relationship. But the distinction did exist in the interviews I conducted. 
The important qualification to this is the extent of the expectation placed on the TRC in 
itself as the method for “accomplishing” this type of reconciliation. Here, there is little 
difference at all in the opinions of those interviewed. As was noted above by Bob Watts, 
the TRC can merely be the caterer but it is who—if anyone—shows up to the banquet 
that presents an entirely different problem. 
 
Impediments to Success 
Continuing with Bob Watts’ metaphor of the Canadian TRC’s role as caterer, there are 
certainly strategies to ensure more guests come to the “banquet.” Even among those who 
responded optimistically to the prospect of a new relationship, their faith in the TRC was 
neither blind nor naive. The major issue consistently identified by the individuals I 
interviewed was the extent to which the TRC could reach the broader Canadian 
community. Scott was clear in his understanding of the importance of dissemination of 
the findings, since “governments are, from time to time, very conscious of public 
opinion... so, consequently, if public opinion is not supportive of the kind of energy that 
should be expended by government to address First Nation, Métis, and Inuit issues 
because they’re not informed,” it is easier for the government not to expend that energy.63 
DeGagné shared this view of the role of the public pushing government to act, when he 
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said, “I think that public opinion could drive the government to a deeper 
understanding.”64  
 And there is certainly evidence to suggest that this knowledge among the public is 
lacking. Scott offered anecdotal evidence during our interview recounting his experience 
teaching at the University of New Brunswick, where even at the graduate level, “in a 
class of thirty, if one person was aware of Indian Residential Schools when I brought it 
up, it was a good day.”65 While Martin was hopeful about Canadians becoming interested 
once they know about the issue, he acknowledged that many are indifferent because they 
are unaware of the issues faced by Aboriginal peoples as a result of the Indian Residential 
Schools system.66  
 Likewise, both Morley and Watts, the two people to whom I spoke who were 
most involved with the TRC itself, identified reaching out to the dominant society as 
crucial and something that is just not happening. Morley was clear, when it came to 
reconciliation, that “absolutely crucial is an engagement of the settler society, if you want 
to call it that, including non-indigenous people, many who are recent immigrants or 
children of immigrants.”67  Watts argues that the TRC was “flying under the radar as far 
as I can see, and doesn’t really seem to be capturing the imagination of Aboriginal people 
either.”68  
 Not everyone I interviewed mentioned a concern about the level of awareness on 
the part of the dominant society. There was no specific question in the interview that 
elicited the concerns above. It is, however, important to note that not everyone agreed 
with the characterization of the TRC as failing to reach out to the dominant society. Dion 
expressed optimism at the level of awareness about Indian Residential Schools, as well as 
their broader impact. As Dion described, reconciliation involves “a greater sympathy and 
empathy for survivors and their descendants. And I think it’s already starting to do that, 
because in 2002 or even five years ago, the level of understanding of Residential Schools 
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within the Canadian population was very low... but it is greater [now] than it was.”69 Dion 
was not exactly disputing the perceptions of the TRC failing to reach out to the broader 
public, as he clearly stated that understanding of the IRS system is “still low.”70 Rather, 
the difference is that Dion was more optimistic about the increase in awareness of 
Aboriginal issues that has occurred since his involvement began in 2002, and he 
attributed that to the workings of the TRC.71 
 While these opinions are few and anecdotal, there is more solid evidence to 
support the conclusion that the TRC was not reaching out to the dominant society.  An 
Environics survey conducted in 2008 for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada found that just over one-third of Canadians “report[ed] familiarity with the issue 
of native people and residential schools, with only one in twenty very familiar.”72 More 
problematic than this, the same survey found that some six in ten Canadian were unable 
to cite any consequence of Indian Residential Schools for the people who attended 
them.73 In a more up-to-date study conducted by Angus Reid in July 2015, the survey 
found that only 17% of respondents were following the TRC closely, a number that 
dropped to 12% when the respondents did not personally know any Aboriginal people.74 
 The lack of wide diffusion and dissemination is a large impediment to the success 
of the TRC in fostering reconciliation through a change in the relationship between 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. Hjortur Sverrisson, discussing the case of 
Kosovo, argues that a record of historic wrongdoings is important in combatting deniers 
of those wrongs. But more important than merely having an official record of 
wrongdoings is that this must be widely disseminated.75 In the case of the Canadian IRS 
system, it is less that the TRC is uncovering previously unknown facts, but, rather, that it 
is giving voice to the Indian Residential School experience through survivor testimonies. 
Hayner argues that in some cases TRCs do not “find new truth so much as break the 
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silence about widely known but unspoken truths.”76 More generally, Bloomfield, Barnes, 
and Huyse argue that public outreach “by a truth commission is critically important.”77 
This outreach can be accomplished by a number of activities including “holding public 
information meetings and... the preparation, publication and dissemination of pamphlets, 
video and publications in popular form.”78 Similarly, a truth commission needs to 
effectively engage with NGOs, other community organizations, and the media.79  
 It is this last mechanism for mass dissemination, the media, that could be most 
useful for engaging Canadians in the work of the TRC, and which was identified as 
lacking by several of those interviewed. The Canadian TRC was mandated to hold seven 
national events meant to engage the population and to facilitate statement gathering. Yet, 
even around these national events, Morley was dissatisfied with the level of coverage by 
the media. Morley stated, “I watched around the national events that happened and I saw 
that the CBC really didn’t have very much about it.”80 If Morley’s impressions are 
correct, this could go some way to explaining the low level of awareness among 
Canadians at the time of the interview.81 Without national but, more importantly, 
sustained media coverage the TRC would have great difficulty reaching those in the 
dominant society and raising awareness of the IRS system and its lasting effects. 
 Even within groups that were party to the agreement it may be difficult to foster 
engagement. Watts expressed frustration at the level of participation by the churches that 
were party to the agreement that led to the TRC. Speaking specifically about the Atlantic 
National Event in Halifax, Watts stated that he had “talked to some of church leaders 
there and said, ‘Where are your people?’”82 While church leaders were engaged and 
attending these events, “you see a lot of the same, really wonderful, church 
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representatives.” But, Watts wondered, “Where [were] the everyday, ordinary Anglicans 
[and Catholics, and United Church congregants]?”83 Overall, for Watts, “those partners in 
reconciliation that are out there need to be better partners. They are not doing their job.”84 
This sentiment is highlighted in a 2015 Angus Reid survey that found only 20% of 
respondents thought the TRC was worthwhile for their community, indicating a feeling of 
divorce from it and its work.85 For Watts it is the federal government that needed to be a 
better partner. He felt it did not even adequately engaging its own staff. It is important to 
inform churchgoers or federal employees. Watts saw this as crucial to aiding in the 
dissemination of information about the TRC and the experience of the IRS system as well 
as forming an indispensable part of the reconciliation process.  Watts put it this way: 
 There are 300,000 people working for the federal government. How many of them 
 know that their government is in a reconciliation process? And how easy would 
 it be for the government to do a half day training session with every government 
 employee. That’s not asking a whole lot. And imagine those 300,000 people, each 
 of them, talking to their spouse that night or to their cousins, or to whomever, I 
 mean, that could be tremendous.86 
 
Here, then, in the lack of media coverage, and lack of followers of this coverage, 
there was a significant impediment to the reconciliation process and to changing the 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. The lack of engagement on the 
part of non-Aboriginal Canadians poses a challenge to the reception of the TRC report.  
While it is still possible that the final report of the TRC could widely disseminate the 
commission’s findings, and thereby create the type of engagement that currently seems to 
be minimal, it may be unreasonable to expect a public largely unaware of and 
disconnected from the events and findings of the TRC to react much, if at all, to the final 
report. The sheer size of the final report itself, too, may mediate against engaging the 
general public, the executive summary alone constitutes 337 pages not including 
appendices and notes, and contains 94 Calls to Action.87 Having an engaged and 
                                                          
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Angus Reid Institute, “Truth and Reconciliation: Canadians see value in process, skeptical about 
government action,” (9 July 2015), 7. 
86 Bob Watts, Interim Director of the TRC (2007-2008), telephone interview with author, 19 Jan. 2012 
87 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling the Future: 
Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015). 
194 
 
informed public on this issue will be important in pushing the government to action and 
in holding that government accountable for its past and future actions and inactions.  
 Many Canadians may find it difficult to engage with the TRC as they are simply 
unaware of the facts of Indian Residential Schools. This facet of Canadian history is little 
taught and many Canadians have no knowledge of what the IRS system was or what 
happened to Aboriginal youth within it. This reality is borne out by the survey research 
cited above. The sad reality against which the TRC must struggle is that too few 
Canadians have a working knowledge of the IRS system. 
 Another reason it was so difficult to engage the broader Canadian society may be 
that the dynamic of the TRC simply did not connect with them. Kelly referred to the 
TRC’s media coverage as “reinforcing the idea that residential schools legacy is one that 
comes with victims and perpetrators, and that puts everyone else who is not a perpetrator 
or a victim on the side lines.”88 If this is the case, a reductive binary of victim and 
perpetrator leaves little room for other Canadians, especially recent immigrants, who 
view themselves as neither victim nor perpetrator. Laurel Fletcher argues that this is 
exactly the weakness of transformative justice mechanisms such as truth commissions 
because they do not “engage bystanders directly—they are the audience for, but not the 
subject of” these mechanisms.89 However, as many of my interviewees argued, in the 
case of the Canadian TRC, we lacked even this removed spectator audience. Arne Johan 
Vetlesen notes that those not involved directly have “a passive role, that of onlookers, 
although what starts out as a passive stance may, upon decision, convert into active 
engagement in the events at hand.”90 Vetlesen, draws lessons from the experiences of the 
Bosnian International Tribunal, and while he specifically discusses the Bosnian genocide, 
one lesson from his analysis is applicable in the case of the TRC in Canada: that “the 
bystander is the one who decides whether the harm wrought by the aggressor is permitted 
to stand uncertified or not.”91  
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 In Canada, the inability of the TRC to engage the Canadian public could seriously 
impact the prospects for a changed Crown-Aboriginal relationship, based on Vetlesen’s 
analysis. While I do not propose an alternative framework, Kelly highlighted  something 
very important when he assesses the victim-perpetrator binary as excluding a large and 
important population from the process of reconciliation: the bystanders. This matches my 
own experience of discussing the TRC with students, friends, family, and even strangers. 
The general public might be sympathetic to the issue of Indian Residential Schools, but 
they fail to see how it is connected with their own lives in any way. As Kelly pointed out, 
there is often some sort of vicarious-perpetrator argument, from which it follows that 
everyday Canadians are not party to the policies of the Canadian government. The effect 
of this argument is that the injustice of the IRS system “just isn't real” for people.92 This, 
again, further diminishes the dominant society's awareness of the IRS system and its 
lasting effects, as they can find no credible place in the binary of victims and perpetrators 
for themselves. 
 
Sincerity of the Partners 
What will be key to the transformation in the relationship between Crown and Aboriginal 
peoples is the willingness of each of the partners in reconciliation to transform their own 
position in relation to Aboriginal peoples. That is to say, in the choice to change the 
relationship, quite aside from the potential to change, there have to be a will to change. A 
lack of a sincere commitment towards reconciliation, which can be read as a lack of will 
to change, would be an impediment to any kind of meaningful transformation, especially 
if this willingness is lacking on the part of government. Each interviewee was asked 
specifically about his or her opinion of the sincerity about the federal government’s 
commitment to reconciliation. Those who were in the government bureaucracy, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, answered most positively to this question. For those who were affiliated 
with the political parties, the views on the government’s sincerity was mixed. Again, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, the lone Conservative party member who consented to an 
interview with me believed that the Harper government was sincere, while the former 
Liberal cabinet ministers interviewed were less convinced. Those from the Aboriginal 
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community answered with the most suspicion regarding the government’s commitment, 
citing many cancelled programs and unilateral moves by the then-Conservative 
government. Survey research bears out this feeling; in 2013 Angus Reid found that 43% 
of respondents said that since the Conservatives came to power in 2006 relations between 
the federal government and Aboriginal peoples had worsened.93 In the same survey 55% 
of respondents thought that the meeting to be held in January 2013 between Stephen 
Harper and Aboriginal leaders would be moderately or very unsuccessful in improving 
relations between the federal government and Aboriginal peoples.94  
 When asked about the sincerity of the Government of Canada’s commitment to 
reconciliation, Dion responded: “Yes they do [have a sincere commitment] and I’m 
convinced of that.”95 Although Dion made it clear that his opinion was “as a citizen,”96 
his former position as Executive Director of IRS Resolution of Canada, as well as his 
general interest in the area, makes his analysis significant. Further, Dion cited the 
apology offered by Prime Minister Harper on the floor of the House of Commons in 2008 
as evidence of the sincerity of the government. For Dion, the apology was “indicative of 
the state of mind that [Harper] had reached” and that while Harper “didn’t do this in 
2006, it took two years to come to this conclusion that it was the right thing to do... [It] is 
very significant, it is not a knee-jerk reaction.... It was deeply felt.”97 It is important to 
point out, again, that Dion as a citizen observer offered these comments, and Dion had no 
inside access to how Stephen Harper felt about all this. Speaking as both a citizen and a 
deputy minister, Wernick was resolute in his answer about the Canadian Government’s 
commitment to reconciliation, stating “I don't doubt that [commitment] for a second.”98 
The reason for this optimism was first-hand experience: Wernick had been involved in 
drafting Harper’s apology, and the movement on “expensive land claim settlements that 
have been navigated, notwithstanding all the fiscal restraint, and the clincher argument 
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has always been that it's the right thing to do.”99  Iacobucci, too, felt encouraged that the 
government was committed to reconciliation. He indicated the continuity of process 
despite a change in power, from Martin to Harper, as evidence, further arguing “it's in 
everybody's interest to make great strides in our relationship [with Aboriginal 
peoples].”100 
 Ian Brodie, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Harper, was similarly 
confident in the sincere commitment of the Government of Canada to reconciliation. In 
addition to the Prime Minister’s commitment, Brodie noted “Prime Minister Harper has 
got some not inconsiderable people in his cabinet to help [the government] through some 
of the issues.”101 For these members of the government, Brodie contended, “there’s 
always an opportunity to press forward with a plan that deals with poverty, housing, 
various forms of inequality, substance abuse, economic opportunity, and on all these sorts 
of concerns I think there’s quite a bit of room.”102 As evidence of this commitment, 
Brodie cited the Crown-First Nations gathering in Ottawa in January of 2012, and he 
noted that it was a “high profile summit” some time in the making.103  
  The Liberals I interviewed held different opinions on the issue of government 
commitment to reconciliation. It is impossible to identify how much of this might be due 
to partisan division. The Liberals, having lost power to the Conservative Party of Canada 
in the 2006 general election at the time of interview, were sitting on the opposition 
benches. The Liberals I interviewed, however, did offer reasons for doubting the resolve 
of the government. Interestingly, members of the Aboriginal community whom I 
interviewed also mentioned some of the reasons offered by Liberals. For Scott, criticism 
of the lack of government resolve on reconciliation is not limited to the Conservatives. As 
he stated, “generally speaking the Government of Canada, regardless of political 
affiliation, is inadequately engaged in this issue.”104 It is improbable that this comment 
was meant to criticize the government in which Scott served as Minister of Indian 
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Affairs, as later in the answer to the same question about sincerity Scott praised former 
Prime Minister Martin’s approach to Aboriginal issues. Scott discussed how he was 
committed, himself, but “didn’t bring to the job near the passion that Mr. Martin 
brought.”105 While at first Martin was motivated by concern for current “First Nations, 
Métis, and Inuit conditions,” Scott noted that when sincerely addressing these conditions, 
“you run up against Indian Residential Schools, immediately.”106 
 Martin certainly agreed with the assessment of his former minister. When asked if 
he thought the Government of Canada under Stephen Harper had a sincere commitment 
to reconciliation Martin was unequivocal: “No, I do not.”107  The reasons for this 
scepticism on the government’s willingness to change the relationship between Crown 
and Aboriginal peoples were several and related to (in)action on the part of the Harper 
government since 2006. The delay in offering an apology was one factor Martin 
identified. Before the general election, a deal had been reached between the parties, at 
least in principle, and not wanting to campaign on the apology, Martin did not raise it. 
But “once the election was over it would have been done.”108 The delay in the apology 
was only one issue that caused Martin to doubt the sincerity of the commitment of the 
Government of Canada.  
 Martin also cited “the UN Resolution [61/295], the negotiation of which was led 
by the Government of Canada for many, many years. And then when it finally passed, the 
Canadian government [under Harper’s Conservatives] refused to ratify it.”109 Martin 
referred here to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
which was passed in September of 2007 in the UN General Assembly, and against which 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States voted.110 While the Canadian 
government, under Harper, initially rejected this declaration, by 2010 Canada had signed 
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on.111 With the Trudeau government that came to power in 2015, instructions were given 
to the Minister of Indigenous Affairs to implement the Declaration, and by May 2016 the 
Minister announced that “Canada is now a full supporter, without qualification, of the 
declaration.”112 What concerned Martin here was the delay in the Declaration’s adoption, 
which mirrors the delay in the apology, and so he suggested this indicated “that this was 
not an important issue” for the government.113  
 Perhaps most problematic from Martin’s point of view was the Conservative 
government’s decision not to honour the Kelowna Accord. While for Martin this refusal 
to follow through on an agreement reached by his government “made me [Martin] mad,” 
it indicated the Conservative government’s decision to significantly break with the 
Liberal approach on Aboriginal issues.114 This approach was characterized by 
collaboration with Aboriginal peoples rather than an imperious attitude towards 
Aboriginal peoples. It is the difference between treating Aboriginal peoples as wards and 
treating Aboriginal peoples as partners. 
 It is important to note that there was no doubt expressed by those whom I 
interviewed over Harper’s perceived sincerity when he proffered the historic apology, on 
behalf of all Canadians, in the House of Commons in 2008. McLellan was clear in 
addressing this issue: “I will give Prime Minister Harper credit. He stood in the House, 
and invited the right people to the floor of the House of Commons. And I think the 
apology, the words of the apology were the right words. I have no reason to doubt the 
Prime Minister’s sincerity in that.”115 McLellan, like both Scott and Martin, still, 
however, had doubts about “this government and its sincerity in relation to certain things 
on this file,”116 but no one from the Liberal Party I interviewed doubted Harper’s 
sincerity in his apology. 
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 Those Aboriginal people whom I interviewed similarly had no reason to doubt the 
sincerity of the apology, but they were less sure about the government’s sincerity in the 
process of reconciliation. Phil Fontaine clearly stated that he felt that Harper’s apology, 
while overdue, was, in the end, sincere.117 On the issue of a sincere commitment to 
reconciliation, however Fontaine was less positive. He noted that “the government has 
had difficulty in giving action to the words of the apology.”118 Fontaine outlined a real 
difference in approach between many Aboriginal peoples and the government, especially 
Harper’s government, suggesting that it comes down to collective versus individual rights 
and values.119 Negotiating this difference is intimately linked to reconciliation and the 
creation of a new Crown-Aboriginal relationship. Fontaine further stated that he “still 
needs to be convinced” that the actions, policies, and words of the Government of Canada 
will reflect an understanding of Aboriginal difference in Canada.120 Far from affirming 
and understanding this difference, Fontaine contended that the government has been 
largely suspicious of Aboriginal peoples, with the exception of Martin, whom Fontaine 
described as “a breath of fresh air.”121 This praise for Martin was largely due to the 
Kelowna Accord, which the Conservatives subsequently did not honour.  During the 
Kelowna negotiations, Fontaine felt as though the government, under Paul Martin, was 
treating Aboriginal government as a legitimate order of government in Canada.122 For 
Fontaine, this view was further strengthened by the close contact fostered between 
himself as National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations and the office of Prime 
Minister while Martin held that post.123  
 Ghislain Picard also had reservations regarding the sincerity of the government’s 
commitment to reconciliation. Picard pointed out that there would be a possible conflict 
between the government’s view of reconciliation with that of Aboriginal peoples; on the 
question of the government’s sincerity, he stated: “I think if the question was asked to 
them [the Government of Canada under Stephen Harper] they would say ‘of course we 
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are.’ But if it’s according to their own definition and what it implies than I have to say it 
doesn’t work that way.”124 It was evident in Picard’s response that he had reason to 
suspect that this was, in fact, occurring, as he indicated that he had to “base [his] opinion 
on the current situation.”125  He further stated that if “the attitude [of the government] is 
going to be tinted with the same colonial attitude and approaches, going back 60 or 70 
years, then I would have to say we are in for a long haul.”126 Judging the Harper 
government on the actions it took once it came to power, Picard argues, gives reason to 
be suspicious of its commitment and cause to worry about old colonial attitudes making 
their way into the government’s approach. According to Picard, the Conservative victory 
in the general election in 2006 “slowed down the process” of the TRC Agreement and 
signalled a negative change in tone by cutting back “on Aboriginal languages which was 
tens of millions [of dollars].”127 In fact, in 2007 the Harper government cut some $172 
million in funding for Aboriginal language preservation, which the previous Liberal 
government had promised.128 Like Fontaine, Picard also identified the delay in endorsing 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as cause for doubting the resolve 
of the government to move forward on reconciliation in a meaningful way. 
 Perhaps the clearest sign that the Harper government did not fully understand the 
governments required scope of work towards reconciliation was the comment made by 
Harper at the G20 meeting in September of 2009 that Canada has “no history of 
colonialism.”129 In answering a routine question regarding the financial crisis, Harper 
extolled the virtues of Canada’s relatively strong financial position, stating “we are one of 
the most stable regimes in history… We also have no history of colonialism. So we have 
all of the things that many people admire about the great powers but none of the things 
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that threaten or bother them.”130 This statement shows a significant misunderstanding of 
facts of Canadian history, while at the same time it insults those Aboriginal peoples who 
have felt the effects of Canada’s colonial history, perhaps most tangibly in Indian 
Residential Schools. 
 Kathleen Mahoney, Legal Counsel to the Assembly of First Nations and a 
University of Calgary Law professor, mentioned similar concerns over actions taken by 
the Harper government. These concerns had caused her to “start doubting” the sincerity 
of any commitment of the government to reconciliation.131 While mentioning water, 
housing, and the situation in Attawapiskat, Mahoney discussed, with much concern, 
issues related to justice and the administration of justice. On this front, she had not “seen 
any clear indication that there is this desire to reconcile. I mean look at the Justice 
Department policy on mandatory minimum sentences. Who is that going to affect the 
most? Obviously it’s going to affect Aboriginal peoples because they’re so grossly over-
represented in prison already, and they are routinely going to jail for things that will be 
affected by mandatory minimums.”132 More than mandatory minimum sentencing, 
Mahoney was troubled by suggestions from the government that special sentencing 
considerations which take into account Aboriginal ancestry and residential school legacy 
were “racist and unfair” 133 even though they had been mandated in the Supreme Court 
decision Gladue. Mahoney’s disappointment is founded in the government’s drive for 
mandatory minimums and the desire to do away with the provisions of Gladue on the 
premise that special sentencing conditions treat Aboriginal peoples differently.  While the 
Gladue decision may not have achieved reductions in Aboriginal incarceration yet,134 the 
concern here was that the basis of advocacy for its inapplicability demonstrates a 
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misunderstanding of the impact of Indian Residential Schools and the immensity of the 
problem of Aboriginal over-representation in prison.135 
 Watts argued that the sincerity of the government can be seen by simply looking 
for evidence that the current government’s actions matched its words, which is “just 
fair.”136 Setting aside cancelled deals, cancelled programs, and a fundamental difference 
in understanding Canadian history, Watts expressed concern that “people shouldn’t be 
able to say a whole bunch of really wonderful, flowery things and not be expected to 
follow through on them.”137 On this limited criteria, Watts had seen little cause for 
optimism, stating bluntly that “even from this mild sort of test, I’m disappointed and I 
think that there has been a real failure in terms of attempting to reconcile.”138 Where 
Picard mentions the possibility of bringing the past colonial governmental approach into 
the issue of reconciliation, Watts gave startling voice to this possibility when he said 
“What we are going to see, more and more, is the federal government taking up a view, 
just like they did with the Residential Schools, which is ‘We know what’s best for you. 
You may not like the bitter medicine but you’re going to take it.’”139 In the same answer, 
Watts goes on to say, without identifying them by name, “some of the church leaders I 
have heard from say ‘We can’t just stand idly by and watch what’s going on, because 
that’s what got us here in the first instance.’”140 Here, Watts referred to the Harper 
government’s status quo colonial approach, which is incompatible with a new 
relationship based on an ethic of political reconciliation.  
 David MacDonald of the United Church of Canada seemed to raise similar 
concerns about the sincerity of the government. When asked about the government, 
MacDonald started by saying “It’s hard to know” whether the government is sincere.141 
Later in the answer MacDonald listed some of the outstanding issues on which the 
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government has failed to act, such as reservation housing and the issue of Aboriginal 
children in state care. He expressed serious concern about reconciliation, stating “If the 
government is sincere about reconciliation, it can’t leave those things standing out there. 
And you can’t use Mickey Mouse arguments like ‘Well we gave them so much money 
and what happened to it?’ or get into a fight with the local band council over who’s going 
to administer the funds.”142 Moreover, MacDonald expressed concern over Harper’s 
subscription to the “Tom Flanagan School of what should be done about First Nations, 
which is really a more sophisticated view of assimilation.”143 Of the two people 
interviewed from the church community, MacDonald certainly articulated the more 
stinging assessment of government sincerity. But Gerry Kelly from the Canadian 
Conference of Catholic Bishops also had cause for concern. Initially Kelly answered 
quite positively regarding government sincerity, stating, “I’m going to give a positive 
answer to that [question].”144 Not wanting to disrespect those “on the ground working so 
hard on this,” Kelly opted for an affirmative answer on sincerity. However, he did 
express concern that “the Government of Canada would like to contain this to a 
conversation that is fairly narrow at this point.”145 Kelly held out hope that this might 
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sovereignty, and rights. Premised on the superiority of Europeans, whose “civilization was several thousand 
years more advanced than the aboriginal cultures” (6) they found in North America, Flanagan proceeds to 
make an argument that Aboriginal peoples receive no special treatment, rights, or consideration. Aboriginal 
peoples are citizens like any other.   




change, but was not naive: “I don’t think [the Government of Canada] is going to, in one 
great moment, embrace the whole ball of wax”—meaning an expanded conversation on 
reconciliation.146 
 It is not, perhaps, surprising that those closest to government at the time of 
interview—current civil servants, a former federal negotiator, and a former Chief of Staff 
to Prime Minister Harper—most favourably assess the commitment of the Government of 
Canada to reconciliation. The difference between their assessments and those of people 
from the other groups interviewed, however, is important.  
The Liberals started the process that led to the TRC, but were not influential in 
crafting government policy, having lost power in the 2006 general election. The Liberals 
pointed to a sentiment that there was not enough being done. More significant, however, 
is the sentiment expressed by a few Aboriginal leaders interviewed, as well as Mahoney, 
who were more circumspect about the sincerity of the government. This perception by 
some within one of the parties to the agreement impacts on what is referred to in the 
literature as acknowledgement and responsibility. It points to possible problems with the 
Government of Canada acknowledging their own complicity in the Indian Residential 
Schools System and taking responsibility for it, in more than a minimal way. While the 
assessment is complicated by the 2015 change in government back to the Liberals, what 
remains clear is the suspicion at the time of the interviews of the Conservative 
government. 
 In discussing the cases of Uganda and Haiti while building a theory of 
acknowledgement, Quinn argues that acknowledgment itself is a way to determine the 
relative success or failure of a truth commission.147 Acknowledgement is located in a 
flow of processes “which can lead to forgiveness, and to strengthened networks of civic 
engagement, all of which may lead, ultimately, to increased levels of social trust and 
reconciliation.”148 The use of the word “may” here is deliberate, as Quinn contends that 
acknowledgement “forms a necessary but not sufficient condition for rebuilding.”149 
Moreover, Quinn describes acknowledgement as a process which has at least three 
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elements: “coming to terms with the past, emotional response, and memory and 
remembering.”150 
 The constituent components that Quinn describes match well with the mechanism 
of a truth and reconciliation commission.  Hayner notes “official acknowledgement can 
be powerful precisely because official denial can be so pervasive.”151 The way to provide 
this “official acknowledgement,” for Hayner, is through a truth commission, whereas for 
Minow truth commissions are only one among a number of other mechanisms, such as 
reparations, and trials.152 Rajeev Bhargava draws a closer link, arguing that 
acknowledgment is bound up in remembering, both general and specific memory of 
wrongdoing, and it is both the general and specific memory that a truth commission can 
facilitate, “but they must be concerned primarily with public recall of specific 
wrongdoing.”153  
 Of course, acknowledgement on its own is insufficient to address wrongdoing; it 
must imply corrective action, too. Acknowledgment is linked to action through the taking 
of responsibility, the double utterance of “this happened” and “it will not happen again.” 
As Bhargava notes “the acknowledgement that an act was immoral is a moral judgement 
and, like all moral judgements, has implications for action. Therefore, to acknowledge 
past injustice is to commit ourselves to avoiding it in the future.”154 In Quinn’s model, the 
important component of “coming to terms with the past” contains a taking responsibility 
for past actions, exactly because of the action implied by the recognition of something as 
wrong. That is to say, “coming to terms with the past... is affected not only by 
confronting its past but also by beginning to do something to overcome that past.”155 This 
understanding of acknowledgement links back to the concept of reconciliation as an on-
going process as discussed above, which would see the occasion of the TRC as the 
transformative opportunity where the Crown-Aboriginal relationship can begin to change 
                                                          
150 Ibid., 16. 
151 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions 
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and that in order for decolonisation to occur this changed/changing relationship must 
continually be acknowledged and re-enacted to fulfill its potential.  
 In this context, then, the doubts of the Aboriginal leaders I interviewed about the 
sincerity of the government’s commitment to reconciliation really are a doubting of the 
degree to which the Government of Canada is acknowledging the Indian Residential 
Schools system and its legacy. The apology offered in 2008 by Conservative Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper; the billions in compensation for school attendance and specific 
abuse; and the TRC itself; are all components of certain aspects of acknowledgement. Yet 
acknowledgment, importantly, implies and requires an action substantially different than 
that which led to the wrongdoing. The evidence offered by those interviewed points to a 
continued colonial attitude on the part of the Government of Canada and its political 
leaders, that is, the Conservatives. Former Assembly of First Nations Chief Shawn Atleo 
has described “the rate and pace of change” as “too slow.”156 In fact, to listen to the way 
in which those whom I interviewed tell it, changes may have been happening in the 
wrong direction. The most visible sign of this was Harper’s failure to honour the 
Kelowna Accord negotiated by the preceding Liberal government under Paul Martin. As 
will be discussed in Chapter Eight this multi-billion dollar multi-year deal had a novel 
and reconciliatory approach to Crown-Aboriginal relations. Not only did the 
Conservative government walk away from the Kelowna Accord after its negotiation, then 
Conservative finance critic Monte Solberg criticized the agreement as “something the 
Liberals crafted at the last moment on the back of a napkin.”157 Of those Aboriginal 
leaders interviewed, the perception that the government of Stephen Harper did not take 
adequate responsibility and adequately acknowledging Indian Residential Schools could 
have a devastating impact on the success of the TRC to produce a new and respectful 
relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Villa-Vicencio and Verwoerd 
highlight the importance of acknowledgment that “reconciliation requires a profound 
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change in people,” one that cannot be brought about by a TRC alone.158 All of this makes 
the actions and willingness of those in government to sincerely commit themselves to 
reconciliation all the more important.  
 It is important to reiterate that there was change in government in 2015 that 
returned the Liberals to power. It was not possible to re-interview the interviewees from 
2011-12 to get their assessment of the new government and its sincerity to reconciliation. 
I will say that there have been signs of a new approach to dealing with Aboriginal issues, 
not least the change of the name of the federal department responsible to Indigenous 
Affairs. The new government announced the striking of a commission on murdered and 
missing Aboriginal women, the chair of which was recently appointed.159 Also, in 
receiving the final report of the TRC, Trudeau himself announced that “we will, in 
partnership with Indigenous communities, the provinces, territories, and other vital 
partners, fully implement the Calls to Action of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, starting with the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.”160 These are just signs of a new sincere approach. While 
there has been much talk and some symbolism on the part of the Liberal government, in 
key areas identified by the TRC and the government to improve relations and foster 
reconciliation, such as child welfare, some are disappointed in the inaction taken.161  
Given the timing of the election, October 2015, the parliamentary calendar, and the 
inertia of nearly a decade of Conservative government to overcome, it may be too soon to 
adequately judge the Trudeau Liberals’ approach.  If it is not too soon, it seems they are 
open to Watts’ criticism of the previous Conservative government, long on words short 
on action.  
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Conclusion: Better than What Came Before 
While there are attitudes discussed above that are critical of the government and identify 
important obstacles to the TRC’s success, no one identified the negotiation process that 
led to the TRC as any worse than previous approaches to dealing with the Indian 
Residential School system legacy. As discussed in Chapter One and Chapter Six, the 
genesis of the TRC lies in lawsuits and the inadequacy of the courts to deal with the 
volume of claims emerging from within the Aboriginal community. Iacobucci described 
how overwhelming the challenge was, with some 15,000 individual claims and 23 class 
action suits, all of which would have taken years to work their way through the courts.162 
In 2003, when Dion was brought in on the file, only 200 of the 15,000 claims had been 
settled and it looked as though it would take an additional 53 years to resolve the 
outstanding actions. At that time, the average age of IRS survivors was 68, meaning that 
many of the survivors would not have lived to see justice done.163 Thus, the importance 
of finding a faster way to deal with these claims was manifest. An alternative dispute 
resolution process was then employed as a way of taking these suits out of the courts and 
dealing with them in a faster and less adversarial way. As discussed in Chapter One and 
Chapter Six the alternative dispute resolution process was a flawed and unfair system that 
was a better alternative to protracted court proceedings, but still failed to adequately and 
fairly deal with the claims made by survivors. 
 Out of this emerged the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement process 
that led to the TRC. Those involved in the negotiation found it to be a fine process, 
thanks in great part to the work of the federal representative Frank Iacobucci. Fontaine 
described Iacobucci as “a wonderful man” who “believes in human dignity and 
demonstrated that in managing the negotiations.”164 Watts, too, felt Iacobucci was exactly 
the person needed to move the negotiations along. “He was wonderful, I think, in terms 
of the whole process, in terms of trying to keep people honest with each other.”165 Those 
on the government side, too, had great respect for the former Supreme Court justice. 
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McLellan, who, as Deputy Prime Minister, had primary cabinet responsibility for the 
negotiations, praised the approach of Iacobucci.166 This process was certainly preferable 
to either lawsuits or the alternative dispute resolution process, but it is important to note 
that it was a negotiation process and that the TRC emerged from negotiations with 
massive lawsuits, and unknown government liability, as a backdrop.  
 It may, then, be less surprising that the TRC was imperfect, that it failed to engage 
the dominant society, those outside the binary of victim and perpetrator, having been the 
product of elite negotiation and legal settlement. Moreover, it cannot be surprising that 
what reconciliation the TRC could foster would possibly be limited by this failure as well 
as the seeming lack of sincerity on the part of the Conservative government.  
 Was the TRC a transformative opportunity in Crown Aboriginal relations? Yes, in 
that it had the potential to transform, as many leaders from the various communities were 
concerned with relationships and changing them for the better and there is in this process 
the presence of an urgent moment of possibility. What tempers enthusiasm here is the 
likelihood of transformation, but this likelihood is a separate question from 
transformative opportunity. While there was troubling doubt of Aboriginal elites, and 
formerly influential Liberal privy councillors, about how far the Conservative 
government was willing to go to change the Crown-Aboriginal relationship, with a new 
Liberal government there is more reason for optimism. While there is cause for more 
optimism under this government lead by Justin Trudeau, it remains to be seen whether 
this approach is different in practice from the previous Conservative government. What is 
clear, however, is that a sincere change in approach is needed to undertake a thorough 
going political reconciliation in Canada, the potential for which was given by the TRC. It 
is in this existing potential, as detailed above, that I can answer affirmatively to the 
research question.
                                                          





What Comes Next: Towards What is This a Transformation? 
 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I discussed my interview findings and how they informed my primary 
research question regarding whether the TRC represents a transformative opportunity in 
Crown-Aboriginal relations in Canada.  Building upon this primary objective, this chapter 
discusses my findings as they relate to my secondary question: toward what is this a 
transformation? That is to say, what future relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada could result from the processes and outcomes of the TRC? 
Part of understanding whether the TRC is likely to impact Crown-Aboriginal relations is 
to assess how this relationship could change as a direct result of the proceedings of the 
TRC. Seeking insight into the outcome of this transformative opportunity is a valuable 
undertaking as a preparatory measure, since a change in the Crown-Aboriginal 
relationship may not necessarily prove to be a positive one, indeed may not occur at all. 
As we saw with the RCAP in the mid-1990s, attention paid to Aboriginal issues, even 
some popular and political support for change in Crown-Aboriginal relations, do not 
guarantee change. The relationship could, in fact, worsen, leaving Aboriginal peoples 
further outside of the Canadian governmental decision-making process. Alternatively, the 
relationship could stay the same, or even improve, with the Government of Canada 
progressing towards a position that acknowledges Aboriginal peoples’ role in 
determining their own futures. The point being that a change in relationship need not 
imply a bettering of a relationship, but simply marks a shift from one mode to another. In 
asking toward what is this transformation, we must acknowledge the range of 
possibilities, especially given the recent history of Crown-Aboriginal relations. 
 While acknowledging this range of possibilities it is not my intention to catalogue 
them. This would be overly speculative and distracting to the main point here, that the 
relationship has the existing potential to change, and that change may lead toward a 
political ethic of reconciliation or away from it. That is to say the potential to change is 
nothing less than the promise of transformation. In addressing this question what I 
present is necessarily speculative. While I am hopeful that the Crown-Aboriginal 
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relationship will eventually become a de-colonialized relationship that strives for an ethic 
of political reconciliation, some policy-based decisions taken by the Conservative 
government point to a relationship that will be characterized by a neo-assimilationism 
that seeks, ultimately, to remove the unique place of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.  With 
a Liberal government recently elected and at least rhetorically committed to 
reconciliation, there is greater cause for hope that a change in Crown-Aboriginal relations 
will toward a decolonial political ethic of reconciliation. It was clear from my interviews 
that a positive change in Crown-Aboriginal relations was unlikely under the previous 
government due to the differing understandings of the extent of reconciliation between 
the government and Aboriginal peoples, but that the possibility of such a change was 
present. As seen in the interviews I conducted and considering the actions taken by the 
Government of Canada under the Conservative party, this difference in understanding 
could prefigure what form relations between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples would 
result from the TRC, eschewing a political ethic of reconciliation.  
 As with any relationship, however, the relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples continues to change as it is lived out through interactions. As 
governments change and become a new face of the Crown in its relationship with 
Aboriginal peoples, new possibilities are opened up. Before moving on to discussing the 
interviewees’ respective appraisals of where the Crown-Aboriginal relationship might be 
heading, it is important to point out that there have been some signs of positive, de-
colonising, change from different facets of the Crown or its representatives. These 
incipient signs of reconciliation may help us to visualise reconciliation in Canada, helping 
us to understand what form reconciliation may take.   
 
Toward Reconciliation in Canada 
The generative political aspects of reconciliation are difficult to deal with because of the 
uncertainty they involve. It is not possible or desirable to lay out exactly what 
reconciliation would look like in Canada, as it needs to be the product of an agonist 
politics of generation in order to avoid the reconstruction of colonial power dynamics. 
That is to say, reconciliation as I have outlined it above in Chapter Three, requires a 
process that will bring about a realisation through dialogical interaction between the 
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parties, where adversaries interact rather than enemies destroy. Some aspects of the 
changing relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples are discussed below, 
linking them to something like the beginnings of reconciliation that can be seen in 
constitutional law, land claims and governance, criminal law, and the Kelowna Accord. 
My unwillingness to sketch reconciliation is not obfuscation; rather, I want to take 
seriously the contingent, contestable nature of reconciliation and instead highlight the 
ethic with which to engage in the process of relational change. Outside of its connection 
to decolonisation, I hesitate to make reconciliation too present a thing. Thus, what 
follows here are just gestures at what might be reconciliation. These gestures will give 
further context to the interviews and help us to glimpse reconciliation. 
 It may be the case that reconciliation is already underway in Canada and has been 
for some time, namely in the area of jurisprudence. McHugh argues that many former 
British colonies have undertaken policies of reconciliation in order to address the 
grievances of indigenous peoples, but only in Canada has this policy been one of a 
“constitutional and court-driven jurisprudence of reconciliation.”1 As Walters argues, this 
process began in 1973 with the Supreme Court of Canada ruling on Calder, in which 
“Canadian judges rediscovered the common law doctrine of Aboriginal title.”2 Successive 
rulings by courts in Canada, aided in 1982 with the insertion of Section 35 into the 
Constitution Act, have led to the Supreme Court putting reconciliation front and centre in 
adjudicating cases involving first peoples in Canada. In 1996, the Supreme Court held in 
its ruling on Van der Peet that “reconciliation provides the cornerstone of Canadian 
Aboriginal rights law.”3 Again in 2005, the Court stated the importance of reconciliation 
in the Mikisew decision that “the fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal 
and treaty rights is the reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples 
and their respective claims, interests and ambitions.”4 While the law through the courts 
can only have a limited ability to create reconciliation, the courts, as a powerful 
institution of the Crown are an important ally in reconciliation. This reconciliation may 
                                                          
1 Paul McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-
Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 579.   
2 Mark D. Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation,” in The Politics of Reconciliation in 
Multicultural Societies, eds. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
176. 
3 Van der Peet 1996: para. 31 in Walters “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation,” 176. 
4 Mikisew 2005: para.1 in Walters “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation,” 176. 
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be quite limited, directed toward bringing competing, and sometimes-incompatible, 
claims in to some sort of equilibrium, but nonetheless represents a version of 
reconciliation.  
 The Supreme Court of Canada itself has recognized the limited ability of the law 
as a mechanism of reconciliation, and as Walters points out, the Court now views its 
primary role as encouraging reconciliation through dialogue.5 In cases where land is 
disputed and no authoritative determination has been made about ownership of it, 
according to two rulings in 2004, Haida Nation and Taku River, the government is 
obliged to consult First Nations before opening lands to development. This significantly 
changed the role of First Nations in the development of lands in and near their traditional 
territories. In the Haida Nation ruling, Chief Justice McLachlin found the government to 
have a duty to “honourable dealings toward Aboriginal peoples” and to seek 
“compromise in an attempt to harmonize conflicting interests and move further down the 
path of reconciliation.”6 As the Court wrote in a subsequent decision, Tsilhqot’in, citing 
Haida Nation, “the governing ethos is not one of competing interest but of 
reconciliation.”7  
 In 2014 the Court further refined its interpretation of both Section 35 of the 
constitution and its understanding of Aboriginal title in the Tsilhqot’in decision. They 
found that the Tsilhqot’in nation had title to the land in question, due to sufficiency of 
occupation, and found this title to consist of the “right of exclusive use and occupation of 
the land… the title holders have the right to the benefits associated with the land—use it, 
enjoy it and profit from its economic development.”8 It is important to note that the Court 
held that the Crown does not retain a beneficial interest in Aboriginal titled land. As 
Borrows puts it “First Nations who have title can use their lands as they choose subject to 
two limits: 1) Aboriginal title cannot be alienated except to the Crown, and 2) nor can be 
encumbered, developed, or misused in ways that would prevent future generations of the 
group from using and enjoying it.”9 While this is a notable advance in the thinking of the 
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Court, and for Borrows this decision is “unparalleled in Canadian law,” it still gives him 
cause for concern.10  
 The problem here revolves around underlying Crown title and sovereignty that is 
supported in the decision. It is the Crown that enables Aboriginal title, licences it, 
restricts it and determines it within the framework of the Western legal tradition. This 
may be all the Court can do given its limited scope as one aspect of the Crown. This fact, 
however, does not change the radical difference between Crown and Aboriginal title, as 
“unlike Crown title, Aboriginal title must be established by the courts or through 
agreement with the Crown.”11 For Borrows it is exactly this unevenness that is at issue: 
Underlying Crown title and overarching Crown sovereignty do not respect the 
dignity of peoples. They do not facilitate the negotiation of first principles related 
to the Crown’s legitimacy in Canada. They imply that Indigenous peoples are 
politically subordinate because of their Aboriginal status. They make the Crown 
the paramount power, rather than showing how power can be shared in 
reconciling legal interests.12 
 
Even though this decision represents a step towards repairing the relationship between 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples, it is only a step. It is telling that the most receptive aspect 
of the Crown to Aboriginal issues is also the most restrictive, in terms of its scope of 
action. The advancement of Aboriginal acknowledgement and reconciliation within the 
legal processes has as its aim, argues Walters,  the transformation of the legal authority of 
the settler state, which is de facto in view of the ideals of rule of law, into a de jure 
system that “legalizes” the settler state.13 That is it to say, a post facto legitimation. I 
argue, this is also the institution of the exception as rule, as it constructs a system of laws 
and interpretations (court decisions) that except Aboriginal sovereignty and title.  
 This aim to legally legitimize the state is, at least in part, motivated by the 
inclusion of Aboriginal rights in the Constitution Act 1982 under Section 35, where “the 
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby 
recognized and affirmed.”14 While the meaning of this section is not entirely clear, its 
intent, Asch argues, is to “place a constraint on the Parliament of Canada, the provincial 
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legislative assemblies and other members of the body politic to act in accord with the 
acknowledgement of these rights, regardless of their political will to do otherwise.”15 
This view is sustained by the Court’s interpretation of Section 35, stating in Tsilhqot’in 
that “where title is asserted, but has not been established. S.35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 requires the Crown to consult with the group asserting title and, if appropriate, 
accommodate its interest.”16  
The ambiguous content of these “aboriginal and treaty rights” was viewed 
suspiciously even at the time of the patriation discussions, most notably by then-Alberta 
premier Peter Lougheed, who worried that the rights affirmed by the section were not 
defined or fixed in time. That is to say, Lougheed worried that “new rights” could 
“continually be added... some of which, in the premier’s view, might have a negative 
impact on the rights of other citizens.”17 The exact content of such rights remains unclear 
despite political efforts to give more concrete content to them. However, Asch argues that 
both the federal government and Aboriginal groups agreed, at the time of patriation at 
least, that Section 35 should afford self-government and land rights to Aboriginal 
peoples.18 Despite the commitment to further constitutional negotiations to sort out the 
implications of Section 35, no such content has been arrived at outside the court. Indeed, 
the refinement and extension of “Aboriginal rights” has come from the courts, not a 
political process aimed at clarifying this section’s meaning.  
 The failure of “mega-constitutional” politics in Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
has marked an end of political attempts to give this section of the constitution more 
definition, for now. In the absence of political agreement, or even a new Royal 
Proclamation,19 it has been left to one aspect of the Crown—the courts—to resolve the 
outstanding issues. As Walters points out, it has been the courts that have significantly 
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defined the contours of Aboriginal rights in Canada. In the absence of political will, it is 
the courts that can protect and extend rights. With the interpretation of Section 35, it has 
provided the backstop to defend and extend some Aboriginal and treaty rights.  
 The duty to consult that was found by the Court in the 2004 decisions Haida 
Nation and Taku River, along with the extension of this duty in the 2005 Mikisew 
decision, is an important elaboration by the Supreme Court, in the absence of political 
will, to constitutionally define the content of the rights affirmed in Section 35. These 
three cases taken together read-in the duty to consult to Section 35, even in the absence of 
a change in the written constitution.20 According to the author of the majority decision, 
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, the duty to consult is grounded “in the honour of the 
Crown.”21  That “honour” is rooted in an ancient British tradition of separating the Crown 
per se from the government of day, to save the former from the intransigence and 
misconduct of the latter.22 What this concept means in practice is that ministers of the 
Crown, when acting on behalf of the Crown, must be held to a higher standard of fairness 
that “demands forethought as to what conduct lends credibility and honour to the Crown, 
instead of what conduct can be technically justified under the current law.”23 This 
concept is, perhaps, most clearly seen in the context of treaties, but as David Arnot 
argues, it is an essential commitment to “justice” and “fairness” on the part of the 
Crown.24 This is not an inconsiderable constitutional principle to have read-in to Section 
35 in the absence of political will and in the context of a history of dishonourable 
dealings.  
 To the extent that Section 35 provides an avenue for reconciliation this 
“reconciliation” is not unproblematic as it still relies on and fails to scrutinize the basis of 
the Canadian state and Aboriginal rights in this context: Crown sovereignty. As Dale 
Turner argues it is Section 35 that “demands that Aboriginal laws, customs, and practices 
be reconciled with Crown sovereignty. Aboriginal laws, customs, and practices need to 
be articulated in the language of the common law, as opposed to Aboriginal peoples 
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looking to their spiritual practices and philosophical systems of thought as the logical 
sources of their rights.”25 Even the Supreme Courts more robust reading of Section 35 has 
the effect remedying past abuses of Aboriginal right with a promise not to do it again. 
Because this fails to deal directly with the issue of sovereignty, Dale argues that 
Aboriginal leaders and legal scholars “have resisted this characterization of Aboriginal 
rights and continue to press for greater recognition of Indigenous nationhood in how we 
ought to understand the meaning of s. 35(1).”26 Without dealing with Crown sovereignty 
directly, the very basis of the colonial order remains unexamined and, as Coulthard 
argues, “in such conditions, reconciliation takes on a temporal character as the individual 
and collective process of overcoming the subsequent legacy of past abuse, not the abusive 
colonial structure itself.”27 
 The re-emergence of the question of Aboriginal land title in the wake of the 1973 
Calder case focuses on another aspect of reconciliation that may already be underway in 
Canada, that of treaty-making and land claims. While it is the case that Great Britain 
made treaties with many northeastern woodland peoples and plains peoples, a notable 
exception to the practice of treaty making happened in what is now British Columbia and 
some parts of the high Arctic. Resolving the lack of treaties in these areas, as well as 
resolving outstanding land claims in other parts of Canada, shows a significant reversal of 
policy that have left many Aboriginal peoples without a bilateral relationship with the 
Crown and denied their rightful lands. The case of British Columbia is instructive in 
seeing this relatively recent push for treaty making. 
 When the Hudson's Bay Company landed in the Pacific northwest, rather than 
purchase land and conclude treaties with the people they found there, the Company opted 
for the Lockian conception of possession through occupation.28 For Locke, the primary 
ownership any person has is of his own body, and thus when has labour is mixed with an 
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object, he comes properly to own it.29 When it comes to land there is only one 
recognizable use for Locke: agricultural development. Tilling the soil and growing crops, 
or enclosing with a fence for use as pasture, removes the land from the common stock 
given by God to all men, as Locke would have it, and make it properly one’s own: that is 
to say property in our usual understanding of it.30 
 What James Douglas, chief factor of the Hudson’s Bay Company, did, then, when 
dealing with the Aboriginal peoples of present day British Columbia, was to grant “land 
rights” over only such lands as were cultivated or had houses built on them. The rest of 
the land was declared unimproved and could be settled by Europeans with underlying 
Crown sovereignty over the land.31 Out of the grace and beneficence of the Crown, the 
people who had just lost their traditional hunting lands were allowed to use whatever 
Crown land had not yet been settled or developed, but only had proper claim to what had 
been developed or built upon before 1846.32 However, no formal treaties were concluded 
for these lands that the Crown claimed and no terms of relationship were established 
between the natives and newcomers. While, thirty years after the expropriation of lands, 
these Pacific coast peoples would be governed by the Indian Act, unlike the northeastern 
woodlands and plains peoples, no formal or treaty relationship was established. Even the 
lands set aside for Aboriginal peoples Douglas—by 1851, governor of Vancouver Island 
and later British Columbia—considered inalienable only because they belonged to the 
Crown and the creation of these reserves was a humanitarian measure.33 After Douglas 
retired in 1864, the government in British Columbia abandoned even this measure of land 
protection for Aboriginal peoples and systematically sided with settlers in disputes over 
land, further alienating traditional lands.  In 1865, the British Columbia government, then 
still an independent colony, outside of the Canadian federation, adopted a land ordinance 
which provided free land grants for colonists of 160 acres per family, with the option to 
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purchase from the Crown an additional 480 acres, while at the same time using 10 acres 
per family as the standard in the establishment of reserves for Aboriginal peoples.34  
 While a thorough history of the issues in British Columbia is not necessary here, 
this brief context ties in with a broader problem of land expropriation in colonial and 
contemporary period, that only since the Calder case has begun to be addressed by the 
Crown. As Raunet argues, it has been the insistence by the Nisga’a people that the land 
belongs to them that has frustrated attempts to legalize the expropriation of lands with 
guarantees of hunting or trapping access and the like.35 It is the problem of competing 
narratives; as Harris puts it, there is “one that [is] about dispossession, and the other about 
development. The former told, almost entirely by Native people... [t]he development 
story, told by newcomers.”36 Thus, the Nisga’a Treaty can be read as reconciliation of 
these competing stories into something new, in the spirit of the Court’s ruling with the 
desire to set the legal foundation of Canada within the bounds of its own laws. The 
Nisga’a Treaty, the first modern treaty in British Columbia, came into effect on 11 May 
2000.  The Nisga’a Treaty established a 2,019 square kilometer area in which the Nisga’a 
people will govern themselves, be provided funds for operating such a government, and 
allocated fisheries and game.37 The authority afforded the new Nisga’a Lisims 
government is more expansive than other treaties and includes administration of justice 
and dispute resolution. However, as John Burrows points out, this is not an exclusive 
authority. Rather, it is concurrent with provincial and federal jurisdiction.38 What this 
means in practical terms is that Nisga’a law must comply with provincial and/or federal 
law; where provincial or federal standards are exceeded, then Nisga’a law prevails. 
However, in many cases if there is a conflict, it is provincial or federal law that would 
supersede Nisga’a law.39 
 While more expansive than other treaties, the Nisga’a Treaty still limits the 
authority of the government established in the Nass Valley. This has led to criticism by 
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some scholars including Taiake Alfred, who rejects this type of “collaboration with 
colonial power [which] cannot be supported within the framework of a traditional 
culture.”40 For Alfred, this fails to be a truly decolonising approach, as it legitimizes the 
Crown’s claim to sovereignty while failing to recognize the full autonomy of Aboriginal 
peoples. Even this expanded authority is “unable to accept the essential compromise that 
would be key to developing processes that are truly decolonising: Settlers must come to 
accept Onkwehonwe existence as autonomous nations and, with this, recognize the need 
for a fundamental reshaping of their countr[y].”41 Controversy aside, what the Nisag’a 
Treaty may represent is a flawed attempt at reconciliation that is already underway. 
Moving from constitutional and property law to criminal proceedings, here, again, 
there might be an extant drive for reconciliation underway. There have been significant 
changes to the way Aboriginal people are dealt with by the criminal justice system over 
the past three decades. This has, in part, been the result of concern of Aboriginal over-
representation in the justice system and also driven by the decisions of the Court. 
Aboriginal people come into contact with the criminal justice system more often and are 
incarcerated in disproportionately high numbers when compared to the general Canadian 
population. According to Proulx, between 1989 and 1994 on average, while Aboriginal 
people represented only 3% of the Canadian population, they accounted for 12% of 
federal and 20% of provincial prisoners.42 In 1997-1998, the Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics reported that Aboriginal people made up a total of 32% of all incarcerated 
persons in Canada, from a low of 1% of the incarcerated population in Quebec to a high 
of 72% in Saskatchewan.43 These numbers have come down slightly since the late 1990s, 
but are still persistently high. In 2010/2011 Aboriginal people represented 27% of adults 
in provincial custody and 20% of adults in federal custody, or roughly 7 times greater 
than their proportion of the general population.44 Aboriginal people are 29 times more 
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likely to be arrested, even if that arrest does not lead to conviction, than non-Aboriginal 
peoples.45   
 In recognition of these stubbornly high rates of contact with the justice system and 
the discriminatory nature of some justice practices toward Aboriginal peoples, programs 
have been undertaken to address this issue and offer culturally appropriate ways of 
dealing with Aboriginal offenders.46 One such program is the diversion program of the 
Community Council Project in Toronto. Begun in 1991, this program gives the Toronto 
Aboriginal community a measure of control over how Aboriginal offenders are dealt with 
by the legal system.47 For a certain set of offences this diversion program allows justice 
to be unfettered from the usual “precedent-bound sentencing, that until recently did not 
take in to account the effects on Aboriginal peoples of colonialism, cultural difference, 
and economic and social structural discrimination.”48 This means that less retributive 
action can be taken against Aboriginal offenders, recognizing the unique circumstances 
of Aboriginal people in Canada.  
 More broadly, in 1996 a bill to amend the provisions of the Criminal Code of 
Canada came into effect, which inserted consideration of Aboriginal affiliation as a 
consideration for sentencing.49 Subsequent cases before the Supreme Court of Canada 
refined the interpretation of Section 718.2(e) and clarified its purpose in addressing 
Aboriginal overrepresentation in prison.50 The Gladue case revolved around the 
interpretation of Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which was added by Bill C-41 in 
1996.51 A lower court had neglected to take Aboiriginality into account in sentencing a 
woman found guilty of killing her common law husband, and this lower court did not 
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apply Section 718.2(e) because the women in question, Jamie Gladue, lived off reserve.52 
The Supreme Court found this to be inconsistent with Section 718.2(e), stating that 
“Section 718.2(e) applies to all aboriginal offenders wherever they reside, whether on- or 
off-reserve, in a large city or a rural area.”53 The Court clearly understood the issue of 
Aboriginal overrepresentation in prisons and that “the issue was not that Aboriginal 
people were necessarily committing more crime than non-Aboriginal people, but rather 
that Aboriginal people went to jail for their actions much more frequently than non-
Aboriginal people.”54 However well the Court understood and set out the problem in their 
decision, it is the guidelines for everyday use of the section that have “proven not to be as 
clear as the Court’s statement of the problem.”55 This means Aboriginal peoples continue 
to be overrepresented in prison, as indicated by the above statistics, pointing to systemic 
bias in the administration of justice.  
While this approach is not uncontroversial, what I mean to illustrate here is that in 
criminal proceedings there have been attempts to address Aboriginal inequality that may 
be read as incipient reconciliation.56 Moreover, it demonstrates that some within the legal 
establishment recognize that colonial values of settler superiority in ways of conduct, 
correction, and justice are embedded within formal Canadian institutions of justice to the 
detriment of Aboriginal peoples, and begins to recognize the special disadvantage that 
Aboriginal peoples may have in a colonial society that normatively excludes Aboriginal 
ways of knowing and being. Sentencing reform may have been sparked by a legislative 
initiative. However, it was the Court that extended and refined the practice. In any event 
justice system related reforms can only address symptoms of a larger and systemic 
                                                          
52 Gladue 1999, para. 18. 
53 Ibid., para. 91. 
54 Rudin, “Aboriginal Over-representation and R. v. Gladue,” 695. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Obvious objections on the grounds of equality before the law are possible here, but other more nuanced 
critiques can be found on the grounds of inadequate understand of the causal relationship between 
sentencing practices and the overrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders in prison (See Stenning and 
Roberts “Empty Promises,” especially 155-168).  In contrast to sentence reform a more restorative 
approach that address dislocation and lack of opportunity is called for by some (See Susan Haslip, 
“Aboriginal Sentencing Reform in Canada—Prospects for Success,” Murdoch University  Law Journal vol. 
7 no. 1 (2000) 1-44). For a book length treatment of restorative justice approaches see  Jane Dickson-
Gilmore and Carol LaPrairie Will the Circle be Unbroken: Aboriginal Communities, Restorative Justice, 
and the Challenges of Conflict and Change (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
224 
 
exclusion of Aboriginal peoples. That is to say, as Rudin argues “real societal change 
cannot come from courts.”57 
Perhaps the most notable exception to the court-driven process of some sort of 
reconciliation in Canada prior to the Settlement Agreement is the Kelowna Accord.  This 
$5 billion, ten-year plan to support Aboriginal peoples in key areas, such as education, 
health, and economic development, was concluded in November of 2005 by the 
Government of Canada and the first ministers of the provinces and territories with the 
Assembly of First Nations, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Métis National Council, Native 
Women’s Council of Canada, and the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples.58 The combination 
of all these groups in establishing such an agreement was “unique in Canadian history.”59 
Because of Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act 1867, which gives to the federal Crown 
alone jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians,” the participation of 
subordinate levels of government in the negotiation process is not necessary. Kelowna 
represents the first time that both federal and provincial Crowns together have negotiated 
an agreement with Aboriginal peoples in Canada. What is perhaps more is what former 
Prime Minister Paul Martin has called the “Kelowna approach.”60 This new approach left 
significant room for Aboriginal voices to both articulate the issues facing their 
communities and to propose solutions.61 This new approach seems to have been very 
important to Paul Martin, as he writes in his auto-biography:  
 Our native peoples have had far too much experience of being brought in for 
 decorative effect, then being ignored. I wanted Aboriginal Canadians to see that 
 they were an integral and important part of our society. I wanted to establish a 
 partnership with them based on mutual respect rather than dependence.62  
 
It is exactly this “decorative” problem that Kelwona was meant to overcome, taking the 
Crown out of defining and solving problems facing Aboriginal peoples, and instead 
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becoming a partner to work with what Aboriginal leaders had come up with as the 
solutions.63 It was the chance to “give [Aboriginal peoples] the instruments that would 
allow [them] the chance to take advantage of all the opportunities that are out there, but 
doing [it in their] way not in our way.”64  
 While one of the first acts of Stephen Harper’s government after its election in 
2006 was to dismiss the Kelowna Accord,65 the lasting impact of the agreement may just 
be the approach to negotiations that it embodied. Paul Martin believes the Kelowna 
approach is “inevitable.”66 While he, as the former Prime Minister who undertook the 
process, is hardly an impartial source, it is hard to imagine that Aboriginal leaders would 
countenance a return to the older, more dictatorial ways of conducting discussions 
between Crown and Aboriginal peoples. Despite the failure of Kelowna, it is the very 
approach that led to the agreement that is a significant sign of reconciliation already at 
work in Canada. 
These few signs of positive change in Crown-Aboriginal relations are not meant 
to be comprehensive, but, rather, to indicate that something like “reconciliation” may be 
beginning to play out in Canada between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. As one of 
the mandates of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada was to foster 
reconciliation between the parties to the Settlement Agreement,67 it is important to 
understand that it is not starting from nothing. The above examples outlined are 
encouraging indications that something is occurring and provide context from which 
post-TRC reconciliation might be understood.  
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The Depth and Breadth of Reconciliation 
To begin to answer the research question with which we are engaged (i.e. toward what is 
this a transformation) it is helpful to get something of an outline of reconciliation in 
Canada, as it is understood by the elites I interviewed. There was definite agreement 
among the Aboriginal elites, Liberal Party members, and church representatives, about 
the extent of the reconciliation project. At the same time, it was not entirely clear to me 
that those currently serving in the bureaucracy or the lone Conservative I interviewed had 
a similar understanding of the potential depth and breadth of reconciliation. As 
highlighted in the previous chapter, the difference here should not be overdrawn, but it is 
important to recognize. What is interesting to note is that the two bureaucrats and the one 
Conservative Party member whom I interviewed, saw reconciliation very similarly to the 
others whom I interviewed, but, in an important distinction, they did not identify the IRS 
system as being connected to a broader system of colonisation. Neither saw reconciliation 
in a broader context. Rather, they limited reconciliation to the specific harm of residential 
schools.  
 The four people interviewed from within the Aboriginal community identified 
reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples in a much more holistic way 
that connected the TRC with a remediation of the whole colonial system. That is to say, 
while the TRC is mandated to focus narrowly upon the Indian Residential Schools, for 
the Aboriginal peoples interviewed for this project, reconciliation was intrinsically 
connected to the larger and more systemic problem of colonisation. Ghislain Picard, 
Québec Regional Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, links the whole project of 
reconciliation to “a question of trust.”68 The fundamental break in this trust, as identified 
by Picard, is related to the “discovery” of North America in 1492 and the colonisation 
process that followed for centuries, which sought to repress, or deny, any history that 
preceded this first landing of European settlers. For Picard, at least part of any successful 
process of reconciliation will lie in the rediscovery of this knowledge for the broader 
Canadian society, and also for Aboriginal peoples. He stated that,  “as First Nations 
people we don’t know much because we went through the schools to learn the same 
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history [as the dominant society] and it’s a history that doesn’t really provide much place 
for Aboriginal contributions.”69 The Indian Residential Schools were part of this systemic 
attempt identified by Picard to control Aboriginal peoples, and, more importantly, their 
lands.  
 Mike DeGagné, former Executive Director of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 
similarly argued that reconciliation must be more broadly linked to issues facing 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada. He stated that reconciliation is about “starting to erase 
people’s gut reactions and gut judgements and biases towards the ‘other,’” in this case, 
the Aboriginal “other.”70 DeGagné clearly did not deny that some within the Aboriginal 
community face difficult circumstances and sometimes lead dysfunctional lives but he 
was quick to identify that in response to these social issues the proper question should be, 
“Why is that happening? Is it because they are lazy or because they can’t manage money? 
Or is it because of other historical forces and trauma that the Canadian public has little 
understanding of?”71 Just as Picard identified, DeGagné associates this understanding of 
the Aboriginal experience as not just resulting from the IRS system and he specifically 
identifies this broader project of colonisation as underpinning many of the social issues 
facing Aboriginal people today. Understanding the IRS experience and the IRS system 
has to frame the discussions around the beginning, rather than the end, of the 
reconciliatory process but for both Picard and DeGagné. Reconciliation must also 
necessarily seek to understand the IRS system as only a part of larger systemic issues 
resulting from colonisation.  Thus, to truly begin to deal with the full vestiges of system 
colonialism the TRC will require a larger, more holistic, and systemic reconciliation than 
for that which it was mandated. 
 The need for shared knowledge and understanding as part of the reconciliation 
process was highlighted by Bob Watts, former Interim Director of the TRC, as well as by 
Phil Fontaine, former National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations. Watts was careful 
not to constrain reconciliation. Instead he posited that reconciliation involves 
understanding, learning, and a shared idea of the future between Aboriginal and non-
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Aboriginal peoples in Canada.72 Fontaine identified reconciliation as, “an all inclusive 
approach.”73 For these two interviewees, the concept of reconciliation must be directed 
towards the whole of the Crown-Aboriginal relationship, since the Indian Residential 
School experience “touches everything in Aboriginal communities.”74 Indian Residential 
Schools, therefore, must be read within a history and process of colonisation, where the 
experience of the IRS system, personally and inter-generationally, affected many, if not 
all, aspects of Aboriginal life. That is to say, that the IRS system itself is seen by these 
two interviewees as only one facet of a colonial system that places Aboriginal peoples 
outside of it, or, at the very most, at the bottom of its social and political hierarchy. As 
argued in Chapter Three, colonisation is a continual process that places Aboriginal 
peoples in a state of exception, in complex relation to, and outside of Canada or notions 
of Canadian identity.  
Those Liberal privy councillors whom I interviewed expressed similar opinions to 
those conveyed above on the scope, breadth, and depth of reconciliation. Andy Scott, 
who served as Minister of Indian Affairs at the time of the IRS settlement negotiation, 
described reconciliation as a shared history. Scott stated that, “once the people of Canada 
and the government have a better sense of this awful period of public policy in our 
country, I believe there will be a great appreciation of the challenges the [Aboriginal] 
community faces.”75 Scott’s understanding of the systemic effects of the IRS system 
leads directly to an identification of the need for a deep and broadly affecting 
reconciliation. In my interview with him, Scott detailed a concept of reconciliation that 
involves starting with a shared history between Aboriginal peoples and Canadians. He 
identified this shared knowledge as the key to gaining support from everyday Canadians 
for a broad-based government action that would rectify this history.76 
 Paul Martin, former Prime Minister of Canada, made it clear that “what we are 
dealing with here is not the first wrong that has been done to Aboriginal Canadians,” and 
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that the Indian Residential Schools were “the result of colonisation [which] was tragic in 
many, many ways.”77 For Martin, reconciliation is an essential part of providing a level 
playing field for Aboriginal opportunity and participation in Canadian society, polity, and 
economy. As a collaborator in its creation, Martin linked reconciliation to larger 
governmental policy moves, such as the Kelowna Accord. In my interview with him, 
Martin argued that reconciliation is about political change, which he felt he tried to 
implement while in government.  
 The two church representatives I interviewed understood reconciliation along 
similar lines to Martin. David MacDonald, Special Advisor on Residential Schools for 
the United Church of Canada, argued that “there has to be a political change... a lot of 
settling treaties and acknowledging existing treaties.”78 For MacDonald, reconciliation 
involves, at least partly, “finding ways for treaties to become meaningful.”79  That is to 
say, reconciliation has an intensely political dimension, a return to Crown-Aboriginal 
interactions guided by treaties, rather than legislative means that are contested by many in 
Aboriginal communities.80 
 Gerry Kelly, Advisor to Roman Catholic entities regarding the Indian Residential 
Schools legacy, saw reconciliation in a complementary way, as dealing with “a relational 
break on both sides.”81 Kelly argued that the TRC could “model a kind of conversation” 
that would help to provide a new basis for relationship.82 Kelly was less explicit about the 
broader colonial context in which the IRS system merged and of which the IRS system is 
an example, but he was clear about his opinion that the IRS system forms a sort of 
“original sin, that exists at the origin of who we are [as Canadians].”83 Framing the IRS 
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system this way not only places it at the very heart of Canada, as both a country and as an 
identity, but it also shows the enormity of the wrong the IRS system represents for Kelly. 
Like original sin, the wrongfulness of the IRS system here touches broadly and has a 
foundational relationship to Canada itself. 
 In contrast, the two current bureaucrats and one Conservative political operative 
whom I interviewed did not place the IRS system within a broadly colonial agenda. These 
three interviewees saw the breadth and depth of reconciliation differently. I do want to 
highlight at the outset that those three people I interviewed were sympathetic and seemed 
to genuinely care about the problems faced by many Aboriginal people. Yet, their 
understanding was more nuanced, and was tied to a very different narrative. Mario Dion, 
former Executive Director and Deputy Head, Office of Indian Residential Schools 
Resolution of Canada (2003-2006), used similar language to that used by the Aboriginal 
peoples and Liberal privy councillors whom I interviewed. Dion spoke of reconciliation 
as “a better understanding on the part of all Canadians... about what actually happened, 
what this actually was, and what impact it has had,”84 referring to the Indian Residential 
Schools system. Dion explained that, in his view, “we are living in a society that is full of 
prejudices that are not based on any concrete evidence. So [reconciliation] will contribute 
to dispelling some myths that exist about First Nations. Why it is that there is so much 
intoxication, substance abuse, and so, on and so forth.”85 More specifically, Dion told me 
he believes that reconciliation will provide “a greater degree of sympathy and empathy 
for survivors and their descendants.”86 These comments, however, are limited to the 
context of the IRS system and do not imply any need for change in Crown-Aboriginal 
relations outside of the serious treatment of the very real trauma that the IRS system has 
caused in Aboriginal communities.  
 Going a little further than his former colleague Mario Dion, Deputy Minister of 
Indian Affairs Michael Wernick saw the link from the work of the TRC to reconciliation 
as helping to “force the rest of the country to look at itself in the mirror and say ‘look 
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what happened here’ and provoke greater knowledge of First Nations.”87 He felt that it 
could help explain, in a certain context, why Aboriginal peoples “have such trust issues 
with the federal government... about education, language, and culture.”88 This, again, is 
helpful and even necessary. But what Wernick did not do, as some others did, was to link 
this to the need for broader change in Crown-Aboriginal relations. That is to say, there is 
no mention of the treaties, or, as MacDonald put it, of “finding ways for treaties to 
become meaningful.”89 Nor is there mention of the IRS system as being within the 
broader colonial context.  
 Former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Harper, Ian Brodie, similarly understood 
and was sympathetic to the negative effects of the IRS system. Brodie was clear about his 
own journey through the process of setting up the TRC and what has come out of the 
TRC, and how that has changed his way of looking at Aboriginal issues. Brodie said that 
“going through the process [of helping set up the TRC] personally and then seeing 
situations like the one in Attawapiskat, and hearing the comments from the Chief and 
people there about the ongoing legacy of residential schools, that has made me much 
more sensitive.”90 (Here Brodie referred to the incident in the Northern Ontario First 
Nations community, which in late 2011 declared a State of Emergency over its housing 
situation.91) Brodie felt that through his experience he had gained an understanding as to 
why moving a community to another location would be looked on with suspicion in the 
context of the IRS system. As he said “the road to hell is paved with the best of 
intentions.”92 
 These views expressed by two government bureaucrats, as well as the only 
Conservative who consented to an interview, are subtly, but importantly, different from 
those expressed by the others with whom I spoke. They indicated that reconciliation is 
limited to the specific harms of the residential school. The contrast in these opinions 
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between the government under the Conservatives, and the opposition along with 
Aboriginal and Church leaders, becomes even sharper when examined alongside 
comments made by the then-Minister of Indian Affairs, John Duncan. In the fall of 2011, 
Duncan created controversy when he characterized the IRS system as simply “education 
policy gone wrong,”93 rather than the determined policy of forced assimilation. This lack 
of understanding on the part of some within the Conservative party was sadly present at 
the time of Harper’s apology in 2008, as well. Then-Parliamentary Secretary to the 
President of the Treasury Board, and later Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister, 
Pierre Poilievre, wondered if Canada was “getting value for all this money [paid to IRS 
system survivors]” and supposed that what was needed instead was to “engender the 
values of hard work and independence and self-reliance. That's the solution in the long 
run — more money will not solve it.”94 These statements downplay the role of Euro-
Canadian colonisation in creating the conditions for systemic Aboriginal disadvantage in 
Canada, or outright deny it. Duncan dismisses the carefully considered tool of 
assimilation that was the residential school, one of many constructed, as simply a poor 
policy choice. Indeed, leaving unclear if the problem was the damage caused to 
Aboriginal people and their communities or the schools’ failure to destroy Aboriginal 
culture. Poilievre places the blame quite squarely on Aboriginal peoples’ lack of industry 
and self-reliance, entirely unreflective of how Aboriginal peoples have found themselves 
in their current state. 
 The difference of opinion regarding the breadth and depth of reconciliation held 
by those occupying the bureaucracy and the government benches, those in political 
opposition, and Aboriginal peoples themselves, could, importantly, impact the sort of 
change in Crown-Aboriginal relations the TRC might hope to achieve.  Clearly, if those 
who are in political power do not see the IRS system as linked to and part of a broader 
colonial enterprise, the change of relationship that might seem appropriate to them will be 
similarly limited. Taken with the differing understanding of those in political opposition 
and among Aboriginal peoples themselves, this constrained understanding of the IRS 
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system will likely lead to a relationship that does not significantly overcome any of the 
problems of a colonial paradigm. 
 
Why this difference could matter 
This differing understanding of the nature of the harm of the IRS system, the system’s 
location within a broader colonial project, and, thus, the extent of reconciliation, could 
presage the very relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples that the TRC was 
meant to reconcile. If there is a new relationship to be forged—and this is not a forgone 
conclusion, as the findings of the TRC could very simply be ignored by both the 
government and the majority of Canadians—it need not be based on the decolonial and 
ethical approach outlined above. It is quite possible that a new relationship between 
Crown and Aboriginal peoples will still involve too much of the old colonial one, but 
simply updated and utilized in a drive toward a renewed effort of assimilation. 
 It was clear from my interview with Ian Brodie that he believes that not everyone 
in the Conservative caucus understood the impact of the IRS system and the severity of 
its legacy. Brodie did talk about how it was necessary for Harper to “settle down some 
folks in the party”95 not only about the apology in 2008, but also the whole Indian 
Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.  It must be remembered that the Conservative 
party inherited the Agreement when it came to power in 2006.  A deal in principle had 
already been reached between the Government of Canada under Martin’s Liberals, 
between Aboriginal organizations, survivor litigants, and the churches. There were other 
related deals, notably the Kelowna Accord, that the Conservatives also inherited and 
chose not to uphold. The move to scrap the Kelowna Accord, as well as other initiatives, 
certainly calls into question the kind of relationship the Government of Canada under the 
Conservatives were open to having with Aboriginal peoples as part of the broader 
reconciliatory process. 
 The approach that the Conservatives took on the Aboriginal file has also involved 
new policies. One policy initiative, announced in August of 2012 by the Conservative 
government, was the introduction of legislation to allow private property on reserves. In 
August of 2012 the Conservative government proposed to introduce legislation to allow a 
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voluntary system of on-reserve property rights.96 The proposed legislation would affect 
hundreds of thousands of on-reserve First Nations and millions of hectares of land.97  
 This drive to allocate private property for First Nations on reserves fits into the 
approach advanced by former Harper advisor Tom Flanagan.98 For Flanagan, Aboriginal 
issues are largely an economic project and require a remedy that allows economic 
development on reserves. He argues that “Indians cannot make progress in the 
contemporary world without reliance on property rights and economic competition.”99 
For Flanagan, private property is about bringing the benefit of the modern capitalist 
world to First Nations and freeing First Nations from the prison of collective ownership. 
As Flanagan argues, both “the treaties and the Indian Act have conspired to imprison 
[First Nations] within a regime of collective rights that fit badly with the needs of a 
market economy.”100 The rationale is to provide modernization so that on-reserve First 
Nations persons can avail themselves of the benefits of modern economic activity in 
Canada’s globalized economy. 
 It is, perhaps, understandable that in the historic context of government programs 
such as enfranchisement many Aboriginal people are suspicious of any policy of 
individual property rights on reserve. There is a more thorough discussion of 
enfranchisement as a tool of colonisation in Chapter Four but to recapitulate here: a key 
aspect of the Gradual Civilization Act, the forerunner to the Indian Act, was the policy of 
“enfranchisement” where First Nations people living on reserve who attained a certain 
level of education, literacy, and moral standing would lose their status as Indians under 
the Indian Act and gain Canadian citizenship.101 Further, these “enfranchised former 
Indians,” as defined under the Indian Act, were entitled to privately own a tract of land of 
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some twenty hectares, taken from the reserve lands.102 Once all the status Indians were 
sufficiently educated, any such distinction would cease to exist, and with it any notion of 
the First Nations’ different and complex relationship to the Crown. The land base that 
supported these communities in the form of reserves would also cease to exist. It is little 
wonder then, that with this backdrop of the historical enfranchisement as a Crown policy 
for assimilation, that there is general trepidation on the part of the First Nations for a 
current policy of privatized reserve land. In fact, there is great suspicion surrounding this 
policy and many Aboriginal leaders, including Shawn Atleo,  then-National Chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations, criticized it.103  
 Moreover, as with the Gradual Civilization Act approach to private property, this 
initiative is yet another unilateral approach on the part of the Government of Canada. So 
as not to be hyperbolic, it is important to note that this plan would not require on-reserve 
private property, but, rather, would provide a voluntary framework for band councils to 
opt-in to this private property scheme.104 This voluntary opt-in is the only aspect that 
comes close to any kind of consultation or collaboration with First Nations that the 
government had on this issue. Clearly, making a policy voluntary is no substitute for 
meaningful consultation with Aboriginal leaders. Thus, when this issue was first raised in 
the 2012 budget by the Conservative government, then-Assembly of First Nations 
National Chief Atleo spoke out against the move, saying  “First Nations, by and large do 
not support private property.”105 Further, Atleo argued that there are more creative 
solutions to land use that are consistent with treaty rights, rather than imposed (settler) 
notions of private property.106 In my interview with him, Phil Fontaine expressed a 
similar view. Fontaine stated that there are “successful reserves in Canada, but they have 
[become successful] in the current system of communal ownership.”107  
 This example of the Conservative government’s general understanding and policy 
towards Aboriginal people makes it clear why the difference in the understanding of the 
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breadth and depth of reconciliation can have a huge impact on Crown-Aboriginal 
relations. There are those who understand the IRS system within the context of the whole 
colonial project and history of Canada, and see reconciliation as necessary on a number 
of fronts, not only as helping to resolve the specific harm of the IRS experience and its 
aftermath, but also as being essential for mitigating the larger colonial experience. That is 
why Martin characterized the negotiation of the Kelowna Accord as reconciliatory in 
nature, specifically identifying the way that the Kelowna Accord was negotiated as a 
collaborative and respectful deal involving the Crown, at both its federal and provincial 
levels, and Aboriginal leaders, particularly in the Assembly of First Nations.108 Moreover, 
this “Kelowna approach,” as Martin termed it, was viewed in a similar way by Phil 
Fontaine—who was National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations at the time of its 
negotiation. Fontaine saw the Kelowna Accord as representing a shift in the Crown’s 
approach that treated Aboriginal governments as “legitimate orders of government.”109 
Understanding reconciliation as a broad and deep initiative would move the Crown-
Aboriginal relationship toward a place where an ethic of political reconciliation can be 
played out, rather than constraining it to a place of unilateral government policy, however 
well-intentioned that policy may be. 
 If the actions of the Conservative government on Aboriginal issues since taking 
office in 2006, especially the unilateral approach to these issues, are read as embodying a 
limited understanding of reconciliation, then the relationship that might come about as a 
result of this transformative opportunity will be of an altogether different quality than the 
ethic of political reconciliation I have outlined in previous chapters. While no one I 
interviewed questioned the sincerity of Harper when he delivered an official apology on 
the floor of the House of Commons in 2008, there were some who felt that not enough 
had been done to live up to those words. Bob Watts stated his dismay that the government 
had not done “things differently, [in a way] that would really manifest and breathe life 
into the words that the prime minister said.”110 It is fairly clear that thoroughgoing 
reconciliation under a Conservative government would have been unlikely. 
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 The unilateral actions taken by the Conservative government are significantly at 
odds with the spirit, if not the words, of the apology given in 2008. This should give us 
cause to consider what form the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples 
will take as it emerges from the transformative opportunity presented by the TRC, and if 
this relationship will be adequately decolonial.  While the words spoken by the new 
Liberal government have been significantly more friendly to reconciliation, it remains to 
be seen how different a course they will chart on this file. To continue on the tack 
presented by the Conservative government’s policies would taint this emergent 
relationship with the old colonial mentalities. I do not want to spare Liberal governments 
of blame on this score either, especially in light of their 2015 election. It will be recalled 
that a previous Trudeau’s government, in 1969, called for the elimination of the Indian 
Act to completely remove any special status for Indians in Canada. The White Paper 
authored by then-minister of Indian affairs and later prime minister, Jean Chrétien, was a 
unilateral move by the Crown to destroy Aboriginal legal difference in the name of 
equality. It was also under a Liberal government led by Chrétien in the 1990s that the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal people went largely ignored. It 
is important not to hold the son accountable for the sins of the father, in this case both 
figuratively and literally, but unilateral colonial action by the Government of Canada is 
neither historical nor limited to one political party. 
What these strategies of “betterment” entail, I argue, is what Bourdieu and 
Wacquant and call a “screen discourse,”111 in which a new form of assimilation is 
shielded by a discourse of “betterment” or “equality.”  As Bourdieu and Wacquant argue, 
a screen discourse is “the product of a gigantic effect of national and international 
allodoxia, which deceives both those who are party to it and those who are not.”112 
Allodoxia is the term that Bourdieu used in his later years to indicate a sort of 
misrecognition at “a global level.”113 The specific form of screen discourse surrounding 
Crown-Aboriginal reconciliation involves the concealment of an assimilationist agenda, 
such as the privatization of property.  Bourdieu and Wacqaunt argue that globalization 
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seeks to dress up the effects of economic fatalism, thus making “transnational relations of 
economic power appear like a natural necessity.”114 If this is the case, then it follows that 
a certain type of economic ordering is not only necessary for Aboriginal peoples to 
flourish—an order that mirrors that of the dominant market-economic society—it is also 
a natural stage in the evolution of any society.115 This places Canadian society high above 
Aboriginal communities and implores a condescending hand to lift Aboriginal peoples 
out of their inferiority. This type of unilateral movement on the part of the Crown, in the 
political executive or Crown-in-Parliament, as the power the Prime Minister appropriates 
in dealing with Aboriginal peoples, replicates an evolutionary trajectory of social, 
political, and economic development, which cannot escape the re-inscription of 
colonialism—albeit, in the guise of a new form of economic necessity and in the 
language of emancipation, or in a language of reconciliation that either perpetuates a 
colonial attitude or renews a drive for assimilation. Even Justin Trudeau’s Liberals might 
find it hard to abandon liberalisms’ insistence on a more or less homogenous equality.  
It is important to recognize that a colonial attitude will prefigure the outcomes of 
reconciliation, once again constraining the Crown-Aboriginal relationship to the old 
policies of “Crown-knows-best” which fail to acknowledge Aboriginal peoples as 
participants in their own destinies. This approach sees Aboriginal peoples as objects to be 
transformed or overcome, rather than as partners in a narrative. This accomplishes 
assimilation in the same way as the Indian Residential Schools system itself sought to 
transform, evolve, and civilize the savage Indian, giving them the benefit of European 
culture. Here, though, rather than European civitas, this assimilation project offers all the 
benefits of a particularly American form of economic organization, which has been 
forced on even “advanced societies through the pauperization of the state, the 




                                                          





Building a Nation 
Chapter Six explored the mechanisms of a TRC and the reconciliation it can foster. One 
of the objectives of TRCs is often to be part of nation building.  In the case of South 
Africa, home of perhaps the most famous truth commission, the objective of building a 
new multi-racial South Africa was an expressed goal of the TRC.117 Similarly, in 
Australia, the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Children from Their Families, and the later Council for Aboriginal 
Reconciliation were part of an effort to wrap up “the unfinished business” of Aboriginal 
issues in Australia by the time of the federation’s century celebration.118 Yet, 
understanding the Canadian TRC under such a rubric of nation building could prove 
problematic. This sort of nation-building objective could hinder the ethic of reconciliation 
sought for the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples that would allow 
the relationship to move beyond its historical colonial framework.119  
 In the interviews I undertook, only one person brought up the idea of nation-
building specifically. Bob Watts conveyed how “the Governor General even talked about 
the importance of the TRC for the unfinished work of nation-building in this country.”120 
In discussions about whether the TRC can move reconciliation forward, Watts again 
brought up this notion of nation-building when he said “[the TRC is] going to leave at 
least a partially unfinished project in terms of reconciliation and in terms of nation-
building.”121  Taken in the context of other comments made by Watts, about the breadth 
and depth of reconciliation, for example, these comments about nation-building indicate 
that Watts has a multi-national understanding of Canada. While I cannot speak for Watts, 
I extrapolate that the nation-building that will be left unfinished by the TRC will be the 
building of a nation, the building of a Canada, that substantively includes Aboriginal 
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peoples. Nation-building and “Canadianness,” here, however, can be dangerous to a 
reconciliation that seeks to eschew assimilation. At least two problems present 
themselves here for understanding reconciliation within a nation-building framework.  
 First, as discussed in Chapter Four, if we understand the history of Crown-
Aboriginal relations after 1830 as the normative and legal exception of Aboriginal 
peoples from society, polity, and economy in Canada, then the invocation of this type of 
Canadianness as an aim clearly cannot help but exclude Aboriginals from a concept of 
“Canada.” As discussed in Chapter Three, it bears repeating here, that Agamben’s 
understanding of the state of exception, when applied to the construction of a Canadian 
identity, means at the very least a new understanding of the Canadian nation is needed, 
rather than simply including Aboriginal peoples in the older understanding that relies 
exactly on their exclusion. 
 Second, and more expansively, there is the problem of the term “nation” and what 
is left out by its invocation. Giorgio Agamben argues that “the constitution of the human 
species into a body politic comes into being through a fundamental split... [between] 
naked life (people) and political existence (People), exclusion and inclusion.”122 Partly, 
this is a problem of semiotics, with the disjuncture between the particular and the 
universal in linguistic articulation. As Agamben notes, “the antinomy of the individual to 
universal has its origin in language... [and the] linguistic being is a class that both belongs 
and does not belong to itself.”123 When we use any word, such as “tree,” we mean both 
the particular and the universal class. “Tree” could mean this particular American 
mountain ash, and the category of existence of a tree, as distinct from a frog, or a flower, 
or an onion. It could mean both simultaneously. As Agamben argues “the word ‘tree’ 
designates all trees indifferently, insofar as it posits the proper universal significance in 
place of singular ineffable trees... [it] is a set (the tree) that is at the same time a 
singularity (the tree, a tree, this tree).”124 That is to say, within an articulation there is this 
tension between the particular and the class to which it belongs.  
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 Though a semantic distinction, it is an important distinction nonetheless, and one 
which when taken in the context of the nation of Canada, has important results for 
Aboriginal identity. In the example of the nation of Canada, with the invocation of 
people, there is a singularity (this Canadian) as subsumed in the entire body politic 
(Canadian). This invocation contains what Agemben calls the “fundamental biopolitical 
fracture” between pure life and a form of life. An invocation of peoplehood, of nation, 
necessarily admits a paradox, it contains what “cannot be included in the whole of which 
it is part as well as what cannot belong to the whole in which it is always already 
included.”125 The remainder, this excluded particular that is subsumed but does not fit 
within the larger class is what is not meant by, but always already in, the invocation of 
something like the Canadian people. The very invocation of peoplehood reinforces a 
national identity that both includes and excludes. Taken with my argument in the Chapter 
Three about the normative exclusion of Aboriginal peoples, this remainder would 
certainly include Aboriginal peoples among others who are already generally considered 
“marginalized.” This understanding gives another enriching lens through which to see the 
interactions between Crown and Aboriginal peoples, namely government action directed 
toward “the radical elimination of the excluded.”126   
 This is the problem of using a term like “nation-building” here. Constructing a 
new concept of the Canadian “People” through reconciliation admits again the problem 
of the particular and the class, and the possibility of seeking once more to eliminate the 
excluded. With the inequalities of power between Crown and Aboriginal peoples, this 
approach invites requirements or policies that demand a certain form of life that will be 
over-determined by the Crown or the dominant society. Thus, nation building could leave 
us in the same situation as that which produced the IRS system. 
  
Conclusion 
Addressing the question “toward what might this be a transformation in Crown 
Aboriginal relations?” is inherently speculative, and it is not my intention here to forecast 
the future. More than this, it might be most beneficial to consider the question rather than 
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provide an outright answer. Providing some specific causal link or narrative arch will 
require more time, it can only be done retrospectively. But, considering the question of 
what character transformation may take can be fruitful for all concerned. Clearly there are 
a variety of possibilities, and it is not my intention to catalogue them. I have offered some 
analysis of themes raised in my interviews and the possible problems with some of these 
approaches to reconciliation. Certainly the Canadian state needs to rethink its approach to 
dealings with Aboriginal peoples, be less paternalistic and more accommodating. 
Structures of government may need to change including reform of the Ingenious Affairs 
Department, and the legislative control over “Indians” should be replaced or abolished, 
not unilaterally as was suggested in 1969, but in negotiation with Aboriginal peoples.  
While I am hopeful that a political ethic of reconciliation can emerge from this 
transformative opportunity, one that will provide a (re)new(ed) foundation for an 
equitable relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples, this is not a necessary 
outcome. I think there is some cause to have hope with the new government and their 
stated commitment to reconciliation.  This is not to say that serious threats to a healthy 
post-colonial relationship do not exist. The difference in opinions about the 
understanding of the breadth and depth of reconciliation could constrain this relationship 
and renew efforts to assimilate Aboriginal peoples. Seeing the Indian Residential Schools 
system as separate from a system of colonisation would limit reconciliation, providing a 
screen discourse for continued efforts to force homogeneity on Aboriginal peoples. 
Similarly, framing reconciliation within nationalism or nation building could, 
intentionally or unintentionally, readmit the politics of exclusion and elimination that 
characterized the period of the Indian Residential School system.  
 What seems clear from action and the one interviewee from the Conservative 
party is that the Conservative idea of reconciliation was significantly at odds with that 
expressed by the Aboriginal people I interviewed. While there is now a Liberal 
government in Ottawa, it remains to be seen how much it agrees with the statements 
made by former privy councillors while their party was in opposition. If those 
interviewed from the Liberal party represent the views of the Trudeau government then 
there seems to be a basis to engage in a political ethic of reconciliation. Words, however, 
are relatively cheap, while a political ethic of reconciliation will be costly in a number of 
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ways, financially, politically, and emotionally. Ultimately, whether the Liberal 
government, indeed any government, will change their approach to Aboriginal peoples, 
the question of what form this change will take is an important one to consider and recall, 







This study has cast a wide net in seeking to understand the significance—as well as any 
possible outcomes and ramifications—of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada. As I have argued, the TRC, as well as the Indian Residential School system, 
whose abuses the TRC hoped to address, need to be placed within the broader context of 
colonialism in Canada, including past attempts at addressing the colonial legacy. I have 
sought to relate the more conceptual politics and histories relevant to the TRC with the 
current understanding of the goals and interest involved in the Canadian TRC. Context is 
an important part of understanding and intelligibly acting. To that end, I argue, the most 
relevant contribution this study can make is to inform a context to understand the TRC 
and reconciliation, as well as providing the views of elites influential at the time of the 
TRC’s creation. 
 
Context is King 
In the early period after contact between Europeans and Aboriginal peoples, when 
independent and self-sufficient European settlement was relatively sparse and fragile, a 
symbiotic relationship based on trade with Aboriginal peoples helped keep European 
settlements alive. As more settlers arrived from Europe, more land was needed to support 
these settlements. Treaties became the vehicle for both French and English Crowns to 
secure lands and win allies among their Aboriginal trading partners. As rivalries from the 
“Old World” were replicated in the “New World” the importance of Aboriginal allies 
increased primarily to allow Great Britain and France to secure their colonies without the 
need for raising troops from the settlers or from Europe. As Aboriginal warriors fought 
alongside their European allies, more treaties were signed to garner more land for 
incoming settlers. It is important to understand this early contact period as one where 
individual Aboriginal nations were treated as “nations,” with the rights and treaties 
afforded by the European newcomers for other state entities. 
 This period of Aboriginal-European relations was built on mutual advantage and 
respect until the early 19th century. The year 1830 is especially significant for the 
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decisive change in Crown-Aboriginal relations. As Jim Miller highlights, that was the 
point at which local colonial authorities in British North America were delegated the 
responsibility for administration of Aboriginal affairs with the transfer of responsibility 
from the military to the civilian governor.1 By the 1850s, the legislative assemblies of 
British North America assumed legislative control for Aboriginal policy, meaning 
decisions were no longer made by imperial authorities in a distant land but by the 
representatives of the colonial apparatus of Crown authority in pre-confederation Canada. 
As a result, Aboriginal policy changed dramatically, becoming very one-sided, with the 
Crown taking unilateral action on Aboriginal affairs, often abrogating earlier treaties or 
even those newly signed. This switch in policy signalled the beginning of the exclusion of 
Aboriginal peoples from the creation of the new state of Canada. This was a decisive 
moment in Crown-Aboriginal relations, when Aboriginal peoples ceased to be seen as 
independent and valuable partners, and began to become integrated into what Giorgio 
Agamben calls a “state of exception,” as they were placed juridically outside of the 
emerging Canadian state—but also normatively excluded from the social, political, and 
economic order. This “state of exception” is a complex topology of inside and outside, 
and the antinomy that exists between them. As Agamben puts it, it is a force-of-law 
without-law.2 I argue that this idea of a state of exception helps to bring into focus what is 
at work in colonialism, and gives us a way of understanding the Indian Residential 
School system within a broader conceptual context. Agamben’s idea of the “camp” as a 
place, “a piece of territory that is placed outside the normal juridical order... the camp is 
the structure in which the state of exception is permanently realized,”3 becomes the main 
mechanism in understanding the specific instances of the IRS system in a broader state of 
exception represented by the colonial project.   
 Seeing colonisation as having the ultimate result of placing Aboriginal peoples in 
a state of exception, and specifically seeing Indian Residential Schools as camp in 
Agamben’s sense, helps us to realize the enormity of what has happened in Crown-
Aboriginal relations. It cannot simply be a case of reading Aboriginal peoples back into 
                                                          
1 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 118. 
2  Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago and London; University of Chicago Press, 2005), 40. 
3 Giorgio Agamben,”What is a Camp?” in Giorgio Agamben Means Without End: Notes on Politics 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 39. 
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the Canadian creation narrative, or seeing Aboriginal peoples as something like a third 
solitude. Rather, the lens of Agamben’s theory allows us to see the very real way in 
which Canada was constructed in the absence of Aboriginal peoples, while in antinomy 
with the very idea of Aboriginality that it sought to annex and control. A “Canada” that 
would substantively include Aboriginal peoples requires a much more critical approach to 
this history of colonisation and must directly confront issues of Aboriginal exception and 
exclusion. It is this “Canada” which substantially includes Aboriginal peoples that the 
TRC may be able to help create. 
 Agamben’s theory of a state of exception also helps us think critically about 
decolonisation in Canada. As detailed in Chapter Five suggestions have been made about 
ending the overtly colonial relationship that exists in law between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada. As I argued in that chapter, many approaches to 
decolonisation fail to overcome a colonial ethic. While suggestions such as that from 
Thomas Courchene and Lisa Powell for a “First Nations province,” are an improvement 
over the inferiority of First Nations governments in the Indian Act, this approach fails to 
confront the issue of Aboriginal sovereignty in a meaningful way.4 Courchene and Powell 
propose that reserve lands be collectively governed by one authority that would have 
status as a province within the Canadian federation, but only consist of First Nations.5  It 
is an approach, however, that subsumes Aboriginal difference into one voice that would 
still result in subjecting Aboriginal peoples to a European style of federalism that is 
premised on an underlying sovereignty of the Crown.  
 Seen through the lens of exception, decolonisation needs to be more critical and 
involves unpacking notions of Canada and the relationship between Crown and 
Aboriginal nations. I argue that this is best represented by the idea of treaty federalism, or 
treaty constitutionalism, as outlined by scholars such as James Henderson, and Kierra 
Ladner.6 These approaches recognize Aboriginal sovereignty in a way that is historically 
                                                          
4 Thomas Courchene and Lisa Powell, A First Nations Province (Kingston: Queen’s University Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1992) 
5 Ibid.,5-7. 
6James Youngblood Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism,” Saskatchewan Law Review 58 (1994), 




rooted and helps to unpack the “Canada” that has excepted Aboriginal peoples from its 
narrative.  
 More than merely historical background, this colonial history is present in the 
continued exception of Aboriginal peoples and importantly informs any theories that 
might lead us to a way out of the present colonial structure of Canada. Colonisation and 
decolonisation must form a significant backdrop to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, and reconciliation itself. 
 
The Commission in Context 
This colonial context, I argue, becomes an important part of the overall picture when 
assessing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. In Chapter Six above, I 
argued that the Canadian TRC was established in what still remains a colonial society. It 
was not preceded by any material or conceptual change in the colonial relationship 
between Crown and Aboriginal peoples. The constellation of colonial power remains 
intact from the period of the IRS system and could distort attempts to deal with the legacy 
of the IRS system and reconciliation. This colonial constellation of power, importantly, 
leads us to consider the forces and interests at play in the creation of the Canadian TRC. 
 In the same chapter, I examined the Canadian TRC by comparing it to two other 
truth commissions, including perhaps the most famous commission, the South Africa 
truth commission, as well as the Australian National Inquiry into the Separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Straight Island Children from Their Families and the CAR. Here I 
have argued that the difference in how colonial power was wielded in Canada, Australia, 
and South Africa had important implications for the relative outcomes and successes of 
these respective commissions. This was specifically the case in the varying levels of 
power given to each respective commission, the commissions’ centrality or lack of 
placement in the overall process of reconciliation, and the level of funding that was 
provided for each commission.  
 Priscilla Hayner outlines a definition of truth commissions as backward-looking 
entities that focus on a broad pattern of human rights abuses, and limit their inquiry to a 
specified period of abuses. They tend to be designated special powers of investigation 
that allow a commission to access the requisite information needed to deal with sensitive 
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issues.7 These are the aspects of the truth commission that, for Hayner, have 
differentiated this mechanism from other judicial or quasi-judicial standing bodies on 
human rights.8 In my comparison of the South African and Australian commissions, this 
last aspect of designated specific powers becomes especially significant. The South 
African TRC was given powers of amnesty and reparation, among others, to undertake its 
work.9 In Australia, the Inquiry had no such powers. At least part of this difference, I 
argue, lies in the transitional nature of South African society at the time of the 
commission, away from a rigid colonial society, while in the Australian case there was 
still a colonial constellation of power. These differences can significantly impact the 
ability of a commission to effectively operate and achieve goals of reconciliation. While 
the comparison here is not between success and failure, that South Africa is continuing on 
a decolonial path while in Australia non-Aboriginal peoples dominate society, economy, 
and polity, is of great significance.  
 Another key difference between the South African and Australian commissions 
that demonstrates the impact colonial power can have on these mechanisms is the 
establishment of the commission during an effort at broader reform. In South Africa, the 
TRC was created after the 1994 electoral victory of Nelson Mandela’s African National 
Congress and became part of a transition away from Apartheid. In contrast, the Australian 
Council on Aboriginal Reconciliation was conceived of as the beginning of a process 
which would identify and address Aboriginal disadvantage, and the Inquiry was 
specifically undertaken in the middle of the CAR’s mandate. Then-Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard argued that reconciliation was a not legislatable initiative, and he 
chose to focus, instead, on acts of on “practical reconciliation” rather than the 
transformative and more difficult and elusive type of reconciliation that could only be felt 
in the “hearts and minds of the Australian people.”10 This lack of a broader context of 
reform and change, in the case of the Australian commission, provides a screen discourse 
by which the colonial constellation of power is protected from any serious threat. 
                                                          
7 Pricilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions--1974-1994: A Comparative Study,” in Human Rights 
Quarterly, 16:4 (1994), 604. 
8 Ibid. 
9 These powers were outlined in the South Africa, Promotion of National Unity Act, 1995. 
10 Howard, “Practical Reconciliation,” 89. 
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 A last but a very significant difference between the South African and Australian 
mechanisms was the funding of each commission. In South Africa the TRC was financed 
by a fund set up by the President, and, thus, operational funds were guaranteed by the 
state.11 While in the case the Australian commission was state-funded, Reconciliation 
Australia, the agency created after the mandate of the CAR expired in order to complete 
its work, is a not-for-profit body funded by private donations.12  
 I argue that these differences highlight the operation of the prevailing colonial 
power dynamics in a decolonial South Africa and a still-colonial Australia. This gives us 
a significant indication as to the ability of the Canadian TRC to function as a justice 
mechanism, since it was created in a colonial context.  As it did in the comparative cases, 
South Africa and Australia, the dominant colonial power has affected the Canadian TRC 
in at least three ways.  
 First, the Canadian TRC comes from a negotiated settlement of legal actions 
against the Government of Canada and the churches that operated the schools. Andrew 
Woolford argues that the Settlement, which contained provisions for the TRC, was an act 
of “governmentality,” in the Foucauldian sense.13 By this, Woolford means that the 
Government of Canada has sought to mitigate and quantify financial liability with greater 
certainty than in a court process.14 The Government of Canada, in this instance, has used 
the asymmetry of power in its relation to Aboriginal peoples to create the certainty that it 
desired. This use of power pre-figures the outcome and stifles the possibility of 
reconciliation as it re-inscribes the process with the same colonialism it is meant to 
overcome.  
 Second, and closely related to this first point, is the issue of funding. While the 
TRC was funded by the Canadian state, the overall funding was established in the 
settlement process and was fixed at a specific amount, which required governmental 
approval of how the money was to be spent before any funds could be released.15 The 
Canadian TRC was allotted a budget of $60 million to finance seven national events, in 
                                                          
11 South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 1995, Section 42. 
12 About RA, http://www.reconciliation.org.au/home/about-ra/who-is-ra- 
13 Andrew Woolford, “Governing Through Repair: Colonial Injustice and Indigenous peoples in Canada,” a 
paper presented at the One Day Academic Conference at the First National Event of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Winnipeg Manitoba June 17, 2010. 
14Ibid. 
15 Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, Section 3.03 (1), pg. 23. 
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addition to funding research, and the administration of the TRC, as well as its final task 
of creating a permanent research centre.16 The Canadian TRC’s former Director of 
Research, John S. Milloy, expressed frustration over the  level of funding available for 
such a broad mandate. Milloy indicated that it would be next to impossible to conduct the 
research that was part of the TRC’s mandate on such a limited budget, let alone to 
establish a working research centre.17 The unexpectedly high costs of collecting and 
cataloguing documents stressed the meagreness of the budget of the TRC and in 
December of 2011 the TRC Chair, Murray Sinclair, pointed out in an interview with CBC 
News that “this commission cannot do all of the things you’ve asked us to do with the 
resources you’ve given us.”18  Clearly, lacking these necessary funds the Canadian TRC 
may fall short of expectations for it to fulfill even basic aspects of its mandate, such as 
commemoration and the collection of documents. Additionally, the Canadian TRC’s 
inability to effectively operate due to lack of funds could impact reconciliation that it 
seeks to foster. 
 Last, the issue of designated and special powers given to the Canadian TRC 
reflects a very real colonial imbalance of power. Unlike the case of the South African 
TRC, and, indeed, contrary to Hayner’s expectation that most truth commissions are 
given special powers, the Canadian TRC has no extra-ordinary powers. Under the terms 
of reference the Canadian TRC is simply empowered to “receive statements and 
documents.”19 The commission cannot compel documents or testimony and, in fact, must 
perform its duties “without making any findings or expressing any conclusion or 
recommendation, regarding the misconduct of any person, unless such findings or 
information has already been established through legal proceedings.”20 Without special 
powers, the work of the TRC could become hobbled. In late 2012 the TRC took court 
action against the Government of Canada to force it to release documents that the TRC is 
                                                          
16 Indian Residential Schools SettlementAgreement, “Schedule N.” 
17 John S. Milloy made these remarks at the “Truth, Reconciliation and the Residential Schools” conference 
March 5th 2010, Nipissing Univeristy. 
18 CBC News, “Residential Schools Commission Faces Financial Crunch,” CBC.ca, 4 Dec. 2011, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2011/12/04/truth-reconciliation-commission-funding.html 
(accessed 26 Nov. 2012). 
19 “Schedule ‘N,’” Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, 2. 
20 Ibid., 2-3. 
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unable to compel due the lack of special powers.21 This crucial function of the TRC, that 
of collecting documents to create a historic record of abuse, is severely limited by its lack 
of special powers to compel documents in this case which could a significant impact on 
the outcomes of the TRC. 
 Read against the backdrop of the Canadian colonial history and approaches to 
decolonisation, the TRC as a mechanism of a settlement and an attempt by the 
Government of Canada to create certainty in an uncertain situation, the TRC can be seen 
as an institution marked by the colonial power constellation. This makes the work of the 
TRC difficult, as structural aspects, funding, and powers limit the scope of the 
commission and its ability to function. The TRC is hamstrung if its goal is to overcome 
colonial relations between Crown and Aboriginal peoples as a part of reconciliation, as I 
argue reconciliation itself implies. This holds back the TRC from the role of catalyst it 
might otherwise play fostering a thoroughly decolonial reconciliation and overcoming the 
colonial relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples in Canada. 
 
Reconciliation in Context 
The historical context of colonisation and decolonisation are, further, helpful in wrestling 
with what reconciliation means in Canada, as the TRC was tasked with fostering 
reconciliation between the parties to the Agreement.22 I argue that reconciliation is an 
expansive concept and is linked to a thoroughgoing understanding and goal of 
decolonisation. Reconciliation would require substantive changes in Crown-Aboriginal 
relations, since reconciliation at a fundamental level involves justice and the righting of 
past wrongdoings.23 
 Following Schaap and Doxtader, I argue that reconciliation implies a political 
ethic of interaction that is based on elements of agonistic democracy. Reconciliation, as I 
                                                          
21 Gloria Galloway, “Ottawa Taken to Court Over Release of Residential-Schools Documents,” The Globe 
and Mail 3 Dec. 2012, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-taken-to-court-over-release-
of-residential-schools-documents/article5904543/ (accessed 30 Dec. 2012). In January 2013 an Ontario 
court ruled that the Federal Government is obliged to hand over all documents related to Indian Residential 
Schools (CBC News, “Ottawa Orders to Provide All Residential Schools Documents,” CBC News Jan. 30, 
2013,http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/story/2013/01/30/pol-cp-truth-reconciliation-
commission-documents.html (accessed 5 April 2013)). 
22 “Schedule ‘N,’” Indian Residential Schools Settlment Agreement, 1. 
23 Daniel Philpott, “An Ethic of Political Reconciliation,” Ethics and International Affairs vol.23, no. 4 
(Winter 2009), 390. 
252 
 
outline it, is a form of politics that is characterized by contingency and contestability.  It 
is an ethic that allows for the specifics of reconciliation to be dynamically worked out, 
without overdetermining the outcome. Applying this concept of reconciliation as a 
political ethic to Canada, I argue, highlights at least four aspect of the Canadian 
reconciliation project.  
 First, reconciliation will not and cannot be a painless activity. Exactly because of 
the state of exception that characterizes the post 1830-1850 Crown-Aboriginal 
relationship, a reconciliation process will need to reckon with how “Canada” has been 
constructed in the absence of Aboriginal peoples. This requires tough questions and 
reflection on historical motivations and actions. Moreover, given the size and scope of 
this historic wrong, even just in the case of the Indian Residential Schools system, 
adequately addressing this will be financially costly, and thus, to some, very painful. 
Beyond financial pain, reconciliation demands that Canadian seriously examine their 
history, which may prove psychologically painful. 
 Second, reconciliation requires (re)enactment. As a political ethic, reconciliation 
is an orientation or a mode of interaction. It requires that an agonistic approach be taken 
that admits contingency and contestability to the interaction. That is to say, it is a politics 
that sees the “other” as an adversary, rather than an enemy to be destroyed and takes 
seriously the ability of the process to produce something for all parties, not a site where a 
predetermined solution can be legitimized or sold. This means that political reconciliation 
does not merely do away with colonialism, but also replaces it in a continuing method of 
interaction and engagement. This is not a “quick fix” so much as a way of living together. 
 Third, reconciliation concerns non-Aboriginal Canadians, yet it cannot be all 
about non-Aboriginal Canadians. Related to the second aspect, interaction, I mean that 
reconciliation must be understood to require room for Aboriginal voices and perspectives. 
The Kelowna approach, for example, recognized the agency of Aboriginal peoples in 
identifying both problems and solutions within their own communities. Reconciliation 
requires that Aboriginal agency be recognized and not diminished by colonial 
stereotypes. Reconciliation concerns non-Aboriginal Canadians, especially the 
government, as it requires something of them. However, it is not all about non-Aboriginal 
Canadians or the Government of Canada.  The new relationship must be dialogical, rather 
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the old colonial monologue. This means overturning the paternalism that smacks of 
Rudyard Kippling’s “white man’s burden” in favour of a relationship that will make room 
to hear how Aboriginal peoples would address what issues there are within their own 
communities.  
 Last, Aboriginal peoples owe non-Aboriginal Canadians nothing. By this, I mean 
to point out that reconciliation cannot be read as a staged plan where A leads to B leads to 
C. Specifically, apology to a wronged group does not imply forgiveness by that wronged 
group, and contrition does not in itself lead to absolution. Reconciliation is a way of 
living, not a transactional economy where apology and compensation lead to a state of 
reconciliation. To think this way mistakes what is at stake in reconciliation. It must be 
clearly understood that the apology offered by Prime Minister Harper in 2008, the 
compensation and even the TRC, do not in themselves imply reconciliation.  
 These aspects of reconciliation in Canada are important to bear in mind, as the 
type of reconciliation that the TRC is meant to foster cannot be easily separated from the 
colonial experience as a whole. It is also clear that a political ethic of reconciliation 
containing these aspects is significantly decolonial as it aims to transcend a system of 
exclusion that has left Aboriginal peoples significantly outside the society, polity, and 
economy of a colonial Canada that was built around them.  
 
Assessing the TRC 
This project has sought to understand the genesis, function, and the work of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of Canada. In particular, I have been concerned with 
assessing whether the TRC represents a transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal 
relations, and towards what kind of relationship this might actually be a transformation.  
These questions are addressed directly in the Chapters Four and Five above.  
 In Chapter Seven, I argued that based on elite interviews and the analysis of 
government actions, reconciliation can be seen to represent this type of transformative 
opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations.  Some of those interviewed were critical of 
the government and identified important obstacles to the TRC representing a 
transformative opportunity, but not one person interviewed disputed that the creation and 
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working of the TRC as an improvement over previously employed mechanisms to resolve 
the Indian Residential School situation.  
 The two important obstacles that the TRC faces, as identified by the people whom 
I interviewed, were the failure of the TRC to reach the broader non-Aboriginal Canadian 
community and the lack of sincere commitment on the part of the Government of Canada, 
under Stephen Harper. Both of these shortcomings will impede the government if it takes 
a different action and a different approach in engaging with Aboriginal peoples. Without 
broad dissemination, the findings of the TRC will fail to inform the public and bring 
public attention to reconciliation. Without the government’s sincere commitment, 
because of the concentration of power in its hands, Crown-Aboriginal relations cannot 
change. If the government will not come to the table with an honest effort to change 
Crown-Aboriginal relations, then the old colonial paternalism will continue to the 
detriment of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.  
 It must be kept in mind that the TRC was created as a part of a court-monitored 
negotiated settlement that cancelled numerous individual and class legal actions against 
the Government of Canada and the churches that operated the schools. Even 
acknowledging that it is an imperfect solution, the TRC is considered by many to be part 
of a transformative opportunity. The simple answer to this first question asking if the 
TRC is a transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations is “yes.” While a 
sincere commitment on the part of government is a necessary condition for reconciliation, 
to take advantage of this transformative opportunity to make a change in Crown-
Aboriginal relations, it is not a sufficient condition for reconciliation. As the more 
powerful partner the government is key here; however, non-Aboriginal Canadians 
themselves are also needed to create a new relationship and ensure that it is lived out with 
integrity. There is more reason to hope for this commitment in light of the election of 
Justin Trudeau’s Liberals after my interviews. But, at the time of writing it is yet unclear 
if the new rhetoric of the Liberals will be met with serious action. 
  I addressed the second research question, towards what might this be a 
transformation, by analyzing interviewee responses, public statements made by 
Conservative politicians, and government action, to assess the type of relationship 
between Crown and Aboriginal peoples that might result from this transformative 
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opportunity. This question is a fruitful one to keep in mind, even in the absence of an 
outright answer. My goal in addressing the question is not to catalogue the possible 
outcomes, but rather discuss the ones raised in my interviews, assessing them in relation 
to a political ethic of reconciliation. While there is some reason to hope that the new 
relationship between Crown and Aboriginal peoples will be a thoroughly decolonial one 
based on an ethic of political reconciliation, it is far from clear that this will be the case. 
There is a significant danger that far from being a break with the colonial ethos of the 
Indian Residential School period, this relationship will be re-inscribed by the colonial 
paradigm.  
 The main reason for concern about the relationship that results from the 
transformative opportunity being re-inscribed with colonial attitudes, being a neo-
assimilationist approach, is the gap in how reconciliation is understood by those in power 
and those who are not in power. If reconciliation is directed only to the narrow instance 
of the IRS system, as it seems the Government of Canada under the leadership of Stephen 
Harper was committed to, then a whole array of related wrongs and adverse condition 
suffered by Aboriginal people will be left to be dealt with in the same “government-
knows-best” paternal way.  The public statements of some Conservatives, especially the 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, the understanding of reconciliation offered by 
bureaucrats, and also by the one Conservative interviewed, point to such a limited form 
of reconciliation, addressed to little more than the immediate impacts of the Indian 
Residential School system. Those whom I interviewed who were by then out of power, 
the Aboriginal leaders, Liberal privy councillors, and church representatives, 
characterized an expanded understanding of reconciliation. I have framed this distinction 
as between a limited reconciliation on the one hand, and a broad and deep reconciliation 
on the other. The main difference between these two views is the connection of the Indian 
Residential Schools system to a broader colonial project that sought to exclude, except, 
and destroy Aboriginality in Canada. By seeing the Indian Residential School system 
connected in this broader way, reconciliation becomes similarly broad and directed at the 
entire relationship, not just specific harms of one policy and its impact on Aboriginal 
communities. For a through reconciliation to emerge as following the Canadian TRC this 
more expansive view of the placement of the IRS system within a broader colonial 
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project is necessary, without it there is a very real danger that the paternalism of the 
colonial project will be left intact and Aboriginal peoples may be subject to a new and 
sophisticated effort to assimilate them into Canada. While the 2015 election of a Liberal 
government has given hope that a neo-assimilationist will be avoided, thus far it has 
offered little more than hope. If non-Aboriginal Canadians want to live in a just society, 
if they want to live up to the rhetoric of what Canada is, then beginning to change how 
the Crown deals with Aboriginal peoples is important. For the TRC to help contribute to 
positive change in this transformative opportunity the commission needs to be heard and 
government needs to come to the table. If the Crown is not moved, by this process or by 
its citizens, to deal honourably with Aboriginal peoples, then the TRC is little more than a 
screen discourse for the long-standing colonial goal of assimilation. The very real 
importance of this study is to point to the potential problems of the TRC and a process of 
reconciliation, in the context of opinions and analysis by elites who were intricately 
involved on the subject. In particular, for the idea of reconciliation in Canada, I have 
presented the opinions of many of the most influential leaders at the time of the TRC’s 
inception, giving a glimpse of how this mechanism was conceived and present a view 
against which to measure the current reality. Answering the question of where the TRC 
may be leading Crown-Aboriginal relations is not possible per se, but is a helpful guide 
in considering colonial pitfalls that this new relationship may want to avoid.  
 It is clear that some reform will be need on the part of the Canadian state. The 
Indigenous Affairs Department’s role and structure can be changed as First Nations are 
treated as legitimate orders of government. The limited of Crown legislative control of 
Aboriginal peoples needs to be rethought in order to take seriously their claims of 
integrity, sovereignty, and legitimacy. This cannot be done unilaterally as the White 
Paper suggested in 1996, but must be subject to thorough and honourable negotiation 
with Aboriginal peoples  
While it is my hope that the relationship will be one characterised by a political 
ethic of reconciliation, it is just that, a hope. But this question is an important one to bear 
in mind as the effects of the TRC continue to ripple out now that its work is done. As I 
undertake future research the second research question of this project will be important in 





This project is only a beginning. While I have given a context for the Indian Residential 
School system with a large colonial project and pointed out obstacles to the TRC 
contributing to a transformative opportunity in Crown-Aboriginal relations, there is much 
work left to be done in assessing the ongoing impact of reconciliation in Canada.  This 
dissertation contributes to the assessment of the Canadian TRC within its specific context 
and helps to understand the difficulties encountered and what possible difficulties the 
commission’s impact will face.  
 More broadly this project can help those who study and practice transitional 
justice understand the truth and reconciliation commission mechanism when used in 
colonial societies that have yet to go through a transition, or are in the midst of transition. 
The Canadian TRC is one of very few such uses of a TRC in a colonial society. However, 
as other colonial states seek to use this mechanism an amended approach is in order to 
reckon with colonial constellations of power. In the United States, the state of Maine has 
announced a TRC to deal with a history of child custody issues with the Wabanaki 
people.24 In such a setting, special care needs to be taken and the colonial structures that 
still exist need to be reckoned with to properly construct and assess a truth commission 
there.  
                                                          
24 Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “History and Background,” 
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1996:  Royal 
Commission of 
Aboriginal People 
issues final report  
 
1998: Statement of 
Reconciliation issued by 
then-minister Jane Stewart. 
.  
1998: Aboriginal Healing 
Foundation established 
with $350m healing fund. 
2004: It becomes increasingly 
clear that Alternative Dispute 
Resolution is not a workable 
solution for survivors and is 
not contributing to 
reconciliation. 
2005: Frank Iacobucci 
appointed by Federal 
Government to lead 
discussions on more 
workable approach to 
addressing the legacy of the 
Indian Residential School 
System. 
 
Nov. 2005: Agreement in 
Principal is signed 
Jan. 2006: Conservative minority 
government elected. 
 
May 2006: Indian Residential 
Schools Settlement Agreement 
signed. 
June 2008: Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper offers apology on 
behalf of all Canadians for Indian 
Residential School system. 
 
Oct. 2008: Conservatives win 
majority government. 
2009: Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
of Canada established under 
the leadership of Murray 
Sinclair, with Marie Wilson 
and Chief Wilton Littlechild. 
This was the second slate of 
Commissioners after the first 
proved dysfunctional. 
Oct. 2015: Liberal majority 
government won under the 
leadership of Justin Trudeau. 
 
Dec. 2015: Final report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation 











(1) The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of 
the past by- 
 
(a) establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the 
gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period from 1 
March 1960 to the cut-off date, including the antecedents, circumstances, factors and 
context of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and the motives 
and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of the violations, by 
conducting investigations and holding hearings; 
 
 
(b) facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the 
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and comply with 
the requirements of this Act; 
 
 
(c) establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of victims and by restoring 
the human and civil dignity of such victims by granting them an opportunity to relate 
their own accounts of the violations of which they are the victims, and by 
recommending reparation measures in respect of them; 
 
(d) compiling a report providing as comprehensive an account as possible of the 
activities and findings of the Commission contemplated in paragraphs (a) , (b) and (c) 








COUNCIL FOR ABORIGINAL RECONCILIATION ACT 1991 No. 127 of 1991 
(section 6) 
Functions 
6. (1) The functions of the Council are: 
 
   (a)  to undertake initiatives for the purpose of promoting reconciliation 
        between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the wider 
        Australian community, focusing in particular on the local community 
        level; and 
 
   (b)  to promote, by leadership, education and discussion, a deeper 
        understanding by all Australians of the history, cultures, past 
        dispossession and continuing disadvantage of Aborigines and 
        Torres Strait Islanders and of the need to redress that disadvantage; 
        and 
 
   (c)  to foster an ongoing national commitment to co-operate to address 
        Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage; and 
 
   (d)  to provide a forum for discussion by all Australians of issues 
        relating to reconciliation with Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders 
        and of policies to be adopted by Commonwealth, State, Territory and 
        local governments to promote reconciliation; and 
 
   (e)  to advise the Minister on policies to promote reconciliation between 
        Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the wider Australian 
        community; and 
 
   (f)  to provide information and advice to the Minister in accordance with 
        section 8; and 
 
   (g)  to consult Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the wider 
        Australian community on whether reconciliation would be advanced by a 
        formal document or formal documents of reconciliation; and 
 
   (h)  after that consultation, to report to the Minister on the views of 
        Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and of the wider Australian 
        community as to whether such a document or documents would benefit the 
        Australian community as a whole, and if the Council considers there 
        would be such a benefit, to make recommendations to the Minister on 
        the nature and content of, and manner of giving effect to, such a 
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        document or documents; and 
 
   (i)  to report, in the Council's annual report, on progress towards 
        reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and the 
        wider Australian community; and 
 
   (j)  in accordance with Part 3, to develop strategic plans that include a 
        statement of the Council's goals and objectives in the promotion of 
        the process of reconciliation and of its strategies for achieving 
        them, together with indicators and targets for measuring the Council's 
        performance in relation to those goals and objectives. 
 
(2) In carrying out its functions, the Council must: 
 
   (a)  have regard to the fact that the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
        Commission has, under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
        Commission Act 1989 , specific functions and responsibilities in 
        relation to matters involving Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders; 
        and 
 
   (b)  make use of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and 
        Regional Councils established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
        Islander Commission Act 1989 as the principal means of facilitating 
        consultation with Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders; and 
 
   (c)  co-operate with and consult Commonwealth, State, Territory and local 
        government bodies and other bodies and organisations, including 
        Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community-based organisations; 
        and 
 
   (d)  focus on the need to promote, at the local community level, the 
        process of reconciliation between Aborigines and 
        Torres Strait Islanders and the wider Australian community. 
 
(3) The Minister is to cause a copy of any recommendations made by the Council 
in performing its function under paragraph (1) (h) to be laid before each 
House of the Parliament within 15 sitting days of that House after they are 





Global Truth Commissions to Date 
Country Commission Name Date Struck
Algeria  Ad hoc Commission (Commission ad hoc) 2003
Argentina  National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, CONADEP) 1983
Australia Council on Aboriginal Reconciliation (1991) andThe National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families (1995)
1991, 1995
Bolivia  National Commission of Investigation of Disappeared Citizens (Comisión Nacional de Investigación de Ciudadanos 
Desaparecidos)
1982
Brazil National Truth Commission 2011
Burundi International Commission of Inquiry 1995
Burundi  National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Nationale pour la Vérité et Réconciliation)  2004 (not appointed)
Canada Qikiqtani Truth Commission 2007
Canada  Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2006
Chad  Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by the Ex-President,  His Accomplices and/or Accessories 
(Commission d'enquête sur les crimes et détournements commis par l'ex-Président,  ses co-auteurs et/ou complices)
1991
Chile  National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation (Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación) 1990
Chile  National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura) 2003
Colombia National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation 2005
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)  Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission vérité et réconciliation) 2004
Ecuador  Truth and Justice Commission (Comisión Verdad y Justicia) 1996
Ecuador  Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad) 2007
El Salvador  Commission of Truth (Comisión de la Verdad) 1992
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Komisija za istinu I pomirenje) 2001
Germany  Commission of Inquiry on Working through the History and Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in Germany (Enquete-
Kommission ‘Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen des SED-Diktatur in Deutschaland’)
1992
Germany  Commission of Inquiry on Overcoming the Consequences of the SED Dictatorship in the Process of German Unity 
(EnqueteKommission ’Uberwindung der Folgen des SED-Diktatur im Prozeß der deutschen Einheit’)
1995
Ghana  National Reconciliation Commission 2004
Grenada  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2001
Guatemala  Commission for Historical Clarification (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico) 1997
Haiti  National Commission for Truth and Justice (Commission Nationale de Vérité et de Justice) 1991
Indonesia  Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi,  KKR)  2004 (not appointed)
Kenya  Truth,  Justice and Reconciliation Commission 2008




Country Commission Name Date Struck
Mauritius Turht and Justice Commission 2009
Morocco and Western Sahara  Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance Equité et Réconciliation) 2004
Nepal  Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Panchayat Period 1990
Nigeria  Judicial Commission of Inquiry for the Investigation of Human Rights Violations 1999
Panama  Truth Commission (Comisión de la Verdad) 2001
Paraguay  Truth and Justice Commission (Comisión de Verdad y Justicia) 2003
Peru  Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación) 2003
Republic of Korea  Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths 2000
Republic of Korea  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2005
Serbia Yugoslav Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2000
Sierra Leone  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2000
Solomon Islands  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2008
South Africa  Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1995
South Africa Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Foermer African National Congress Prisoners and Detainees 1992
South Africa Commission of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelty and Human Rights Abuse against ANC Prisoners and Detainees by ANC 1979
Sri Lanka three regional Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons (Western, Southern and 
Sabaragamuwa Provinces; Central, North Western, North Central and Uva Provinces; Northern & Eastern Provinces)
1994
Timor Leste  Commission for Reception,  Truth and Reconciliation (Comissão de Acolhimento,  Verdade e Reconciliação, CAVR) 2005
Togo  Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (Commission Vérité,  Justice et Réconciliation) 2009
Tunisia Truth and Dignity Commission 2014
Uganda  Commission of Inquiry into the Disappearances of People 1974
Uganda  Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights 1986
Uruguay  Investigative Commission on the Situation of Disappeared People and its Causes (Comisión Investigadora sobre Situación de 
Personas Desaparecidas y Hechos que la Motivaron)
1985
Uruguay  Peace Commission (Comisión para la Paz) 2000
United States Greensboro Truth and Reocnciliation Commission 2004
United States Maine Wabanaki-State Child Welfare Turht and Reconciliation Commission 2012




Adapted from Amnesty International, Commissioning Justice: Truth Commissions and Criminal Justice, (London: Amnesty International, 2010) and Joanna R. 
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